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1967 Supreme(Bom) 131

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
(V. M. Tarkunde and V. G. Wagle JJ.)
UNION OF INDIA - Appellant.
vs.
SUGRABAI ABDUL MAJID and others - Respondents.
Advocates Appeared
For State- V. H. Gumaste, Govt. Pleader.
For respondents Nos. 1 to 7- M. A. Rane.

The State is liable for torts committed by its servants unless it is established that the servant was acting in the exercise of a sovereign power delegated to him.

Headnote:

TORT - VICARIOUS LIABILITY - STATE - SOVEREIGN POWER - ACT DONE IN EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGN POWER - TRANSPORT OF MACHINE FOR TRAINING ARMY PERSONNEL - WHETHER SOVEREIGN POWER - LIABILITY OF STATE.

Fact of the Case:

A military truck driven by defendant No.1, an employee of the defence department, collided with the bicycle of Abdul Majeed, resulting in his death. The plaintiffs, Abdul Majeed's wife and children, filed a suit for damages against defendant No.1 and the Union of India, alleging rash and negligent driving and seeking compensation of Rs. 30,000. The trial court found defendant No.1 liable for the accident and held the Union of India jointly liable for damages.

Finding of the Court:

The court upheld the trial court's findings that the accident was caused by the rash and negligent driving of defendant No.1 and that the amount of damages claimed by the plaintiffs was fair and proper.

Issues: 1. Whether the Union of India is liable for the tortious act of defendant No.1, a military driver employed by the defence department. 2. Whether the amount of damages awarded to the plaintiffs was excessive.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The extent of the State's immunity for torts committed by its servants is the same as that of the East India Company, which was immune from liability for torts committed by its employees while exercising delegated sovereign powers. 2. The State is liable for torts committed by its servants unless it is established that the servant was acting in the exercise of a sovereign power delegated to him. 3. The transport of a machine for training army personnel, though necessary for the proper discharge of the State's sovereign function of maintaining the army, is not an exercise of sovereign power if it could have been carried out by a private agency without materially affecting the State's function. 4. The act of defendant No.1 in transporting the machine in a military truck was not an exercise of a delegated sovereign power, as it could have been done by a private carrier without detriment to the State's function of maintaining the army and training personnel.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal filed by the Union of India, upholding the trial court's decree for payment of Rs. 30,000 and costs by the defendants to the plaintiffs.

JUDGMENT

TARKUNDE J. - On September 13, 1960, one Abdul Majeed was going on a bicycle from Bhagur to Deolali camp near Nasik. At that time defendant No.1, who was a driver employed in the defence department, came in a military truck from the opposite direction. The military truck dashed against the bicycle of Abdul Majeed with the result that Abdul Majeed received severe injuries and died on the spot. He left behind his young wife and six minor children. The wife and the children filed a pauper suit for the recovery of damages estimated at Rs. 30,000 from defendant No.1 and from the Union of India defendant No.2. The plaintiffs alleged in the plaint that the accident occurred because of the rash and negligent driving of defendant No.1, that defendant No.1 was on Government duty when the accident took place, and that both the defendants were liable for damages. In his defence, defendant No.1 denied that he was rash or negligent in driving the truck and further pleaded that the amount of damages claimed by the plaintiffs was excessive. The Union of India took up the same defences and advanced a further plea that they were not liable for the tort alleged to have been committed by defendant No.1 as the latter was in military service. On the evidence led before him the learned trial Judge found that the accident was occasioned by the rash and negligent driving of defendant No.1, that the amount claimed by the plaintiffs by way of damages was fair and proper and that the Union of India was liable for the tort along with defendant No. 1. On these findings the learned Judge passed a decree for the payment of Rs. 30,000 and costs by the defendants to the plaintiffs. From this decree the Union of India has filed .the present appeal. No appeal was filed by defendant No. 1.

2. Adequate evidence was produced at the trial to show that at the time of the accident the deceased Abdul Majeed was riding on his bicycle on the left side of the road, that defendant No.1 came in his truck at great speed from the opposite direction, that he swerved to his right to pass a tonga, that he dashed the truck against the bicycle of the deceased, and that thereafter the truck went to a distance of 108 feet and struck against a tree. Defendant No.1 was convicted by Court Martial under section 304-A, Indian Penal Code for causing death by rash and negligent driving. In view of the evidence on record the learned Government Pleader, who appeared before us on behalf of the Union of India, did not find it possible to contest the trial Courts finding that the accident was occasioned by the rash and negligent driving of defendant No. 1.

3. Two contentions were advanced by the learned Government Pleader before us: (1) that the Union of India was wrongly held liable for the tortious act of defendant No.1, and (2) that the amount of damages allowed to the plaintiffs was excessive.

4. In deciding whether the Union of India is liable for the tort committed by defendant No.1 it is necessary to notice the duty in which defendant No.1 was engaged at the time of the accident. Defendant No.1 was attached as a military driver to the School of Artillery conducted by the defence department of the Government of India at Deolali. A machine of the School of Artillery called "Records Sound Ranging" and some other equipment had been sent for repair to a military workshop, and after the work of repair was over defendant No. 1 was, at the time of the accident, transporting the machine and the other equipment in the military truck from the workshop to the School of Artillery. It is in evidence that Records Sound Ranging is a machine for locating enemy guns. The machine was to be used at the School of Artillery for giving training to military officers.

5. The principles which determine the immunity of the State in respect of torts committed by its servants during the course of their duty can now be taken as well settled. The extent of the immunity of the State is the same as the extent t



























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