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2002 Supreme(Bom) 457

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
R.J. Kochar, J.
Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai .... Petitioners.
Versus
Sunder Rao B. Shinde others.... Respondents.
Writ Petition No. 2393 of 1996, decided on 3-6-2002.
Advocates appeared :
S.K. Talsania i/b. Crawford Bayley Company, for petitioners.
N.M. Ganguli, for respondents.

The central legal point established is that an employer's decision based on sufficient medical evidence and in compliance with binding terms does not constitute unfair labour practice.

Headnote:

M.R.T.U. P.U.L.P. Act - Unfair Labour Practice - Section 28, Section 30, Section 44 - Schedule IV - Item 1(b)

Fact of the Case:

The respondent employee, a bus driver, was terminated due to being medically unfit after an accident resulting in the loss of his thumb. The Labour Court held the termination as unfair labour practice under Item 1(b) of Schedule IV of the M.R.T.U. P.U.L.P. Act.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the termination was not an act of unfair labour practice as the employer acted bona fide based on medical evidence and was bound by an Award prohibiting offering alternate employment in similar circumstances.

Issues: The main issue was whether the termination of the employee constituted unfair labour practice under the M.R.T.U. P.U.L.P. Act.

Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized that the employer's decision was based on sufficient medical evidence and was in compliance with the Award, thus not constituting unfair labour practice.

Final Decision: The court quashed and set aside the orders of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court, holding that the termination was not an act of unfair labour practice.

JUDGMENT - R.J. KOCHAR, J.:---The petitioners, in Writ Petition No. 2393 of 1996, the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, a body corporate under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 is aggrieved by the judgments and orders passed by the Labour Court and the Industrial Court under the provisions of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as “the M.R.T.U. P.U.L.P. Act”) holding that the petitioners had engaged in unfair labour practice under Item 1(b) of Schedule IV of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act and directing the petitioners to give alternative job to the respondent employee or to pay a sum of Rs. 60,000/- as compensation to him. The Labour Court has passed this order in the complaint of unfair labour practices filed by the respondent employee against the petitioner in exercise of its powers under section 28 read with section 30 of the M.R.T.U. P.U.L.P. Act. The petitioners were aggrieved by the said order and, therefore, they filed a revision application under section 44 of the M.R.T.U. P.U.L.P. Act before the President, Industrial Court, Maharashtra, Mumbai. The learned President by the impugned order confirmed the order of the Labour Court and dismissed the revision application filed by the petitioner. It would be convenient to mention at this stage itself that even the respondent employee was aggrieved by the order of the Labour Court, as he had prayed for reinstatement with full backwages and continuity of service on the ground that the impugned order of discharged passed by the petitioner, was an act of unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the M.R.T.U. P.U.L.P. Act. It appears that the said revision application, on account of peculiar events and developments, was heard by another member of the Industrial Court and by order dated 24th June, 1999, the same was dismissed. The respondent employee has also challenged the aforesaid order of the Industrial Court by way of Writ Petition No. 2298 of 1999.

2. I have heard both the petitions together. The facts are in a very narrow compass. The respondent employee was employed by the petitioner as a driver of the bus. He had put in six years of service. It appears that on 24th February, 1987, the employee met with an accident which was not in any way connected with the employment or his work. It is not the case of the petitioner that the employee had sustained injury during the course of and arising out of employment. Admittedly, there was no accident by him while driving the bus. It appears that he had some injury outside the course of his employment. It further appears from the medical certificate that on account of the aforesaid accident the right thumb had to be amputed and which injury was assessed by the G.T. Hospital as permanent disability of 30%. It is also on record that the employee was examined by the Senior Medical Officer of the petitioner undertaking on 17th July, 1987 as he was referred to him for medical test and fitness to drive the vehicle. It appears that the Senior Medical Officer by his certificate dated 17th July, 1987 certified the employee to be medically unfit and invalid as a bus driver. He has also observed in his certificate that the employee suffered from traumatic amputation of a right thumb with poor grip as a consequence of which he became invalid to be employed as a bus driver. Acting on the aforesaid medical certificate, the General Manager of the BEST undertaking passed the order dated 5th August, 1987 under Standing Order No. 26(2) discharging the employee from his duties on account of his being unfit on the ground of his disability.

3. The respondent employee was aggrieved by the aforesaid order of termination passed by the General Manager of the petitioner BEST undertaking. He also appears to have filed two internal departmental appeals before the prescribed higher authorities but he failed at both the stages.

4.












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