The main legal point established in the judgment is that an appeal challenging a surrender order must be filed within the limitation period, and the failure to do so renders the appeal incompetent.

JUDGMENT - KHANWILKAR A.M., J.: - All these three writ petitions can be disposed of by common judgment, as they are between the same parties in relation to the agricultural land bearing Survey Nos. 230/3-B(part) and 230/4-A/2, which has been subsequently formed into Gut No. 1294, situated at village Pandare, Taluka Baramati, District Pune. Petitioner Krishna alias Kisan Rajaram Karve and others are the landlords in respect of the suit land. It is not in dispute that Dinkar Anaji Kumbhar was inducted in the suit land as tenant. It is also not in dispute that the landlords issued notice for possession of the suit land under section 31 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act for personal cultivation on 25th August, 1995. Thereafter, the landlords instituted proceedings for possession of the suit lands on that ground, which proceedings culminated with the order of possession of half portion of the suit lands to be handed over to the landlords. That order was passed on 3rd March, 1959. Pursuant to the said order, the landlords have been put in possession of the half portion of the suit lands. That land is not subject-matter of the present proceedings. However, insofar as the remaining half portion of the suit lands is concerned, the landlords subsequently filed application for issuance of exemption certificate under section 88-C of the Act on 30th November, 1959. We are not concerned even with the said proceedings. What is relevant for our purpose is that the tenant himself moved an application before the Tenancy Awal Karkoon, which was numbered as Proceedings No. 1 of 1959 stating therein that he was not interested in cultivating the suit lands any further and that he was in occupation of the other lands owned by him, which were sufficient to cater to his requirements. In other words, the application came to be filed by the tenant that he may be permitted to deliver possession of the suit lands to the landlords. That application was considered by the Tenancy Awal Karkoon and after giving sufficient opportunity to the tenant, eventually, the same was allowed and the tenant was permitted to surrender the lands to the landlords by order dated 30th October, 1959. The order clearly records that matter was also postponed on 3 occasions and the tenant was made fully aware of the consequences of his stand that he would like to hand over possession of the suit lands to the landlords and inspite of that, the tenant volunteered and stood by his application. Indeed, after the tillers' day, i.e., 1st April, 1957 the question of surrender of lands by the tenant did not arise, because, on that day, by operation of law, the tenant became deemed purchaser and that the relationship of landlord and the tenant between the parties came to an end. However, the stand taken by the tenant, such as in the present case, was surely one covered by section 32-G of the Act, which obligates the Tribunal to record a statement of tenant whether he is or is not willing to purchase the land held by him as tenant. Before we refer to the other facts, it will be apposite to advert to the scheme of the Tenancy Act. Section 32 of the Act provides that on the tillers' day, the tenant is deemed to have purchased the land under cultivation, but that arrangement is subject to the other provisions of the Act, as is provided for in sub-section (1) of section 32. Section 32-G thereafter obligates the tenant to exercise the right to purchase the suit land. In cases where the tenant declines the option of purchase, it would necessarily follow that the statutory purchase has become ineffective and procedure for resumption of land under section 32-P of the Act is required to be initiated in such cases. In other words, it is not as if on 1st April, 1957 the tenant becomes full and absolute owner of the land, but his right is subject to complying with other requirements of the Act including section 32-G, expression willingness to purchase the suit land. Whereas, in the prese

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