JUDGMENT - J.A. PATIL, J.:---The plaintiffs have taken out this chamber summons and prayed for setting aside the order dated 20th October, 2000 passed by the learned Taxing Master, High Court, Mumbai directing the plaintiffs to pay Court fee of Rs. 75,000/- on prayer (f) of the plaint. The learned Taxing Master overruled the plaintiffs' contention that the suit falls under section 6(iv)(j) of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959 (for short, the Act) and ruled that it falls under Article 7 of Schedule I of the said Act. It is the plaintiffs contention that the subject-matter of the suit is not susceptible to the monetary evaluation. They have, therefore, paid the Court fees on the footing that the value of the subject-matter of the suit is Rs. 600/- under section 6(iv)(j) of the Act. The short question which therefore, arises for the decision in this chamber summons is whether the present suit falls under section 6(iv)(j) of the Act or under Article 7 of Schedule I of the Act.

2. In (Gulam Mohamed Mohamed Yunus v. Lalchand Chellaram others)1, A.I.R. 1976 Bombay 389, the Division Bench of this Court has pointed out the distinction between the provisions of section 6(iv)(j) and Article 7 of Schedule I of the Act and observed that section 6(iv)(j), contemplates suits where the subject-matter in dispute is not susceptible of monetary evaluation and where the suit is not otherwise provided for by the Act. Whereas Article 7 of the Schedule I on the other hand refers to the obtaining of substantive relief capable of being valued in terms of monetary gain or prevention of monetary loss. It was pointed out that whereas section 6(iv)(j) lays down emphasis on the subject-matter of the suit. Article 7 of Schedule I lays emphasis on the substantive reliefs claimed. The Division Bench laid down guidelines for assessing the prayers made in the plaint and observed that the recitals in the plaint should be looked into to find out what relief is substantively prayed for. The next step would be to find out whether such relief is or is not capable of being valued in terms of money value or at least loss to be occasioned could be estimated in money value. It was held that if any suit satisfied the element of Article 7, it would automatically be out of the purview of section 6(iv)(j). It will therefore, be necessary to take a cursory look on the recitals made by the plaintiffs as well as the reliefs claimed by them.

3. The first plaintiff is a company incorporated under the laws of Liberia and was at the relevant time owner of a Panama Flag Vessel m.v. “Cordigliera”. The second plaintiff was at the material time, the agent of plaintiff No. 1. The defendants are claimed to be the legal heirs/next-of-kin/nominees/dependents of the officers and crew members who were employed on board of the said vessel at the material time under the individual employment contracts. The said vessel after loading cargo on 13-11-1996, left the port of Durban for Cape Town in South Africa but after departing from Durban, she sank off the coast of Durban on the same day with all the officers, crew members and the cargo. The plaintiffs claim that the said vessel was fit and seaworthy in all respects. But the sinking of the said vessel was on account of Vis Majeure/Force Majeure and that the plaintiffs were not at all at any fault nor they were guilty of any negligence. It is the plaintiffs case that the officers and crew members were entitled to their balance wages as on 13-11-1996. The individual employment contracts of the crew members provide for the amount of compensation in the event of death/loss of life of the crew members, payable to the next of kin/nominees of the crew members as per the National Maritime Board (NMB) Agreement. As far as the officers are concerned, their employment contract do not provide any amount for compensation and therefore, the plaintiffs claim that they have no liability to pay any compensation for the deaths of the officers. However, on compas

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