JAHAGIRDAR J. - [After negativing the contentions regarding non-registration of the decree within time as also the objection as regards the power of attorney in paragraphs I to 5, the Judgment proceeds]-

6. The most substantive challenge which was made by Mr. Pinge to the maintainability of the Darkhast was one based upon the alleged bar of limitation. It is submitted that the Darkhast which was filed on 10th of December 1968 is hopelessly barred by time considered from any angle. The basis of this argument is that under the Limitation Act of 1963, the period of limitation prescribed for an execution application under Article 136 is twelve years. The starting point of the period of limitation, in so far as it is relevant for the purpose of this appeal, is the time when default was made in making the payment of money as required by the decree. Mr. Pinge says that under the decree which is sought to be executed, the entire decretal amount became payable as soon as there were defaults in the payment of six instalments. According to him, such defaults had taken place in the year 1954 itself and, theref9re, this execution application filed in the year 1968 is barred by time. Though there were part payments from time to time upto the year 1956 and though there was an acknowledgment in March 1961, these part payments and acknowledgment will not give any advantage to the decree holder because the Limitation Act of 1963 has done away with the provisions contained in sections 19 and 20 of the Limitation Act of 1908. Under the said sections of the Limitation Act of 1908, if part payment was made, or if an acknowledgment of the amount due was made, then a fresh period of limitation was available to the decree holder. Under sections 18 and 19 of the Limitation Act of 1963, which are somewhat analogous to sections 19 and 20 of the Limitation Act of 1908, the benefit of a fresh period of limitation on account of part payment or of acknowledgment has been specifically excluded. The period of limitation, therefore, will have to be calculated by ignoring the part payments and the acknowledgment made by the judgment-debtor. If this is done, says Mr. Pinge, the Darkhast application filed in the year 1968 must be held to be barred by time.

7. Then there was further argument of Mr. Pinge that, the period of 12 years which is provided by Article 136 of the Limitation Act of 1963 is shorter than the period of limitation provided by Article, 182 of the Limitation Act of 1908, This bas the effect of attract in a the provisions contained in section 30 (b) of the Limitation Act of 1963. If this is so then it was incumbent upon the decree holder to present an application for execution within ninety days from the date of the commencement of the Limitation Act of 1963. This means that the execution application should have been presented before 1st of April 1964. In support of these submissions Mr. Pinge relied upon the Judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Messrs. Nagardas Chhotalal Shah v. Messrs. Sardoolsingh Karmal & Co.1, which has held that the period of limitation provided under Article 183 of the Limitation Act of 1908 was longer than the, period of limitation provided by article 136 of the Limitation Act of 1963.

8. All the submissions of Mr. Pinge can be answered by considering in the first place as to whether the period of limitation prescribed under Article 136 of the Limitation Act of 1963 is shorter than the period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act of 1908 as mentioned in clause (b) of section 30 of the Limitation Act of 1963. Article 182 in the Schedule to the Limitation Act of 1908 pfovide4 a period of three years for the execution of a decree or order of any Civil Court not provided for by article 183 or by section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Where a certified copy of the decree or order had been registered, the period was six years, In the third column of the said schedule, the time from which perio