KHANDEPARKAR R. M. S. , J.

( 1 ) SINCE common questions of law and facts arise in all these petitions, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

( 2 ) IN all the petitions, rule, and by consent, the rule is made absolute returnable forthwith. Perused the records. Heard at length the learned Advocates for all the petitioners as well as the leaned APP.

( 3 ) IN all these petitions, the approval for recording of the commission of the offence as well as the FIR No. 6 of 2005 recorded on 7th February, 2005 under provisions of sections 3 and 7 of the Maharashtra Control of Organised crime Act, 1999, hereinafter called as "the MCOC Act", are sought to be challenged on various grounds including the ground that the activities which are disclosed as the offences of organised crime under the MCOC Act in the said fir refer to the period prior to 24th February, 1999, the day on which the mcoc Act came into force and that therefore, considering the provisions of article 20 (1) of the CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, the said approval for recording the information about the commission of offence under the MCOC Act as well as the FIR itself need to be quashed.

( 4 ) THERE cannot be any dispute on the point that the MCOC Act came into force with effect from 24th February, 1999. It is well settled law that all convictions and subjection to penalty after the enforcement of Constitution of india are prohibited in respect of the acts done prior to enforcement of a statute under which such acts are declared to be the criminal offences. The article 20 (1) of the CONSTITUTION OF INDIA is very clear in that regard and reads that

"no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence".

( 5 ) THE Apex Court in (G. P. Nayyar v. State (Delhi Administration), reported in A. I. R. 1979 S. C. 602 had held that Article 20 (1) deals with expost facto laws though that expression has not been used in the Article and though a sovereign legislature has power to legislate retrospectively, creation of an offence for an act which at the time of its commission was not an offence or imposition of a penalty greater than that which was under the law provided violates Article 20 (1 ). The Apex Court also clarified in (Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and another v. State of Vindhya Pradesh), reported in A. I. R. 1953 S. C. 394 that the expression "law in force" as used in Article 20 does not relate to a law "deemed" to be in force and thus brought into force, but to the law factually in operation at the time or what may be called the then existing law, otherwise, the whole purpose of Article 20 would be completely defeated in its application even to the ' ex post facto' laws passed after the Constitution. It was held that it cannot, therefore, be doubted that the phrase "law in force" as used in article 20 must be understood in its natural sense as being the law in fact in existent and in operation at the time of the commission of the offence as distinct from the law "deemed" to have become operative by virtue of the power of legislature to pass retrospective laws. "it was also clarified that if a party is able to substantiate its contention that the acts charged as offences in a matter are being described as the offences only by virtue of the statute which has come into force subsequent to the commission thereof, then the party would be entitled to the benefit of Article 20 of the Constitution.

( 6 ) THE law on the above point was reiterated by the Apex Court in (M/s. West Ramnad Electric Distribution Co. Ltd v. The State of Madras and another), reported in A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 1753 holding that even il a criminal law is enacted by the legislature retrospectively, its retrospective operation will be controlled by a