IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Thakker C.K., C.J. Smt. Desai Ranjana, J.
Anil Vasantrao Shirpurkar .... Petitioner.
Versus
State of Maharashtra through its Secretary others.... Respondents.
Writ Petition No. 3701 of 2002, decided on 12-7-2002.
Advocates appeared :
R.K. Mendadkar, for petitioner.
C.R. Sonawane, A.G.P., for respondents 1 2.
A.S. Rao, for respondent 3.
Termination from Service -Where services of employee terminated and proceedings initiated on the ground that he did not belong to Scheduled Tribe, it was found that he was appointed in 1994 and was regularized in 1996, the proceedings initiated five years thereafter, since the proceedings were not initiated within reasonable period, the action taken will not be sustainable. Therefore, the proceedings quashed
2. The petitioner has approached this Court as an order was passed against him terminating the services. The petitioner was granted caste certificate as belonged to Dhoba (ST) on 17th December, 1991. On the basis of said certificate, the petitioner obtained job with Kalyan Dombivali Municipal Corporation respondent 3 herein as a Pharmacist on 9th of August, 1994. The services of the petitioner were regularised on 8th of August, 1996, as he had successfully completed his probation period of two years. Thereafter also, nothing was done by the respondents. It was stated that only on 1st of July, 2001 i.e. after the petitioner completed about seven years of service, it was alleged that the petitioner did not belong to Scheduled Tribe and proceedings were initiated.
3. As soon as the petitioner came to know about initiation of proceedings, he instituted a petition but no interim order was passed. Meanwhile when the matter was sub-judice, the respondent No. 3 passed an order on 9th of July, 2002 terminating the services of the petitioner on the ground that he did not belong to Schedule Tribe. In an affidavit in reply, the said order has been brought on record.
4. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties.
5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the proceedings were not initiated within "reasonable time". An order was passed on July 9, 2002 when the matter was sub-judice and thus there is colourable exercise of power on the part of the respondents.
6. It was also contended that the committee constituted by the State could not be said to be an "expert committee" as directed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (Kumari Madhuri Patil another v. Additional Commissioner Tribal Development, Thane others)1, 1995(2) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)690.
7. On merits, it was submitted that the petitioner belongs to Dhoba community which is a Scheduled Tribe. The learned Counsel stated that great prejudice will be caused to the petitioner, if at this stage, his services would be terminated, as he is age barred for Government and Semi Government services. He, therefore, submitted that petitioner deserves to be allowed by quashing and setting aside the impugned order.
8. The learned Counsel for the respondents 1 2 supported the order. It was submitted that the petitioner did not belong to Dhoba community and when the appointment was made on that basis, he was not eligible to get appointment. An action, therefore, has been taken. It was stated that the order which is otherwise legal and valid cannot be objected to by the petitioner on the ground that there was delay by the respondents.
9. Regarding constitution of committee, it was submitted that the constitution was legal and lawful. Therefore, it was submitted that the petition deserves to be dismissed.
10. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is not necessary to go into a larger question. It is clear from the record and not controverted by the respondents that the petitioner joined the services of respondent No. 3 on August 9, 1994. He completed the probation period of two years and had been made regular with effect from 8th August, 1996. It is only in July, 2001 i.e. after about seven years of service and after about five years of regularisation that the proceedings were initiated. The question, therefore, is whether such a period can be said to be "reasonable period" to initiate proceedings against the petitioner.
11. In the leading decision in (State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha others)2, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1297, the Supreme Court held that the power of revision must be exercised within reasonable period. So far as reasonable period is concerned, it depends upon the scheme of the Act, nature of action li
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