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2002 Supreme(Bom) 1106

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Khanwilkar A.M., J.
Chandrasekhar Narayan Tambe .... Petitioner.
Versus
Dhondusa Sitaram Pawar since deceased
through heir and legal representative.... Respondent.
Writ Petition No. 4395 of 1990, decided on 10-10-2002.
Advocates appeared :
R.A. Thorat, for petitioner.
Jagdish Reddy, for respondent.

Headnote:Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 354 - Outraging modesty of scheduled caste woman. - Investi- gation in case not conducted by an officer as prescribed by Prevention of Atrocities Act, contrary to Rule 7 of SC and ST Rules vitiates charge-sheet filed by him in special Court.

       Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 - Sections 5 (3) and 28 - Suit for possession - Respondent/plaintiff not owner of premises - Not entitled to receive rent - He cannot be labelled as landlord - Suit filed by him cannot be pursued before Rent Court under Section 28 of the Act - Suit not maintainable. - The respondent is neither the owner of the premises nor entitled to receive the rent or had authority to receive rent in respect of the demised premises at the relevant time when the action was instituted. If that be so, he cannot be labelled as the landlord even within the wide meaning of Section 5 (3) of the Act. As a consequence of which, the suit as filed by him could not be pursued before the Rent Court under Section 28 of the Act which has jurisdiction to adjudicate matters between landlord and tenant.

JUDGMENT - KHANWILKAR A.M., J.:---This writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India takes exception to the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge, Satara, dated July 27, 1990 in Regular Civil Appeal No. 84 of 1986. The subject matter of the present petition is a garage of one Khan out of property situate at C.T.S. No. 90, Gurwar Peth, Satara. It is not in dispute that the said property was originally owned by the respondent plaintiff. However, the said property was purchased by one K.S.D. Shanbag on 27-4-1966, pursuant to the Court auction. The name of said Shanbag came to be entered in city survey records in respect of the suit property as owner. This fact is not in dispute. However, the respondent claims that the property was purchased in the name of Shanbag by him. It is on this premise the respondent asserts that he continued to be in possession and ownership of the suit property and that inducted the petitioner as his tenant in the demised premises on monthly rent basis on 3-9-1968. Even the petitioner does not dispute that he was inducted by the respondent in the suit premises as tenant. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner paid rent directly to the respondent until December 1976. However, when the petitioner realised that the real owner of the property was said Shanbag and, since he was called upon to pay rent by owner Shanbag, he started paying rent to Shanbag from January 1977. As monthly rent in respect of demised premises was not received by the respondent, he issued a demand notice sometime on 6-2-1980, claiming arrears of rent with effect from 1-1-1977 to 2-2-1980. Since the petitioner did not offer any rent as demanded, the respondent instituted suit for possession against the petitioner in the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division being Regular Civil Suit No. 169 of 1981 on the ground of default. The trial Court by judgment and decree dated March 1, 1985 dismissed the said suit holding that the petitioner has established the fact that respondent was not the owner of the suit premises nor was the landlord. Against this decision the respondent carried the matter in appeal. The Appellate Court by the impugned judgment and decree dated 27-7-1990 was pleased to allow the appeal and decreed the suit for possession in favour of the respondent on the ground of default. The Appellate Court however concluded that the respondent cannot be treated as the mere rent collector or the agent of the real owner. According to the Appellate Court since the petitioner was inducted in the suit premises by the respondent; and that the petitioner had accepted the respondent as his landlord, coupled with the fact that he was regularly paying rent to the respondent till December 1976, the inescapable conclusion was that the respondent was the landlord of the petitioner. Since there is no dispute that the petitioner did not offer any rent as demanded in the suit notice, on the above finding, the Appellate Court proceeded to decree the suit for possession on the ground of default. It is this decision which is subject matter of challenge in the present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

2. On examining the record and the decisions of the two courts below with the assistance of the Counsel appearing before this Court and after considering their respective submissions, I have no hesitation in taking the view that the Appellate Court completely misdirected itself in allowing the appeal in favour of the respondent on the above said reasoning. This is so because, even if it was to be accepted that the petitioner was inducted in the suit premises by the respondent and the petitioner was paying rent regularly thereafter to the respondent till December 1976, that by itself would not be sufficient to conclude that the respondent was the landlord in respect of the demised premises or competent to institute suit for possession. The question as to whether the respondent was landlord or not ou








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