An appellate authority exercising judicial functions, even in the absence of specific rules of procedure, is bound to observe the principles of natural justice, including the right of both parties to be heard before the appeal is disposed of.

ABRYANKAR J. - The petitioner in this case is the Gram Panchayat of village Soit. By this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution they challenge an appellate order of the Standing Committee of the Zilla Parishad, Chanda, modifying the assessment of house-tax made by Gram Panchayat, Soit, in respect of houses belonging to respondents Nos. 2 to 34. Its main grievance is that the Standing Committee in disposing of an appeal filed by respondents 2 to 34, neither issued a notice to the petitioner-Panchayat, nor gave it an opportunity of being heard before disturbing the assessment and levy of tax on the buildings as proposed by the Panchayat.

2. The petitioner-Panchayat has been constituted as a Village Panchayat under the Bombay Village Panchayats Act, 1958 (Bombay Act 3 of 1959). Under section 124 (1) (i) the Panchayat is empowered to levy a tax on buildings and lands within the limits of the village. Such tax has been levied by this Village Panchayat. The Panchayat passed a resolution fixing the assessment of a house-tax on houses of certain residents on 20th October 1961, which was to be operative for the next four annual periods i.e. from 1962-63 to 1965•66. Among such persons whose houses were assessed by the Panchayat were respondents Nos. 2 to 34. Respondents Nos. 2 to 34 felt aggrieved by this assessment and preferred appeals against the same before the Panchayat Samiti, Warora. The Panchayat Samiti dismissed the appeals filed by respondents Nos. 2 to 34 in limine on the ground that they were barred by limitation. Against the dismissal of these appeals respondents Nos. 2 to 34: preferred further appeals which lay to the Standing Committee of the Zilla Parishad, Chanda. Such an appeal is provided by section 124: (5) of the Bombay Village Panehayats Act. What followed after filing such appeals can be gathered from the return filed on behalf of the Zilla Parishad by way of a defence to this petition. The Zilla Parishad has averred in paragraph 6 of the return that for the purposes of deciding the appeals the Standing Committee directed the Administrative Officer of the Zilla Parishad, Chanda, to make a local enquiry and report the values of respective houses of respondents Nos. 2 to 34. Accordingly the Administrative Officer gave his report in all the cases on or about 3rd May 1964. The Standing Committee "adopted" this report and decided all these appeals on 27-6-1904 as per resolution filed with the petition. It is admitted by the Standing Committee that no notices of these appeals or that of the meeting dated 27-6-1964 was given to the petitioner. It is also stated that likewise notices of the meeting were not given to the appellants before it i.e. respondents Nos. 2 to 34. The defence of the Standing Committee is that there is no rule which prescribes that the petitioner-Panchayat should be given notice of the appeals or that the petitioner should be heard by the appellate authority. As there is nothing in the Act or the rules that there should be a hearing of the arguments in the appeals, the Standing Committee could dispose of the appeals without such notice or hearing.

3. Thus, there is no dispute as to the fact that neither a notice nor an opportunity for hearing was given by the appellate authority which disposed of the appeals filed by the assessees against the assessments made by the Panchayat. What is further revealed is that even respondents Nos. 2 to 34 were neither noticed nor heard before disposal of the appeals.

4. Ordinarily, a tribunal invested with the powers of hearing and disposal of an appeal as provided in section 124 (5) of the Panchayats Act acts judicially and exercises the powers of a quasi-judicial tribunal. It is an admitted position that beyond prescribing a period of limitation within which appeal is to be filed, no rules seem to have been framed either by the Standing Committee or by any other authority laying down the procedure for hearing such appeals. It is therefore contend