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2002 Supreme(Bom) 1137
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Radhakrishnan S., J.
R.A. Yadav others .... Petitioners.
Versus
Special Steels Ltd. another.... Respondents.
Writ Petition No. 3360 of 1997, decided on 18-10-2002.
Advocates appeared :
S.C. Naidu with Jaiprakash Pawar S.B. Singh, for petitioners.
Kuldeep Singh, for respondent No. 1.
Headnote:Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - As clearly indicated hereinabove, apart from the oral evidence on record of the parties, the parties also relied upon documentary evidence, namely, settlement dated 16.8.1984 entered upon between the union on one hand and the respondent on the other hand wherein the petitioners are members in no uncertain terms stated in clause 1(i) that the workman includes "D-2" category apart from other categories and D-2 category also clearly indicates scrap inspector as the workman. Therefore, the employer has clearly accepted the petitioners also to be in the workman category. Over and above, the evidence on record clearly indicates the type of work rendered by the petitioners of preparing of charge mix wherein the petitioners seek the assistance of crane operator and while seeking assistance of crane operator, the petitioners give them hand signals to indicate the quantity of material for the purpose of mixing the charge. By indicating the hand signals to the crane operator, the scrap inspector does not become a supervisor as contemplated under the Act, 1947. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the Industrial Court ought not to have reappreciated the evidence on record and given a different finding when a clear detailed finding is given by the Labour Court which is based on evidence and which cannot be said to be perverse and the Industrial Court ought not to have exercised its jurisdiction under Section 44 of the Act, 1971 and interferred with the same. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the impugned order passed by the Industrial Court dated 8.7.1997 cannot be sustained in law at all, hence liable to be quashed and set-aside. Accordingly, rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b) with costs. Writ to go forthwith to the III Labour Court at Thane.
Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 - Section 44 - Revision - Revisional powers of Industrial Court - Clear detailed finding given by Labour Court - Based on oral and documentary evidence - Not perverse - Petitioner accepted to be in workman category - Industrial Court erroneously exercised its jurisdiction under Section 44 in interferring with finding of Labour Court - Order passed by Industrial Court not sustainable - Set-aside. - In the facts and circumstances of this case, as clearly indicated hereinabove, apart from the oral evidence on record of the parties the parties also relied upon documentary evidence, namely, settlement dated 16.8.1984 entered upon between the union on one hand and the respondent on the other hand wherein the petitioners are members in no uncertain terms stated in Clause 1 (i) that the workman includes "D-2" category apart from other categories and D-2 category also clearly indicates scrap inspector as the workman. Therefore, the employer has clearly accepted the petitioners also to be in the workman category. Over and above, the evidence on record clearly indicates the type of work rendered by the petitioners of preparing of charge mix wherein the petitioners seek the assistance of crane operator and while seeking assistance of crane operator, the petitioners give them hand signals to indicate the quantity of material for the purpose of mixing the charge. By indicating the hand signals to the crane operator, the scrap inspector does not become a supervisor as contemplated under the Act, 1947. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the Industrial Court ought not to have reappreciated the evidence on record and given a different finding when a clear detailed finding is given by the Labour Court which is based on evidence and which cannot be said to be perverse and the Industrial Court ought not to have exercised its jurisdiction under Section 44 of the Act, 1971 and interfered with the same. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the impugned order passed by the Industrial Court dated 8.7.1997 cannot be sustained in law at all, hence liable to be quashed and set-aside.
Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 - Sections 3(5), 28, Schedule IV, Item 1(a), (b), (d), (f) and (g) - Meaning of workman - Scrap Inspectors examining scrap with help of assistants - Were held to be workmen under Section 3(5) - Finding of Industrial Court was challenged - Held - Industrial Court has a very limited jurisdiction and it was wrong in appreciating evidence at this stage - Mere signalling by hand to crane operator does not make a workman, a supervisor. - Therefore, the employer has clearly accepted the petitioners also to be in the workman category. Over and above, the evidence on record clearly indicates the type of work rendered by the petitioners of preparing of charge mix wherein the petitioners seek the assistance of crane operator and while seeking assistance of crane operator the petitioners give them hand signals to indicate the quantity of material for the purpose of mixing the charge. By indicating the hand signals to the crane operator, the scrap inspector does not become a supervisor as contemplated under the Act, 1947. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the Industrial Court ought not to have reappreciated the evidence on record and given a different finding when a clear detailed finding is given by the Labour Court which is based on evidence and which cannot be said to be perverse and the Industrial Court ought not to have exercised its jurisdiction under Section 44 of the Act, 1971 and interferred with the same. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the impugned order passed by the Industrial Court dated 8.7.1997 cannot be sustained in law at all, hence liable to be quashed and set-aside. Accordingly, rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b) with costs. Writ to go forthwith to the III Labour Court at Thane.
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - As clearly indicated hereinabove, apart from the oral evidence on record of the parties, the parties also relied upon documentary evidence, namely, settlement dated 16.8.1984 entered upon between the union on one hand and the respondent on the other hand wherein the petitioners are members in no uncertain terms stated in clause 1(i) that the workman includes "D-2" category apart from other categories and D-2 category also clearly indicates scrap inspector as the workman. Therefore, the employer has clearly accepted the petitioners also to be in the workman category. Over and above, the evidence on record clearly indicates the type of work rendered by the petitioners of preparing of charge mix wherein the petitioners seek the assistance of crane operator and while seeking assistance of crane operator, the petitioners give them hand signals to indicate the quantity of material for the purpose of mixing the charge. By indicating the hand signals to the crane operator, the scrap inspector does not become a supervisor as contemplated under the Act, 1947. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the Industrial Court ought not to have reappreciated the evidence on record and given a different finding when a clear detailed finding is given by the Labour Court which is based on evidence and which cannot be said to be perverse and the Industrial Court ought not to have exercised its jurisdiction under Section 44 of the Act, 1971 and interferred with the same. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the impugned order passed by the Industrial Court dated 8.7.1997 cannot be sustained in law at all, hence liable to be quashed and set-aside. Accordingly, rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b) with costs. Writ to go forthwith to the III Labour Court at Thane.
2. The petitioners herein have joined the services of respondent No. 1 as scrap inspectors during the years, 1980-81. It is the contention of the petitioners that they are "workmen" within the meaning of section 2(s) of the Act, 1947 and also "employee" within the meaning of section 3(5) of the Act, 1971. It appears that the respondent No. 1 company manufactures steel bars and blades since the year, 1971 and there are about 400 workmen working in the said factory. All the aforesaid three petitioners who had joined in the year, 1980-81 as scrap inspectors were duly confirmed in the post of scrap inspector on 24-8-1982.
3. It is the case of the petitioners that they were all pressurised and asked to resign by the Deputy General Manager as well as the Divisional Manager of the respondent No. 1 and on their refusal to comply with the same, the petitioners services came to be terminated on 7-12-1993. The petitioners, aggrieved thereby, had approached their union, namely, Association of Engineering Workers which immediately on 9-12-1993 questioned the unfair labour practice adopted by the respondent No. 1 employer. To the above, the respondent company had replied by its letter dated 13-12-1993 contending that the petitioners were engaged in various acts of cheating and in view of the loss of confidence, their services were terminated.
4. All the above three petitioners had filed three different complaints viz., Complaint (ULP) No. 52 of 1994, Complaint (ULP) No. 53 of 1994 and Complaint (ULP) No. 54 of 1994 under Items 1(a), (b), (d), (e), (f) and (g) of Schedule IV of the Act, 1971. To the above complaints, the respondent employer had filed its written statement contending that the petitioners herein are not workmen within the meaning of section 2(s) of the Act, 1947 as well as employee within the meaning of section 3(5) of the Act, 1971.
5. The Labour Court, after recording the evidence of the complainants in each of the complaints and also the evidence of the employer, finally came to the conclusion by its common judgment dated 28-6-1995 wherein the Labour Court has held that the respondents herein are workmen within the meaning of section 2(s) of the Act, 1947.
6. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent No. 1 employer moved the Industrial Court by way of revision, three revision applications under section 44 of the Act, 1971. In the said revision applications, the Industrial Court passed a common order dated 8-7-1997 dealing with aforesaid three revision applications, had set aside the order dated 28-6-1995 and held that the petitioners herein are not workmen within the meaning of section 2(s) of the Act, 1947 and employee within the meaning of section 3(5) of the Act, 1971.
7. Aggrieved thereby the petitioners herein have filed this petition contending that they are workmen within the meaning of section 2(s) of the Act, 1947 as well as employee within the meaning of section 3(5) of the Act, 1971. Shri Naidu, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners broadly made the following four submissions:---
i) the Industrial Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under section 44 of the Act, 1971 has a limited jurisdiction to interfere with regard to: (a) finding an error
