The term "consecutive terms" in the proviso to section 42 of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961 means unbroken periods of two consecutive terms of office as President.

Headnote:
MAHARASHTRA ZILLA PARISHADS AND PANCHAYAT SAMITIS ACT, 1961 - SECTION 42 - CONSTRUCTION - TERM OF OFFICE OF PRESIDENT - CONSECUTIVE TERMS - MEANING OF.
Fact of the Case:

The petitioner challenged the election of the respondent as President of the Zilla Parishad on the ground that he was ineligible for being elected as President as he had held the office for two consecutive terms. The respondent was elected as President of the Zilla Parishad in 1962 and held the office till 1967. He was again elected as President in 1968 and held the office till 1972. The petitioner contended that the two terms of the respondent were consecutive and, therefore, he was ineligible for being elected as President for the third time.
Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the two terms of the respondent were not consecutive as there was a break between the two terms. The Court construed the term "consecutive terms" in the proviso to section 42 of the Act to mean unbroken periods of two consecutive terms of office as President. The Court further held that the proviso to section 42 will operate only in a case where a Councillor holds office as President for two full terms of five years each as contemplated by section 43 read with section 10 (2) and section 11 (1) of the Act.
Issues: Whether the respondent was ineligible for being elected as President of the Zilla Parishad for the third time as he had held the office for two consecutive terms.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court held that the two terms of the respondent were not consecutive as there was a break between the two terms. The Court construed the term "consecutive terms" in the proviso to section 42 of the Act to mean unbroken periods of two consecutive terms of office as President. The Court further held that the proviso to section 42 will operate only in a case where a Councillor holds office as President for two full terms of five years each as contemplated by section 43 read with section 10 (2) and section 11 (1) of the Act.
Final Decision: The Court dismissed the petition and held that the respondent was not ineligible for being elected as President of the Zilla Parishad for the third time.

JUDGMENT

CHANDURKAR J.- These two petitions have been filed by the two petitioners praying for a writ in the nature of quo. warranto against the respondent No.1 who is holding the office of President of the Zilla Parishad, Nagpur, having been elected to that office on 12-8-1972. Petitioner Shankarrao in Special Civil Application No. 1050 of 1972 had contested the election as a Councillor of the Zilla Parishad, Nagpur, from Kelod constituency in Saoner tahsil but was defeated. Petitioner Shrawan Domaji in Special Civil Application No. 1051 of 1972 admittedly is a voter from the Bamni constituency, and both these petitioners claim that they are vitally interested in the affairs of the Zilla Parishad and are entitled to show that the respondent is illegally holding the office of President of the Zilla Parishad, Nagpur. So far as respondent No. 1 Chhatrapal Anandrao Kedar is concerned, it is not in dispute that he was elected as the President of the Zilla Parishad at the first statutory meeting of the Zilla Parish ad held on 14-8-1962. He was, however, unsuccessful at the next election as a Councillor held on 27-5-1967 for the second term 1967-72. The first statutory meeting of the second term was held on 12-8-1967, and one Baliram Damusao Dakhane was elected as the President of the Zilla Parishad for that term. However, a bye-election came to be held from Vihirgaon constituency in Nagpur tahsil as a result of the resignation of a Councillor by name Nilkanth Nandurkar. At this bye-election the respondent No.1 was elected as a Councillor and his election was duly notified in the Official Gazette on 16-3-1968. After the election of the respondent No.1 as a Councillor, Dakhne who was then the President of the Zilla Parishad resigned his office, and at a meeting held on 21-6-1968 to elect a President of the Zilla Parish ad in the vacancy caused as a result of the resignation of Dakhane, the respondent No.1 was again elected as the President having defeated petitioner Shankarrao, and the respondent No. 1 thus became the President for the rest of the period. Fresh elections were again held for the third term and the respondent No. I was again elected as a Councillor on 27-5-1972. He was also re-elected as the President of the Zilla Parishad on 12-8-1972. These facts are not in dispute.

2. The contention of both the petitioners in these petitions is that in view of the proviso to section 42 of the Maharashtra Zilla Parish ads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the, respondent No.1 was not eligible for being elected as President because he had held the office for two consecutive terms. The question which, therefore, falls for consideration is whether the petitioner who was the President of the Zilla Parishad for the whole of the term 14-8-1962 to 12-1-1967 and a part of the second term from 21-6-1968 to 12-8-1972 can be said to have become ineligible for election as President as contemplated by the proviso to section 42 of the Act. Section 42 reads as follows:

"Every Zilla Parishad shall be presided over by a President, who shall be elected by the Parishad from amongst its elected Councillors. The Zilla Parishad shall also elect one of its elected Councillors to be the Vice-President.

Provided that, no Councillor shall be eligible for being elected as President or Vice President if he has held any such office for two consecutive terms:

Provided further that if a Chairman or Deputy Chairman of a Panchayat Samiti is elected as President or Vice-President, the office of the Chairman, or as the case may be, of the Deputy Chairman shall, on the date on which he is so elected, become vacant."

We are not concerned with the second proviso. Diverse constructions are placed on the first proviso to section 42 which alone is material for the purposes of the present petition. There are four constructions which are canvassed before us. On behalf of petitioner Shankarrao, Mr. Bobde, learned counsel appearing on his beh

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