The main legal point established in the judgment is that the definition of 'holding' under the Maharashtra Resettlement of Project Displaced Persons Act, 1976 includes land held by a person as an occupant or tenant, and the court's interpretation of the definitions of 'occupant' and 'to hold land' under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 influenced the decision regarding the inclusion of mortgaged land in the total holding of the petitioners.

Headnote:
Land Acquisition - Challenge to Acquisition - Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Maharashtra Resettlement of Project Displaced Persons Act, 1976 - Section 4, Section 6 - Summary of Acts and Sections: The court discussed the relevant provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Maharashtra Resettlement of Project Displaced Persons Act, 1976. It focused on the definition of 'holding' under section 2(10) of the Act of 1976 and the restrictions on transfer, sub-division, or partition of land in the benefited zone under section 12. The court also considered the power of the State Government to acquire land for resettling displaced persons under section 16(4) and the size of the holding under Clause (b) of Part II of Schedule A, and the proviso thereto. The court interpreted the definitions of 'occupant' and 'to hold land' under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966, to determine the applicability of the provisions to the case.
Fact of the Case:

The petitioners challenged the acquisition of their land for the resettlement of Dudhaganga Project affected persons. They argued that their total holding, including mortgaged land, did not exceed the limit prescribed under the Maharashtra Resettlement of Project Displaced Persons Act, 1976. The court considered whether the mortgaged land should be included in the total holding and whether the restoration of possession of the suit land in the execution proceedings was hit by the provisions of the Act of 1976.
Finding of the Court:

The court found that the suit land was rightly included in the petitioners' holding as they were in lawful possession of the land as mortgagees. It also held that the restoration of possession of the suit land in the execution proceedings was not hit by the provisions of section 12 of the Act of 1976. After excluding the suit land, the court found that the petitioners' holding exceeded the limit under Clause (b) of Part II of Schedule A, making the surplus holding liable for acquisition.
Issues: The issues before the court were whether the suit lands should be included in the total holding of the petitioners and whether the restoration of possession of the suit land in the execution proceedings was hit by the provisions of section 12 of the Act of 1976.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the suit land was rightly included in the petitioners' holding as they were in lawful possession of the land as mortgagees. It also found that the restoration of possession of the suit land in the execution proceedings was not hit by the provisions of section 12 of the Act of 1976. After excluding the suit land, the court found that the petitioners' holding exceeded the limit under Clause (b) of Part II of Schedule A, making the surplus holding liable for acquisition.
Final Decision: The petition was allowed, and the notice under section 4 and section 6 notification regarding the land Gat No. 1551 were quashed and set aside. The rule was made absolute accordingly, and no costs were awarded.

JUDGMENT - D.B. BHOSALE, J.:---The petitioners seek to challenge the acquisition of their land for the purposes of resettlement of Dudhaganga Project affected persons. The petitioners have also prayed for quashing and setting side of the notice under section 4, dated 9th August, 1990 and section 6 notification of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, "Act of 1894"), as published in the newspaper on 29th November, 1990 qua their land Gat No. 1551 admeasuring 81 ares, situate at village Abdul-Late, taluka Shirol, District Kolhapur.

2. Now, before we look at the relevant provisions and consider the challenge made, it would be perhaps better just to state briefly what credentials of the petitioners are and what is the ground for this petition. The petitioners are the heirs and legal representatives of the original landlords Ramgonda Patil. According to the petitioners, their total holding is within the permissible limit and not liable to be acquired under the provisions of the Maharashtra Resettlement of Project Displaced Persons Act, 1976 (for short "Act of 1976"). Though the petitioners filed their objections under section 5-A of the Act of 1894, against the proposed acquisition of the said land and raised several objections, they have restricted their challenge in the present writ petition only on the ground that the mortgaged land in their possession cannot be clubbed with their other lands, while determining the total holding of the petitioners for the purposes of the Act of 1976.

The petitioners have contended that one Shripat Rayande and Gopal Rayande had mortgaged their lands admeasuring 2 hectares and 66 ares to the petitioner's father Ramgonda Patil and put him in possession thereof as a mortgagee. In 1968, Civil Suit No. 6 of 1968 was filed by the said Rayande for redemption of the mortgage and possession of the land Gat Nos. 1342, 1353 and 1368 admeasuring 2 hectares and 66 ares (for short, "the suits lands"). The suit was decreed in 1968 itself and the first appeal carried by the petitioners in this Court, bearing First Appeal No. 540 of 1969, was dismissed and the decree was confirmed.

Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order passed in the first appeal, the petitioners preferred Civil Appeal No. 750 of 1973 before the Apex Court. The Apex Court dismissed the said appeal by its judgment and order dated 22nd April, 1988. It appears that the said Rayande, thereafter, obtained, possession of the suit land on 3rd January, 1989 in the execution proceedings, being Special Darkhast proceeding No. 42 of 1973.

Further, it is the case of the petitioner that Regular Civil Suit No. 137 of 1978 was filed for partition and separate possession and it was decreed on 16th December, 1978 and petitioner No. 2 was given one hectare and 69 ares and petitioner No. 2 was allotted 2 hectares and 93 ares of the lands and in view thereof, no land of either of the petitioners is liable to be acquired under the provisions of the Act of 1976.

3. The argument advanced by Mr. Ingale, learned Counsel for the petitioners is of two-fold. Firstly, that the suit lands were wrongly included in the total holding of the petitioners, resultantly, their total holding has crossed the higher limit prescribed under the Act of 1976. The higher limit fixed in the present petition under Clause (b) of Part II of Schedule A, of the Act of 1976, was 3 hectares and 23.75 ares, i.e. 8 acres. According to the petitioners, the mortgage land in their occupation, is not covered within the definition of "holding" under section 2(10) of the Act of 1976 and, therefore, they cannot be termed as "occupants" of the suit lands within the meaning thereof. Secondly, he contended that restoration of possession of the suit lands to the original landlord in the Darkhast proceedings is not hit by section 12 of the Act of 1976, and, according to him, as on the date of issuance of the notification under section 4 of the Act of 1894, the petitioners had already surrendered the suit

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