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IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
(B. A. MasodkarJ.)
GRAM SEWA MANDAL, Wardha - Appellant.
v.
COLLECTOR, Wardha and 2 others - Respondents.
Advocates Appeared
For appellant - G. D. Patil.
For respondents - V. V. Naik, Hon. Asstt. to Addl. Govt. Pleader.
LAND ACQUISITION ACT - SECTION 12(2), 18(2) - INTERPRETATION - LIMITATION - REPRESENTATIVE - NOTICE - KNOWLEDGE OF AWARD - COMPENSATION.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant, a public trust, owned land that was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Land Acquisition Officer made an award on February 25, 1963, fixing the compensation at Rs. 3,852.50, including solatium. The appellant filed an application for reference under section 18 of the Act on April 20, 1963, claiming an additional Rs. 3,647.50 as compensation. The Collector made a reference, which was tried by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Wardha. The Civil Judge held that the reference was barred by limitation, as it was made after six weeks from the date of the award. He also found that one D. B. Bhoyar, who signed the Roznama, was the person who represented the public trust and, therefore, the limitation started to run from February 25, 1963, under proviso (a) to section 18(2) of the Act.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the reference was not barred by limitation. It interpreted the proviso to section 18(2) of the Act to mean that the limitation period starts to run from the date of the award only if the person interested was present personally or was properly represented by another person when the award was made. In the present case, the court found that the appellant was not present personally when the award was made and that Mr. Bhoyar was not a properly constituted representative who could act on behalf of the appellant. Therefore, the court held that the limitation period started to run from the date the appellant came to know of the award, which was within six months of the date of the application for reference.
Issues: 1. Whether the reference was barred by limitation under section 18(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894? 2. Whether Mr. Bhoyar was a properly constituted representative of the appellant? 3. From what date did the limitation period start to run?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court interpreted the proviso to section 18(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to mean that the limitation period starts to run from the date of the award only if the person interested was present personally or was properly represented by another person when the award was made. 2. The court found that Mr. Bhoyar was not a properly constituted representative of the appellant, as he did not have the authority to act on behalf of the appellant and give good discharge by accepting compensation. 3. The court held that the limitation period started to run from the date the appellant came to know of the award, which was within six months of the date of the application for reference.
Final Decision: The court allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Civil Judge dismissing the reference. The appellant was awarded additional compensation of Rs. 3,047.50.
On April 20, 1963, the present applicant filed an application under section 18 before the Collector for making a reference. The appellant claimed a further sum of Rs 3,647.50 as additional compensation. In that application, he alleged that he came to know of the award on March 4, 1963 and after receiving the copy, the application was made. The Collector made a reference entertaining that application, which was tried by the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Wardha. Before the said Court, the respondent-State raised amongst others the plea of limitation as far as the tenability of the reference is concerned. The parties also led evidence on merit in support of their respective cases. The learned civil Judge held against the appellant, finding that the reference itself was barred by time having been made after six weeks, from the date of the award. He further found that one D. B. Bhoyar, who signed the Roznama, was the person who represented this public trust and, therefore, the limitation started to run from February 25, 1963, under proviso (a) to section 18 (2), of the said Act. Taking that view, he held that the claim of the appellant was unentertainable On the matter of compensation, he found that the appellant would be entitled to Rs. 3,000 as the compensation for the well in place of Rs. 5000 granted, while he would be entitled to compensation for land at the rate of Rs. 1000 per acre instead of Rs. 950 per acre.
2. Now this raises an important question as to the true interpretation of the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 18 laying down the starting point for limitation under clause (a) or (b) of the proviso.
3. For the appellant it is contended that this case is governed by clause (b) having a period of six months', limitation and it was an error to apply clause (a) in the present case. It is contended that clause (a) is only attracted when either the person who filed an application for reference was present before the Collector at the time when the award was made or was duly represented by a person competent to act on his behalf. In no other case clause (a) is applicable. It is further submitted that admittedly, Collector hold not issued any notice as required by section 12 (2) and the only period for limitation, therefore, could be the period of six months.
4. As against this, for the State it is contended that whether there was a person who represented the applicant before the Collector, is a question of fact to be decided in each case upon evidence. It is submitted that the finding given by the learned civil Judge on issue No.5 that one Mr Bhoyar was present and was the person authorised to represent the Mandal is based on evidence and particularly the circumstances available on record. It is not necessary, according to the learned counsel, that such person must be further shown to have authority to act or should be a constituted attorney or an agent who is capable of representing the interest of the applicant ill such proceedings.
5 Now these two dimetrically opposed submissions are to be considered in the context of the other provisions available in the Act. There is no definition in the Act itself of the word "representative" and that word by itself would mean an agent. That is, however, not enough for the words of the statute are to be understood in the context and for the purpose which may be obvious in the given provision.
6. A little look back to the provisions and the scheme of the Act would therefore be necessary.
7. The law itself deals with compulsive process of acquisition of land. F
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