JUDGMENT - D.K. DESHMUKH, J.:---By this petition the petitioner challenges the order dated 30th June, 1995 passed by the Industrial Court in Complaint (U.L.P.) No. 137 of 1994. The facts that are material and relevant, for deciding this petition are on 2-2-1994, the petitioner displayed a notice of lock-out with the statement of reasons stating therein their intention to effect the lock-out w.e.f. 21-2-1994. Though according to this notice, the lock-out was to be effective on 21-2-1994 the petitioner suspended work from 2-2-1994 itself. The reason given for suspension of work immediately on 2-2-1994 itself was the atmosphere of violence prevailing in the factory premises on that day. According to the petitioner, the petitioner was forced to suspend the work immediately from 2-2-1994 because it was not possible, due to the atmosphere of violence, to continue the manufacturing activity in the factory premises. The respondent No. 2 Union filed a Complaint under section 28(1) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1971") making a grievance against the suspension of work as also the lock-out. It transpires that after the complaint was filed and while it was pending, the petitioner withdrew the lock-out on 23rd March, 1994. The complaint was decided by the Industrial Court by its order dated 30th June, 1995. The Industrial Court set aside the lock-out notice dated 2-2-1994. The Industrial Court held that suspension of operations effected from 2-2-1994 amounts to illegal lock-out and unfair labour practices. It also held that the lock-out declared w.e.f. 21-2-1994 till it was lifted on 22-3-1994 is illegal. The Industrial Court directed the petitioner to consider about payment of full wages for the period from 21-3-1994 to the date of lifting of the lock-out i.e. 21-3-1994. In substance the Industrial Court held that because the lock-out was effected w.e.f. 2-2-1994 without issuing 14 days notice as required by law, lock-out effected from 2-2-1994 is illegal. It held that the defect of effecting lock-out without notice will also not be cured on expiry of the period of 14 days from 2-2-1994 and, therefore, the Industrial Court held that the entire period of lock-out commencing from 2-2-1994 is illegal.

2. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of (Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. G.R. Sapre and others)1, 1981 Lab.I.C. 221 submits that though the lock-out was commenced on 2-2-1994, continuance of that lock-out till the expiry of the period of 14 days notice may be held to be illegal. However, the period of lock-out after expiry of the period of 14 days from the date of the publication of the notice i.e. 2-2-1994, cannot be held to be illegal because after expiry of the period of 14 days the lock-out becomes a lock-out effected after complying with the provisions of the law. The learned Counsel further submits that the employer can also not be held liable for payment of wages for the period of 14 days when either there was an illegal lock-out, in the sense that the lock-out was effected without notice, or there was suspension of work without payment of full wages to the employees or workers because, according to the learned Counsel, the petitioner was forced to suspend the work and effect the lock-out from 2-2-1994 because of the atmosphere of violence created by the workers. The learned Counsel further submits that in any case the petitioner cannot be held solely responsible for the acts of violence that were admittedly committed in the factory premises and, therefore, the Industrial Court was not justified in directing the petitioner to pay full wages to the employees. According to the learned Counsel, the workers have also contributed to the circumstances due to which the atmosphere of violence was created and, therefore, at least a part of their wages for the per

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