SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Article Pause Article
judgment-img

2003 Supreme(Bom) 1080

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Khandeparkar R.M.S., J.
Prakash D. Shah others .... Petitioners.
Versus
Union of India another.... Respondents.
Writ Petition No. 522 of 2001, decided on 16-9-2003.
Advocates appeared :
S.K. Talsania with Kishore Thakore i/b. Thakore Jariwala Associates, for petitioners.
H.V. Mehta, for respondents.

Headnote:Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 - Section 7-A - a partner working in his own firm cannot be considered as an employee. AIR 1985 SC 278 - Followed.

       Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 - Section 16(a)(d) - when the firm was established the benefits of period of infancy were available and it was entitled to the same - before completion of the said period of three years, provision deleted by amendment - amendment cannot take retrospective effect - benefit already accrued to petitioner cannot be denied. 1999 (II) CLR 426 - Relied upon.

JUDGMENT - KHANDEPARKAR R.M.S., J.:---Heard the learned Advocate for the parties.

2. The petitioners challenge the order dated 6-2-2001, passed by the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, Mumbai under the section 7-A of the Employees Provident Fund Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, hereinafter called as "the said Act". The challenge is on two grounds, namely, that the partner working in the firm cannot be construed as the employee of the firm, and secondly, that the authority erred in misconstruing the amended provision regarding the infancy period in as much as though the firm of the petitioners having been established prior to amendment to the section 16(1)(d) of the said Act, whereby the infancy period was of three years, the petitioners could not have been denied the exemption from the provisions of the said Act for a period of three years from the date of its inception merely because during the subsistence of the said period of three years the section 16(1)(d) of the said Act was amended, deleting the availability of the infancy period. Reliance is placed, in support of the first ground of challenge in the matter of the (Regional Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation, Trichur v. Ramanuja Match Industries)1, reported in A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 278, and in relation to the second ground of challenge, in the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of (Magic Wash Industries (P.) Ltd. others v. Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner others)2, reported in 1999(II) C.L.R. 426.

3. The Apex Court in Regional Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation, Trichur v. Ramanuja Match Industries (supra) clearly held that:---

"A partner who belongs to the class of employer cannot rank as employee because he also works for wages for the partnership. Undoubtedly the term employee is the co-relative of employer. In common parlance the status of a partner qua the firm is different from employees working under the firm, it may be that a partner is being paid some remuneration for any special attention which he devotes but that would not involve any change of status and bring him within the definition of employee."

It was clearly ruled that the contention, that on the basis of the status being beneficial a partner should also be counted as an employee, was unsustainable. The law on the point being well-settled, it is apparent that the authority below erred in ignoring the said well-settled law while dealing with the matter in issue.

4. The Division Bench in Magic Wash Industries (P.) Ltd. others v. Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner others (supra) has clearly held that the infancy period is essentially for the benefit of the establishments and the establishments are entitled to continue to enjoy such infancy benefit for the period for which it was granted to them from the date of commencement of such establishment, and the amendment brought about to the statutory provision reducing the period of infancy during the subsistence of the said period of infancy in case of a given undertaking or establishment cannot alter such period to the detriment of the establishment. It was clearly ruled that the amended provision does not curtail the infancy period of the already existing establishment which enjoyed the five years infancy period under the unamended provision. In the said case, the infancy period of five years was reduced to three years by amendment to the section 16(1)(d) of the said Act during the subsistence of the said period of five years, applicable to the petitioners therein, namely, Magic Wash Industries (P.) Limited. In the case in hand, the period of infancy of three years was available to the petitioners in terms of the provision of the section 16(1)(d) of the said Act, as was in force at the time when the firm of the petitioners was established. Before completion of the said period of three years, there was amendment to the section 16(1)(d) of the said Act whereby the provision regarding the infan





Click Here to Read the rest of this document

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
whatsapp-icon Back to top