JUDGMENT - REBELLO F.I., J.:---The petitioners by the present petition have invoked the provisions of section 9 of the Arbitration Conciliation Act, 1996. The contract was entered into on 18th December, 2000. There is no dispute that the contract was entered into at Chennai. There is also no dispute that none of the respondents are residing or having their offices or carrying on business within the jurisdiction of this Court. The only argument advanced at the hearing of the petition is that the letter of termination in respect of the subject-matter of the contract was issued from Mumbai. There is a clause in the agreement under which it is set out that the courts in Mumbai alone shall have exclusive jurisdiction. It is, therefore, contended on behalf of the petitioners herein that this Court would have jurisdiction to hear, entertain and decide this application relying on the judgments of the Apex Court in (Hakam Singh v. M/s. Gammon (India) Ltd.)1, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 740 and (A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. another v. A.P. Agencies, Salem)2, 1989(2) S.C.C. 1643. Reliance is also placed on the judgment in (Globe Transport Corporation v. Triveni Engineering Works)3, 1983(4) S.C.C. 707.

On the other hand on behalf of the respondents their learned Counsel contends that notwithstanding the clause in the contract which provides for conferring of jurisdiction on this Court as no part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court this Court would have no jurisdiction. Parties it is contended, cannot confer jurisdiction on the Court which it does not have. It is also pointed out that the petition under section 9 by the petitioner herein could have only been maintained if the predicates of explanation to section 20 of the C.P.C. were met. In the instant case the petitioners, it is contended carry on business at Chennai and also have an office down there. The agreement was entered into at Chennai and consequently considering the explanation to section 20 it will be the Court at Chennai which would have jurisdiction. Learned Counsel relied upon the judgment in the case of (M/s. Patel Roadways Ltd. v. M/s. Prasad Trading Company)4, 1992(1) Bom.C.R. 456

2. With the above the controversy in issue may be decided. The provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and the corresponding provisions of the Letters Patent of this Court govern the provisions as to jurisdiction. Therefore, on the facts of this case and the arguments advanced considering the ouster clause as contained in Clause 7.6 would this Court have exclusive jurisdiction? It may be pointed out that under Clause 7.5 arbitration shall be held in Mumbai. The place of Arbitration, however, does not confer jurisdiction on the Court. That jurisdiction would be considering the definition of Court under section 2(e) of the Act of 1996. The Court therein must mean the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the arbitration, if the same had been the subject matter of suit and includes the High Court in exercise of its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction. Therefore, the test to be applied is could the plaintiff have instituted the suit before this Court in respect of the cause of action pleaded by them. The jurisdiction must be in respect of the subject matter and not pecuniary jurisdiction. The territorial jurisdiction would come into play while considering which is the Court of Principal Original Civil Jurisdiction in the district. For the purpose of deciding the controversy we may address ourselves to the judgments of the Apex Court to find out if the matter stands concluded or is still open for consideration. Hakam Singh v. Gammon (India) Ltd. (supra) was a case before the amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure by the amendment Act of 1976. In that case the arbitral clause contained a provision that the contract shall be deemed to have been entered into by the parties in th

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