The starting point of limitation for an application for possession under section 29(2) of the Tenancy Act is the expiry of the notice period terminating the tenancy, not the date when the right to obtain possession actually accrues to the landlord.

CHAINANI C. J. - The petitioners father was a tenant of two lands, belonging to opponents Nos. 1 and 2 (hereinafter referred to as the opponents). As there were defaults in the payment of rent for the years 1951 -52, 1952 -53 and 1953 -54, the opponents gave a notice terminating the tenancy on December 27, 1954. This notice was served on the petitioners father on December 9, 1954. It appears that there were further defaults in the payment of rent for the years 1954 -55 and 1955 -56. On March 23, 1957,the opponents made an application under section 29 of the Tenancy Act for obtaining possession of the lands. The petitioners father died during the pendency of the proceedings and the petitioner was brought on record as his heir. The Additional Tenancy Aval Karkun who heard the application came to the conclusion that there had been defaults for more than three years. He, therefore, directed that possession of the lands should be restored to the opponents. This order has been confirmed in appeal by the Prant Officer and in revision by the revenue Tribunal.

2. Mr. Gole, who appears on behalf of the petitioner, has contended that the application made by the opponents for possession of the lands was timebarred. He has relied on the Full Bench decision of this Court in Chimnabai Rama V. Ganpat Jagannath (1). This decision has been considered by the Revenue Tribunal. The Tribunal was, however, of the opinion that the matter must be decided in the light of the decision of another full Bench of this Court in Ganpati Appa V. Maruti Bala (2), in which it was held that the right to obtain possession of a land accrues to the landlord on the expiry of the period of notice terminating the tenancy given by him. Under section 14 of the Tenancy Act a landlord has to give three months notice informing the tenant of his decision to terminate the tenancy, before the tenancy can be terminated on the ground that the tenant has failed to pay the rent due from him. The period of notice expired on March 29, 1955. The application for possession was made by the opponents on March 23, 1957, i. e. within two years from the date on which the notice terminating the tenancy expired. The Tribunal, therefore, held that the application was in time.

3. Sub -section (2) of section 29 of the Tenancy Act provides that for obtaining an order for possession from the Mamlatdar the landlord shall make an application in the prescribed form within two years from the date on which the right to obtain possession of the land is deemed to have accrued to him. As pointed out in Chimnabai Rama V. Ganpat Jagannath (1), the section fixes as the starting point of limitation not the date on which the right to obtain possession has actually accrued to the landlord, but the date on which this right must be deemed to have accrued to him. At page 978 it has been observed:

" .. The one fact that immediately strikes the reader of this section is that the Legislature bas advisedly not made the time, when the actual right to take possession accrues to the landlord, the starting point of limitation .. the Legislature has inserted a legal fiction and the legal fiction is that you have not to consider for the purpose of limitation when the right to obtain possession actually accrued to him fictionally by reason of the fiction introduced by the Legislature. Therefore, it is clear that under section 29 (2) limitation does not begin to run from the time when the right to obtain possession actually accrues to the landlord ….. It begins to run from a point of time when in fact he has no right to obtain possession, but the Legislature for the purpose of limitation considers that be has a right to obtain possession."

Later on, on the same page, it has been observed:

“….. Therefore we must look to something antecedent to the actual moment of time when the right to possession accrues to the landlord and that antecedent point of time is the creation of the sub -tenancy. What the Legislat