IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Gokhale H.L. Mohite R.S., JJ.
Maharashtra Power Development Corporation Limited .... Appellants.
Versus
Dabhol Power Company others.... Respondents.
Appeal (L) No. 798 of 2003 in Company Appeal (L) Nos. 04 06 of 2003 in Company Petition No. 45 of 2002, decided on 10-10-2003.
Advocates appeared :
T.R. Andhyarujina with N.H. Seervai, Rahul Chitnis, S.H. Merchant, Chakranani Misra, Shailesh Dalvi, Ms. Rifat Merchant i/b. M M. Legal Venture, for appellants.
J. Dwarkadas i/b. B.K. Girdharlal, for respondent No. 1.
Kapil Sibal with Manmohan, Abhinav Vashishta, C.D. Mehta, Ms. Rashmi Kapthalia, Mrs. Vinita Honbalkar i/b. D. Liladhar, for respondents Nos. 2 to 5.
S.H. Doctor, i/b. Mahimtura Co., for respondents Nos. 6 to 9.
Companies Act, 1956 - Sections 483, 10-F, 397 and 398 - Scope of second appeal. - The right of appeal under Section 483 has been specifically noted by Apex Court in Arati Dutta s case that if there is an appeal under the statute it has to be made available even though in the rules there is no provision for that.
Companies Act, 1956 - Sections 397, 398, 483 and 10-F - Company Court exercising power thereunder. - It is not correct to say that Section 100-A of CPC is specific provision to the contrary within meaning of Section 4(1), CPC which limits right of appeal under Section 483 of Companies Act. Order in this context means an order passed by civil Court and Company Law Board under Section 397 and Section 398.
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Sections 4(1) and 100-A - Second appeal. - Appeal against Company Law Board s decision to a single Judge is provided under Section 10-F of Companies Act but thereafter no specific appeal provided unlike one under Section 483 of Company Act.
2. We have gone through the impugned order. Mr. Andhyarujina submits that it is erroneous on facts as well as on law. Mr. Sibal, learned Counsel appearing for respondents Nos. 2 to 5 submits that the impugned order is primarily on facts and correct one. We are, however, of the view that there are important questions of law which are as well involved in this matter.
3. Mr. Sibal has raised a question with respect to maintainability of this appeal.
4. This appeal under section 483 of the Companies Act seeks to challenge the order dated 2nd September, 2003 passed by a learned Single Judge (Maharashtra Power Development Corporation Limited v. Dabhol Power Co.)1, 2004(Supp.) Bom.C.R. (O.O.C.J.)428 under section 10-F of the Companies Act in Company Law Board and petition initiated by the appellants under sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act.
5. Mr. Sibal and Mr. Dwarkadas, learned Counsel appearing for the respective respondents submit that section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure abolishing further appeals in certain cases has come into force with effect from 1st July, 2002 and thereafter the appeal of the present kind would not lie. Mr. Sibal submits that a Division Bench of this Court in an unreported judgment in the case of (Bnenoy G. Dembla and another v. M/s. Prem Kutir Pvt. Ltd.)2, Appeal No. 354 of 2003, decided on 30th June, 2003, reported in 2004(2) Bom.C.R. (O.O.C.J.)280 has taken the view that against the decision of a Single Judge under section 10-F of the Companies Act, there is no express conferment of a further right of appeal. He referred to para 13 of this judgment in that behalf. The Division Bench has observed in paragraph 8 of the said judgment, that as per the object behind introducing section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, where an appeal from original or appellate decree is decided, by a Single Judge after 1st July, 2002, no further appeal would be maintainable.
6. The Division Bench referred to and relied upon a Full Bench judgment of the Gujarat High Court in (Nasik Hing Supplying Company v. Annapurna Gruh Udyog Bhandar)3, reported in 2003(2) Gujarat Law Reporter 926. The Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court was concerned with the right of appeal under section 109(5) of the Trade and Merchandise Act, 1958 whereunder a further appeal is available to a Bench of High Court against an appellate decision of a Single Judge. The Full Bench held that the non obstance clause under section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure is not in derogation of the express provisions of a special law conferring a substantive right of appeal against the decision of a Single Judge. Mr. Sibal submits that as observed in Bnenoy Dembla case (supra), after the introduction of section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, unless a special stature confers a right of appeal, no such appeal would lie. He points out that the Division Bench has held in paragraph 13 of its order that there was no appeal specifically provided against an order of a Single Judge passed under section 10-F of the Companies Act, and, therefore, the present appeal would also not be maintainable.
7. Mr. Sibal drew our attention to the judgment of the Apex Court in (Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India)4, 2003(3) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)327 and particularly paragraph 15 thereof and submitted that the idea in introducing section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure was to reduce the intra-Court Appeals and that unless there is specific statutory appeal, such construction to increase the number of appeals is not expected. He therefore submitted that the appeal ought to be dismissed in limine.
8. Mr. Sibal further pointed out that prior to 31st May, 1991, the jurisdiction under sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act used to be with the Company Court. After 31st May, 1991, the jurisdiction is now vested with the Company Law Board
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