R. M. S. KHANDEPARKAR, J. :- Reardthe learned Advocate for the parties.

2. This is an appeal stated to have been filed under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") against the order dated 23-12-2005, whereby the lower Court has rejected the application filed by the appellants in terms of section 34(3) of the Act.

3. A preliminary objection has sought to be raised on behalf of the

dents that the impugned order is not an appealable order within the meaning of said expression under section 37 of the Act.

4. The contention of the respondents is that section 37(1) of the Act clearly provides that an appeal is maintainable against granting or refusing to grant any measure under section 9 and against setting aside or refusing to set aside an al award under section 34 of the Act. By the impugned order, the Court has neither dealt with nor disposed of the application which was filed by the respond for setting aside of the award. The impugned order only deals with decides the application which was filed by the appellants under section 34(3) extension of time or for condonation of delay in filing the application by the appellants for setting aside the award.

5. On the other hand, it is the case of the appellants that the application for g aside the award being required to be filed in compliance with the decisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 34 of the Act, the impugned I is in the cause of disposal of such application for setting aside of the award, therefore, the order impugned is appealable within the meaning of the said expression under section 37 of the Act.

6. It is not in dispute that by the impugned order the lower Court has dealt the issue relating to the delay in filing application for setting aside the award, as to whether such delay should be condoned and whether the application setting aside the award should be entertained. The issue as to whether the arbitral award should be set aside or not has not been dealt with under the impugned order.

7. Section 37(1) clearly provides that an appeal shall lie from the orders passed either granting or refusing to grant any measure under section 9, or setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under section 34 of the Act. Undisputedly, therefore, whenever there is order passed either for setting aside of award or refusing to set aside the arbitral award and such order is passed in

exercise of powers under section 34, the same would be appealable under section l)(b) of the Act. In the case in hand, since it is not in dispute nor it can be disputed that the impugned order does not deal with the issue as to whether the arbititral award should be set aside or not and it merely deals with the issue in relation to the delay in filling an application for setting aside of the award evidently the impugned order cannot be said to be an appealable order meaning of the said expression under section 37(1)(b) of the Act.

8. Section 34(1) of the Act provides that recourse to a Court a arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). In other words an application for setting aside of award should satisfy the requirements section (2) as well as sub-section (3) of section 34 of the Act. Merely because the application satisfies the requirements of anyone of sub-sections (2) a section 34 of the Act, it cannot be said that it is a valid and lawful a under section 34(1) of the Act. Such application has necessarily to s requirements of both the sub-sections.

9. Sub-section (3) of section 34 of the Act provides that an application for setting aside may be made after three months have elapsed from date on which the party making such application had received the arbitral award or , if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal, provided that if the Co