JUDGMENT - Dr. CHANDRACHUD D.Y., J.:---Rule returnable forthwith. Learned Counsel for the respondent waives service. By consent taken up for hearing and final disposal.

2. A decree for eviction under the Rent Act has been passed under section 13(1)(b) and 13(1)(l). The judgment of the trial Court was confirmed in appeal by the Additional District Judge, Solapur.

3. The question as to whether a ground for eviction under section 13(1)(l) has been made out can be taken up first. Section 13(1)(l) operates where the tenant after coming into operation of the Act has built or acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a suitable residence. The alternative accommodation in the present case admittedly stands in the name of the tenant's wife. The trial Court recorded that the tenant has admitted that he was residing with his wife in a joint family and that his wife was "doing nothing". Presumably by the expression "doing nothing" (which to my mind is inappropriate) what the learned trial Judge meant is that the wife of the tenant had no independent means of her own. With the assistance of the learned Counsel, I have perused the evidence of the tenant to determine whether there was any evidence or admission to that effect. Upon a perusal of the evidence, it does appear that there is no such admission on the part of the tenant as noted by the trial Court. Counsel for the respondent laid emphasis on the statement of the tenant in his examination-in-chief that the livelihood of the family of tenant depended on the shop which was being conducted by the tenant. However, prima facie, it appears that no case was put to the tenant to the effect that the acquisition in the present case was by the tenant himself though in the name of his wife. There was no line of cross-examination on the source of funds through which the premises came to be acquired by the tenant; atleast none has been placed before the Court during the course of the hearing. The Appellate Court has not considered the question as whether the acquisition of the premises by the wife of the tenant could be treated as an acquisition by the tenant himself within the meaning of section 13(1)(l) of the Rent Act.

4. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a number of judgments on the interpretation which should be placed on a provision akin to section 13(1)(l). A learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in a judgment delivered on 28th November, 1969 in (Smt. Revti Devi v. Kishan Lal)1, 1970 All India Rent Control Journal 417 adverted to the provisions of section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The learned Single Judge held that there was no law according to which a husband and wife could be deemed to be one person. Therefore, where the provision requires that the tenant himself should acquire vacant possession of another residence before he is liable to eviction, the force of its language cannot be whittled down by arguing that the proviso would apply even if, not the tenant himself but his wife or other relation had acquired another residence. The next judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in (V.K. Malhotra v. Smt. Ranjit Kaur)2, 1985(1) All India Rent Control Journal 250 arose under section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in (Prem Chand v. Sher Singh)3, 1981(2) D.R.J. 287 in which it was held that the tenant had through his wife acquired vacant possession of a residence in Delhi and that a ground for eviction was consequently made out. The earlier judgment in Revti Devi was considered in the subsequent judgment of the Delhi High Court in V.K. Malhotra's case (supra) and the learned Single Judge held that in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Premchand's case (supra), it is the law laid by the Supreme Court which would have to be followed.

5. In so far as this Court is concerned, in (Indulal Ranchoddas Shah v. Ramprasad Mahadeorao Gite)4, 1992

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