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1981 Supreme(Bom) 26
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
(M. R. Waikar J.)
TAJ MOHAMMAD and others -Applicants
v.
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET COMMITTEE, NAGPUR Non-applicant.
Civil Revn. Appln. Nos. 12/81, 818, 819/80 and 2 to 12/81,
Decided on 28-1-1981.
Advocates Appeared
For applicants-M. G. Bhangde.
For non-applicant-K. H. Deshpande.
The existence of a penal provision in a statute does not necessarily imply the negation of a civil liability.
Headnote:
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET COMMITTEE - REGULATION OF MARKETING - INJUNCTION - JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT - CIVIL RIGHT - PENAL PROVISION - REMEDY - MAHARASHTRA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKETING (REGULATION) ACT, 1963 - SECTIONS 6, 11, 12, 29, 46 - ORDER 39, RULES 1, 2 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Fact of the Case:
The Agricultural Produce Market Committee (APMC) filed separate suits against several individuals for perpetual injunction and temporary injunction. The trial court rejected the applications, but the first appellate court allowed them. The individuals filed revision applications, arguing that the APMC had no locus standi or right to file the civil suits as section 46 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1963 (the Act) provided for a penalty.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the APMC had a civil right to regulate the marketing of agricultural produce within the specified market areas and to enforce the provisions of the Act. The conferral of such plenary powers and right, though by a statute, certainly constituted a civil right in the plaintiff, and merely because penal consequences are provided for that, by itself, would not deprive the plaintiff of its civil right to seek enforcement of the provisions of the Act or to prevent breach or infringement of its civil right.
Issues: 1. Whether the APMC had a civil right to regulate the marketing of agricultural produce and to enforce the provisions of the Act. 2. Whether the existence of a penal provision in section 46 of the Act barred the APMC from filing civil suits for injunction.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the APMC had a civil right to regulate the marketing of agricultural produce and to enforce the provisions of the Act. The court relied on the following provisions of the Act: - Section 6: Prohibits or injuncts any person from operating in the market area as a trader or commission agent, or a broker without any licence or otherwise than in conformity with the terms of the licence. - Section 11: Establishes Market Committees and empowers them with all such powers and functions as are vested in it by or under the Act. - Section 12: Declares that every Market Committee shall be a body corporate and shall have perpetual succession and a common seal and may in its corporate name sue or be sued and shall be competent to contract, acquire and hold property and do all other things necessary for the purposes for which it is established. - Section 29(2)(k): Empowers Market Committees to enforce the provisions of the Act and rules, bye-laws and conditions of the licences granted under the Act. 2. The court held that the existence of a penal provision in section 46 of the Act did not bar the APMC from filing civil suits for injunction. The court noted that section 46 provided for criminal prosecution for contravention of the provisions of section 6, but that this remedy was not sufficient or efficacious for enforcing the provisions of the Act. The court also noted that the Act did not provide for any other remedy for enforcing the provisions of the Act.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the revision applications and upheld the orders of the first appellate court granting the temporary injunctions.
2. The non-applicant (original plaintiff), namely, Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Nagpur, is common in all these revision applications. This non· applicant had filed separate suits against each of these applicants for perpetual injunction and had applied for a writ of temporary injunction. The trial Court rejected these applications, but the first appellate Court allowed them and hence these revisions by the original defendants. As common question of law and fact was involved in all these matters, the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court also disposed of these applications for temporary injunction by common judgment.
3. The non-applicant Agricultural Produce Market Committee (hereafter called the Committee) was duly established under section 11 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1963 (hereafter called the Act). The present revisions fall in two categories. Four revision applications Nos. 5, 10, II and 12 fall in one category, in that the applicants in these revision applications admittedly have been operating as commission agents in the market area, without any valid licence. The applicants in the rest of the revisions, no doubt, hold a valid licence as Adtiyas or Commission Agents, but admittedly again they have been recovering the commission from the agriculturists at a higher rate of 6 per cent in contravention of the terms of their licences.
4. The non-applicant- Committee, therefore, filed separate suits restraining the first four applicants from working as Commission Agents within the market area and restraining the rest of the applicants from recovering the commission from the cultivators in excess of the rate prescribed under the licences.
5. The applications made by the Committee for temporary injunction were all dismissed by the trial Court holding that the plaintiff-Committee has no locus standi or right to file the civil suits as section 46 of the Act provides for a penalty.
6. In the appeals preferred by the plaintiff· Committee, the first appellate Court found that the plaintiff-Committee had made out a prima facie case that the civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suits and to issue injunction and allowed the applications of the plaintiff.
7. In these revisions preferred by the original defendants, Shri Bhangde, the learned counsel, submitted that section 6 of the Act itself enacts a prohibition and an injunction against all persons not to operate without licence or in violation of the terms of the licence issued. Thus this statutory provision itself operates an injunction against such persons and the first appellate Court by granting temporary injunction against these applicants in a way only re-enacted the provisions of section 6 of the Act. He further submitted that there could be no injunction to prevent the breach of any provision of law. In other words, what was complained of was prevention of a public wrong and there was 00 infringement of any private right. The Committee, according to him, receives cess from the purchasers and if these applicants are charging more commission from the cultivators, or are operating as Commission Agents within the market area without licences, there is no damage or loss to the Committee. The alleged conduct of the applicants; therefore, does not entail in civil wrong to the Committee. His further argument is that the Act itself is a self contained code creating rights and liabilities and also providing remedies in case of breach of the provisions of the said Act. He also submitted that grant of a licence by the Committee in favour of an applicant does not constitute a contract and as such the provisions of Order 39, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure dealing with cases of breach of contract can have no application. So far as cases of those who are operating without
