Per Vaidya J.- [After dealing with questions which are not material for the report in paras 1 to 27, the Judgment proceeds.]

28. Mr Deo then contended that even if the defendant was born, on February 3, 1923, she was hardly a child of one year and two months on April 2, 1924, the date of the adoption of her father; and she must be, therefore, considered to have passed, along with her mother, into the adoptive family of the deceased Abaji.

29. He also submitted that irrespective of whether she passed into the adoptive family or not, in accordance with the old Hindu Law, section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, overruled such rule, if any, with regard to the status of a daughter; and section 8 of that Act entitled the defendant as a daughter of the deceased Abaji to succeed Abaji as an heir in class I along with Devkabai and Jankabai No.2, both the widows having one share; and she having the other.

30. After the death of Jankabai No.2, even assuming that as a stepdaughter she was not a daughter, she wall entitled to an equal share in the share of Jankabai along with Devkabai under section 15 (1) (b); and thus Mr. Deo submitted that the defendant was entitled to 5/8th share in the suit lands.

31. The points of law raised by Mr. Deo were not raised on behalf of the defendant in the lower Court, as already stated above. But the point that the defendant was an heir of Abaji under the Hindu Succession Act, was taken in the memorandum of appeal filed in this Court; and Mr. Paranjpe, the learned Counsel found it impossible to repel the same, having regard to the Full Bench decision of this High Court in Martand Jiwajee v. Narayan Krishna1, decided by Sir John Beaumont, C. J., and Wadia and Lokur JJ. where it was said at page 609 :

"It may be that in ancient and primitive society the son was regarded as hardly better than his father's slave and the prominent idea involved in an adoption was the transfer of dominion or patria potestas to the person adopting. But when the times changed and the status of the son was raised, the father's power to give in adoption came to be founded on a different conception. The text of Vasishtha quoted in Dattaka Mimansa (sec. V. pl. 31), which is said to afford the foundation of the Hindu law of adoption and which J have already referred to, recognizes the power of the father and the mother to "give or sell or abandon" their son as he is "produced from their virile seed and uterine blood." This paternity of the father cannot be shaken off even though he may leave the family, as, according to the Hindu Shastras, by no means can you make your other cease to be."

32. Mr. Paranjpe, however, relied on Full Bench decision of the Nagpur High Court in Sharadchandra v. Shantabai2, where the said Full Bench appears to have taken a view different from the above Bombay Full Bench. Both these Full Bench decisions concerned the status of a son in the genetive family after adoption. However, we are not concerned here with the case of the status of the son. We are here concerned with the status of the defendant, a daughter, who was hardly a year old, and who had no right, title or interest whatsoever in the genetive family at the time when her father was adopted.

33. Mr. Paranjpe fairly stated that he could not find any authority taking the view that such a daughter would cease to be the daughter of her father because of his adoption. As. far as we are aware, there is no text of any Dharmashaptrao; which lays, down that a daughter ceases to be a daughter the moment her father is given in adoption. I

34. The blood relation of the daughter and the father continued till the Hindu Succession Act came into force; and hence we are of the view that Mr. Deo's contention that the daughter the defendant, was entitled to 5/8th share in the suit lands, having regard to the provisions contained in sections 8 and 15 (b) read with section 10, Rule (1), must be up help. The decree must, therefore, follow in favour of the p