IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
C.K. Thakker, C.J. S. Radhakrishnan, J.
BASF Styrenics Private Limited .... Appellant.
Versus
Offshore Industrial Construction Pvt. Ltd. another.... Respondents.
Appeal No. 72 of 2002 in Arbitration Petition No. 613 of 2001, decided on 18-2-2002.
Advocates appeared :
S.H. Doctor with S.Y. Doijode i/b., Raval Shah Co., for appellant.
S.U. Kamdar i/b. V.L. Panjuwani, for respondent No. 1.
Jurisdiction - Arbitration - Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 13(5), 16, 37 - The court discussed the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, particularly sections 13(5), 16, and 37, and highlighted the competence of the Arbitral Tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction, the procedure for challenging the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, and the availability of judicial review for challenging the award.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant filed an arbitration petition contending that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute. The learned Single Judge held that the petition was premature and could only be challenged after an Award was made by the arbitrator.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the learned Single Judge's decision did not commit any error of law and/or jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
Issues: The issues included the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, the timing for challenging the jurisdiction, and the alleged bias of the arbitrator.
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized the competence of the Arbitral Tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction, the procedure for challenging the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, and the availability of judicial review for challenging the award.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed with no costs.
2. The appellant, which was the petitioner before the learned Single Judge, filed the above petition, inter alia, contending that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute. The learned Single Judge, considering the rival contentions of the parties, and keeping in mind the relevant provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ("the Act", for short), held that the petition was premature. It was open to the petitioner to take appropriate proceedings only after an Award would be made by the arbitrator. The said decision is challenged by the appellant in the present appeal.
3. The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that when a plea was raised by the appellant-petitioner before the learned Single Judge that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction in the matter, the contention ought to have been dealt with and decided. It is only at that stage that the contention is expected to be raised. If it is well-founded, the proceedings cannot be continued further. By not deciding the point, the learned Judge has committed an error of jurisdiction, and the order deserves to be quashed and set aside.
4. The learned Counsel for respondent No. 1, on the other hand, submitted that the learned Single Judge was right in considering the provisions of the Act, and particularly sections 13(5), 16 and 37 of the Act, and the order does not require interference.
5. Now, section 16 speaks of competence of Arbitral Tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction. In our opinion, the law is well-settled and it is this. Whereas a Civil Court has inherent power to decide the question of its own jurisdiction, a Tribunal or an authority constituted under a relevant statute has to confine its jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of an Act. There are two classes of cases coming before an authority or Tribunal constituted by an Act, as observed in (Chaube Jagdish Prasad another v. Ganga Prasad Chaturvedi)1, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 492 : (i) where the legislature entrusts a Tribunal with the jurisdiction, including the jurisdiction, to determine whether the preliminary state of facts on which the exercise of its jurisdiction depends exists; and (ii) where the legislature confers jurisdiction on such Tribunals to proceed in a case where a certain state of facts exists or is shown to exist.
6. The Supreme Court then proceeded to state :
"The difference is that in the former case the Tribunal has power to determine the facts giving it jurisdiction and in the latter case it has only to see that a certain state of facts exists."
From the above decision, it is clear that if a statute confers jurisdiction on a Tribunal or an authority as to existence of certain state of facts, by deciding those facts wrongly, a Tribunal or authority does not confer upon itself jurisdiction which it otherwise does not possess. But where the legislature confers jurisdiction on such Tribunal or authority to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists and then to exercise such jurisdiction, it has also power to decide those facts and to proceed with the matter for holding that it has jurisdiction. Such a finding, therefore, cannot be challenged by a writ of certiorari see (Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh another)2, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1621.
7. So far as the Act is concerned, section 16 confers jurisdiction on Arbitral Tribunal. Sub-section (1) specifically declares that the Arbitral Tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including an objection with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, etc. Sub-section (2) states that the plea that the Arbitral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised at a particular stage.
8. Sub-sections (5) and (6) are relevant and they read as under :---
"(5) The Arbitral Tribunal shall decide on a plea referred to in sub-secti
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