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1973 Supreme(Bom) 128
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
(G. N. Vaidya J.)
SAYED ABDUL KHAIR - Petitioner
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA -Respondent.
Advocate Appeared
For petitioner - G. A. Merchant.
For State - B. D. Kamble, Asstt. Govt. Pleader.
For respondent No. 3 - L. D. Jaisinghani.
The distinction between girls and women in the context of prostitution and immoral traffic is reasonable and justified, and special provisions for the protection of young girls from exploitation in prostitution are not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Headnote:
SUPPRESSION OF IMMORAL TRAFFIC IN WOMEN AND GIRLS ACT, 1956 - SECTIONS 15 (4) AND 16 (1) - CONSTITUTIONALITY - ARTICLE 14 - DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN GIRL AND WOMAN - REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION - OBJECT OF THE ACT - PROTECTION OF YOUNG GIRLS FROM EXPLOITATION IN PROSTITUTION.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner, accused No.3 in a case under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, challenged the constitutionality of sections 15 (4) and 16 (1) of the Act, arguing that they discriminated between girls and women and were therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the distinction between girls and women in the context of prostitution and immoral traffic was reasonable and justified, as young girls were more likely to be exploited in the prostitution market. The court also held that the special provisions contained in sections 15 (4) and 16 (1) for removing young girls from brothels and rescuing them from prostitution were germane to the object of the Act and did not amount to unreasonable or constitutionally prohibited discrimination.
Issues: 1. Whether the distinction between girls and women in sections 15 (4) and 16 (1) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 2. Whether the special provisions in sections 15 (4) and 16 (1) for removing young girls from brothels and rescuing them from prostitution were reasonable and justified.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. Article 14 of the Constitution of India does not prohibit reasonable classification based on rational connection with the object to be achieved. 2. The distinction between girls and women in the context of prostitution and immoral traffic was reasonable and justified, as young girls were more likely to be exploited in the prostitution market. 3. The special provisions in sections 15 (4) and 16 (1) for removing young girls from brothels and rescuing them from prostitution were germane to the object of the Act and did not amount to unreasonable or constitutionally prohibited discrimination.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the petitioner's application and upheld the constitutionality of sections 15 (4) and 16 (1) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956.
2. By raising such a frivolous point, this case is kept pending from December 7, 1971, when the charge-sheet was filed, till now. The point sounds fantastic in the mouth of a person charged with running a brothel and procuring the girls for prostitution. I do not thing that either in Article 14 or in any other part of the Constitution there is anything which gives any such right to a brothel-keeper or to one who procures girls to contend that a woman and girl must be treated in the same fashion for all purposes by the Legislature. The Constitution is made for good Government and good life. It is certainly not intended to help people who want to live by or to promote the ancient vice of prostitution without making any distinction between a woman and girl. A kitchen is not made for cockroaches. The Constitution is not made for helping brothel-keepers and procurers, who do not want the Legislature to make an enactment providing for different treatment for woman and girls below 21 being exploited for purposes of prostitution. On this ground alone, the application of the petitioner ought to be thrown out as a frivolous application which has delayed the proceedings, pending from 1971.
3. However, Mr. Merchant, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, solemnly contended that it is open to the accused to submit that section 15 (4), in so far as it empowers a Special Police Officer entering any premises to remove there-from any girl, if in his opinion, she is under the age of 21 years and is carrying on or is being made to carry on, or attempts are being made to make her carry on prostitution, is unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminating between a girl and a woman, because tile woman is not liable to be removed. Similarly, he contended that section 16 (1) which empowers a Magistrate to direct the special police to enter a brothel and to remove there-from a girl also makes an unreasonable distinction between a girl and woman.
4. I do not think it is open to a person charged with keeping a brothel and procuring the girls to contend that "woman should also be removed because a girl is removed" or "a girl should not be removed because a woman is not removed from the houses of the prostitutes". Similarly, he cannot contend that "a girl should not be rescued from the brothel because woman cannot be rescued or a woman should be rescued because a girl is to be rescued." The distinction between a girl and a woman in fact and also in law relating to prostitution is well-known particularly since the beginning of the century, when laws were enacted to suppress the vice of prostitution and prevent or stop the exploitation of young girls and women.
5. The Act itself is called the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act. It is an Act to provide, in pursuance of the International Convention signed at New York on May 9, 1950, "for the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls." The Convention has prescribed the distinction presclibed. The civilized world is agreeing with the Convention in making a distinction between a girl and woman for purposes of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls. The word "girl" as defined in sect
