JUDGMENT - DESHPANDE D.G., J.: - The appellant has applied for bail before the Special Court. His application was rejected by the Special Court Gadchiroli on 7-8-2003. Hence he has filed this appeal.

2. One of the contentions raised by the appellant before the Special Court was that as required by section 50 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, there was a bar in Court taking cognizance of offence without the previous sanction of the Central Government or as the case may be, the State Government. According to the appellant when he applied for bail and when the order of rejection of bail came to be passed, at that time there was no sanction as required by section 50 and therefore he was entitled for bail.

3. The Counsel for the appellant drew our attention to the Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in 2003 Bom.C.R.(Cri.) (N.B.)1727. (Criminal) 1107, given in Criminal Appeal No. 3/2003 with Criminal Appeal No. 3/2003 with Criminal Appeal No. 679/2002 in (Mohammad Gausuddin Wali Mohammad v. State of Maharashtra)1, where a similar question arose that about the interpretation of section 50 and the effect on not obtaining the sanction and the Division Bench ultimately held that in the circumstances of the case accused was entitled for bail, so the accused in that case was granted bail.

4. One more Criminal Appeal No. 535 of 2003 came before us and we passed a similar order granting bail in that appeal following the judgment of the Division Bench referred to above.

5. In the present appeal No. 561/03 Shri Loney A.P.P. conceded that till today there is no sanction as required under section 50 of Prevention of Terrorism Act. He however tried to distinguish the Division Bench judgment of this Court referred to above and relied by us, on the basis of the judgment reported in 2003(6) S.C.C. 195, (Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja another)2. However, attention in that regard was drawn to paragraphs 20 and 21. We reproduce the said paras as under:

20. Thus the legal position is absolutely clear and also settled by judicial authorities that the Court would not interfere with the investigation or during the course of investigation which would mean from the time of the lodging of the first information report till the submission of the report by the Officer in charge of the Police Station in Court under section 173(2) Cri.P.C., this field being exclusively reserved for the investigating agency.

21. An incidental question as to what will be the result of any error or illegality in investigation on the trial of the accused before the Court may also the examined. Section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 provided that no Police Officer below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police shall investigate any offence punishable under section 161, section 165 and section 165-A I.P.C. or under section 5 of the said Act without the order of a Magistrate of the first class. In H.N. Rishbud, the investigation was entirely completed by an Officer of the rank lower than the Deputy Superintendent of Police and after permission was accorded a little or no further investigation was made. The Special Judge quashed the proceedings on the ground that the investigation on the basis of which the accused were being prosecuted was in contravention of the provisions of the Act, but the said order was set aside by the High Court. The appeal preferred by the accused to this Court assailing the judgment of the High Court was dismissed and the following principle was laid down:

"9. The question then requires to be considered whether and to what extent the trial which follows such investigation is vitiated. Now trial follows cognizance and cognizance is preceded by investigation. This is undoubtedly the basic scheme of the Code in respect of cognizable cases. But it does not necessarily follow that an invalid investigation nullifies the cognizance or trial based thereon. Here we are not concerned with the effect of the breach of a mandatory prov

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