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2002 Supreme(Bom) 961
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
R.J. Kochar, J.
Ramchandra Narayan Rao .... Petitioner.
Versus
Sub-Divisional Officer, Mandur
Madhameshwar Project others.... Respondents.
Writ Petition No. 195 of 2000, decided on 6-9-2002.
Advocates appeared :
S.A. Sawant, for petitioner.
C.R. Sonawane, A.G.P., for defendants Nos. 1 2.
Headnote:Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Section 25-F - Continuous employment - Calculation of 240 days - Sundays and public holidays are included - With actual working days preceding one year from date of termination. - The well-known judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of the Workmen of American Express International Banking Corporation v. Management of American Express International Banking Corporation reported in AIR 1986 SC 458. The Supreme Court was dealing with the same point of interpretation of "continuous employment". The Supreme Court has repelled the contention of employer to exclude while counting 240 days the Sundays and holidays. The Supreme Court observed that the expression "actually worked" will have to be interpreted to mean that the concerned workman was in service and that he worked during that period including the Sundays and holidays which were also to be counted. The Supreme Court has observed that actually work does not mean that he should have reported for work with sickle, hammer and pen. The expression necessarily comprehend all those days during which he was in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders, etc. Following the aforesaid law laid down by the Supreme Court the Labour Court has rightly concluded that the petitioner had completed continuous employment of more than 240 days in the preceding 12 months from 3.7.1987. The computation of the number of days which is given by the respondents has to be accepted as correct. From that computation the Labour Court has come to a conclusion of fact that during the aforesaid period he had worked for more than 240 days and therefore, he was in continuous employment to get the benefit of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act. The Labour Court has rightly concluded the fact that the petitioner had completed 240 days of continuous employment following the judgment of the Supreme Court. The Labour Court was also within its jurisdiction to hold that the respondent had violated Section 25-F of the I.D. Act. The Labour Court was therefore right in directing the reinstatement with full backwages and continuity of service which is the normal rule.
2. However, in the present petition I am concerned with the impugned order passed by the Industrial Court on 22-10-1999 in Revision Application No. 177 of 1997 under section 44 of the M.R.T.U. P.U.L.P. Act, 1971. By the impugned order the learned member of the Industrial Court has reversed the order of the Labour Court dated 8-7-1997 whereby the learned Labour Judge had allowed the complaint filed by the petitioner employee and he was granted reinstatement with full backwages and continuity of service. This is the later portion of the events with which we are immediately concerned. However, earlier the petitioner had filed a complaint of Unfair Labour Practices complaining against the respondents that his services were terminated on and from 3-2-1987 illegally, improperly and in violation of the mandatory provisions of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. By its order dated 18-3-1996 the Labour Court had dismissed the complaint. The petitioner was aggrieved by the said order of the Labour Court, and therefore he preferred a Revision Application under section 44 of the Act before the Industrial Court. By its order dated 3-6-1997 the learned member of the Industrial Court reversed the said order of the Labour Court and remanded matter back to the Labour Court for fresh hearing and fresh decision in accordance with law. After remand the Labour Court allowed the complaint by its order dated 8-7-1997. This time the Industrial Court dismissed the complaint by reversing the order of the Labour Court. The petitioner is aggrieved by the last order of the Industrial Court dated 22-10-1999.
3. I have gone through the entire proceedings very carefully. I have also heard both the learned Counsel on both the sides at length. The nub of the petitioners complaint before the labour Court was that his services were terminated with effect from 3-7-1987 in violation of section 25-F of the I.D. Act, 1947. According to him no retrenchment compensation was offered and no wages in lieu of notice were offered. The respondents had contested the complaint and had contended that the petitioner was employed on daily wage from 22-9-1980
