A joint petition challenging the validity of an Ordinance is not tenable, and the court fees should be appropriated towards the court fees payable on two separate petitions.

MASODKAR, J. - The two petitioners filed the present petition on September 30, 1975, challenging the Ordinance No. VII of 1975 as void and ultra vires as well as unconstitutional and beyond the legislative competence and the powers of the State Legislature. They, sought ad interim writs regarding the enforcement, of those provisions, Petitioners alleged that they are money-lenders by profession and carryon the business of money-lending and are independently registered under the Bombay Money-lenders Act. They held independent licences. This joint petition was entertained on 1-10-1975 and there being several such petitions, a common order was made as was passed in Special Civil Application No. 1172 of 1975. It maybe mentioned that both before this Benchas well as in Bombay several petitions challenging the provisions of this Ordinance and thereafter the Debt Relief Act, were filed. In several petitions more than one money-lenders were joined all petitioners. All the matter being urgent, one set of court-fee which was affixed to such petition was held sufficient and by way of concession it wall directed that qua-each additional petitioner, court-fee payable on his independent petition should be got deposited in the office of this Court and question of its appropriation would be decided afterwards.

2. It may be mentioned that validity of the, provisions of law which were in challenge hall been eventually decided by the Bombay Bench and the matter has been taken up by leave before the Supreme Court.

3. This petition has been placed before us today for directing the appropriation of the deposit of court-fees, so deposited.

4. At the hearing Mr. Manohar appearing, for the petitioners urged that such a joint petition was tenable in view of the provisions of Order 1, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code and court-fee paid in one set should, therefore, be treated as validly paid and the deposit be directed to be refunded. Alternatively he submitted that there should, be election available to these two petitioners to pursue the petition in the name of one only. He relied on the question of tenability of joint petition following the-decision of the several High Courts, being A. Adi Narayana v. State of A.P.1, Abdul Qaum v. Keshav Saran2, Mahindra Nath v. Baranagore Municipality3, Ram Kishan v. State4, Nathmal v. Commr. Civil Supplies Mahabir Pd. v. B. S. Gupta6 and Jobiruddin v. Factory Manager, Model Mills7.

5. As against this, Mr. Qazi appearing for the State urged that these are in fact two petitions filed by two individuals, having separate cause of action and claim to relief, there being no identity of interest and that the deposit taken by the Court should be appropriated towards the court· fees as payable on two petitions. The learned counsel counters the submissions on behalf of the petitioners by relying on the decisions, being Uma Shankar Rai v. Divisional Superintendent, Northern Railway8, Bishwarajan v. Secretary, R. K. Mission9 and Mohammad Ibrahim v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer10.

6. To us it appears that the question is not open as far as the tenability and institution of such applications are concerned. The whole matter was considered by the Division Bench of this Court, including some other decisions on which reliance is placed, in Firm Parekh Brothers and 8 others, v. The Administration of the City of Nagpur and 5 others11. The facts appearing in the order indicate that nine petitioners were questioning the issuance of the notices under the Bye-laws framed under the provisions of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948. In that petition it was contended that the provisions of section1l4 (1) of the said Act were unconstitutional and should be declared as such. Similarly, rules framed under the Bye-laws being rules 43, 44, 45 and 47 of the Octroi 'Rules were challenged as invalid. After noticing the several decisions including that of the High Courts and the Supreme Court as to the nature of the jurisdiction exercised