In cases of section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, it is advisable for the Appellate Court to impose a condition for depositing the compensation amount, considering the heavy amount and the object of the Act.

( 1 ) ON the last date I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties.

( 2 ) THE Applicant is an accused in a private complaint filed under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the said act of 1881 ). The respondent No. 1 is the original Complainant in the said complaint. The said complaint was heard by the learned Judicial Magistrate First class, Pune. By his Judgment and order dated 27th July, 2005, the learned magistrate sentenced the Applicant to suffer simple imprisonment of six months and to pay compensation of Rs. 13 lakhs to the Complainant and in default thereof to suffer simple imprisonment for 10 days.

( 3 ) AN Appeal was preferred by the Applicant before the Sessions Court. The Appeal was admitted by the learned Ad hoc Addl. Sessions Judge, Pune. By order dated 22nd August, 2005, the learned Judge directed that the substantive sentence passed by the trial Court is suspended till decision of the Appeal and till then the Applicant shall be released on P. R. Bond of Rs. 25,000/- with one or two solvent sureties in the like amount. The learned Judge directed that the conviction and sentence stands suspended on the Appellant depositing half of the cheque amount i. e. Rs. 6,25,000/- within 15 days. The challenge in this Application is to the said part of the order dated 22nd August, 2005.

( 4 ) SHRI Mohite appearing for the Applicant has made detailed submissions. He submitted that on a plain reading of section 357 of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973, the learned Magistrate could not have imposed punishment in default of payment of compensation. He submitted that the direction was to make payment of compensation and not fine and therefore, the order passed by the learned Magistrate directing that in default of payment of compensation, the applicant will have to suffer simple imprisonment for 10 days is patently illegal. He submitted that under section 389 of the said Code, the learned Additional sessions Judge could not have imposed condition while suspending substantive sentence by directing the Applicant to deposit half of the cheque amount i. e. Rs. 6,25,000/ -. He submitted that section 389 of the said Code does not give jurisdiction to the Appellate Court to impose such a condition. The learned advocate appearing for the respondent No. 1 supported the impugned Judgment and Order.

( 5 ) I have considered the submissions. Though the first submission of Shri mohite may appear to be prima-facie attractive, the law laid down by the Apex court on the subject appears to be against him. In a case reported in 1988 SCC (Cri.) page 984, Hari Singh vs. Sukhbir Singh and others, the Apex Court had an occasion to consider the effect of section 357 of the said Code and in particular sub-section (3) thereof. The Apex Court in paragraphs 10 and 11 held thus :"10. Sub-section (1) of section 357 provides power to award compensation to victims of the offence out of the sentence of fine imposed on accused. In this case, we are not concerned with sub-section (1 ). We are concerned only with sub-section (3 ). It is an important provision but courts have seldom invoked it. Perhaps due to ignorance of the object of it, it empowers the court to award compensation to victims while passing judgment of conviction. In addition to conviction, the court may order the accused to pay some amount by way of compensation to victim who has suffered by the action of accused. It may be noted that this power of courts to award compensation is not ancillary to other sentences but it is in addition thereto. This power was intended to do something to reassure the victim that he or she is not forgotten in the criminal justice system. It is measure of responding appropriately to crime as well of reconciling the victim with the offender. It is, to some extent, a constructive approach to crimes. It is indeed a step forward in our criminal justice system. We, therefore, recommend to all courts to e