IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
(A. N. Mody J.)
A
Versus
I
First Appeal No. 307 of 1980
Decided on 9-7-1981
Advocates Appeared
For appellant - J. C. Bhatt with S. H. Karim.
For respondent - Smt. Nanavati with Y. E. Mooman.
FOREIGN MARRIAGE ACT - MATRIMONIAL RELIEF - SECTION 18 - INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION - MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW - APPLICABILITY TO FOREIGN MARRIAGES - DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE BY TALAQ - VALIDITY.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant, a Muslim man, and the respondent, a Hindu woman, got married in England in 1966 under civil law. They returned to India in 1969, and the respondent converted to Islam and they had a Nikah ceremony. Later, the appellant pronounced talaq, claiming to dissolve both the civil marriage and the Nikah. The respondent filed a suit seeking an injunction restraining the appellant from interfering with her entering and staying in the suit flat, which was the matrimonial home. The appellant counterclaimed for an injunction restraining the respondent from entering the flat.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the Foreign Marriage Act, 1967 (the Act) governs all marriages solemnized in a foreign country, whether under the Act, registered under the Act, or otherwise, where one of the parties is an Indian citizen. The consequences of such a marriage and reliefs in respect thereof are governed by section 18(1) of the Act read with the relevant provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, except where any Indian law, statutorily or otherwise, provides for the grant of relief. The court found that the Muslim personal law does not provide for the grant of relief in respect of a marriage and, therefore, the appellant's talaq was invalid as he had no power to dissolve the marriage under the Act.
Issues: 1. Whether the Foreign Marriage Act, 1967 applies to marriages solemnized in a foreign country between Indian citizens? 2. Whether the Muslim personal law is applicable to foreign marriages governed by the Foreign Marriage Act, 1967? 3. Whether a Muslim husband can dissolve a foreign marriage by pronouncing talaq under the Muslim personal law?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Foreign Marriage Act, 1967 applies to all marriages solemnized in a foreign country, whether under the Act, registered under the Act, or otherwise, where one of the parties is an Indian citizen. 2. The Muslim personal law is not applicable to foreign marriages governed by the Foreign Marriage Act, 1967, as it does not provide for the grant of relief in respect of such marriages. 3. A Muslim husband cannot dissolve a foreign marriage by pronouncing talaq under the Muslim personal law, as the Foreign Marriage Act, 1967 governs such marriages and does not recognize the right of a Muslim husband to dissolve the marriage unilaterally.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the reliefs granted by the trial court in the counterclaim, subject to the qualification that the respondent was directed not to interfere with the rights of the appellant in the same manner as the appellant was restrained from interfering with her rights.
2. The plaintiff-appellant is the husband of the defendant-respondent. On 6-5-1966, the plaintiff then a muslim and the defendant then a Hindu got married in England by getting the marriage registered under the civil law applicable there. Both were and are Indian citizens. They returned to Bombay sometime in April 1969. According to the plaintiff the defendant got herself converted to Islam on 29-12-1969 followed by Nikah on the same day. A few years thereafter there were disputes between them and the appellant purported to dissolve the marriage by pronouncing talaq in accordance with Muslim law. It is alleged by the appellant that the- respondent thereafter broke into his residential flat which was the matrimonial home, forcing the plaintiff to file the present suit which is, inter alia, for restraining the defendant from entering the suit flat. The ground on which the relief was sought is that after the divorce the respondent is not entitled to enter the flat. The respondent counterclaimed, inter alia, for an injunction restraining the plaintiff from interfering with her entering and staying in the suit flat.
3. Mr. Bhatt for the appellant submits that the conversion and nikah are proved. He has very vigorously attacked the appreciation of evidence by the learned trial Judge and strongly assailed the findings as being completely unjustified by the weight of evidence, particularly in the light of the respondent not being a truthful witness, she having retracted several of her statements made on oath earlier. According to Mr. Bhatt as the parties were muslims at the relevant time, they were governed by muslim law and the appellant had a right to give talaq which he had done and the marriage stood dissolved. In support of his contention Mr. Bhatt relied on Khambatta v. Khambatta1. He referred to section 18 (1) and (4) of the Foreign Marriage Act and contended that the muslim personal law was a law in force, particularly as the same had been recognised by The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 (the Shariat Act). He contends that even if conversion was not proved, a marriage between a muslim and a Hindu is only an irregular marriage, recognised by muslim law as "Fasid" marriage and the plaintiff was within his rights to dissolve the same by talaq.
4. The allegations of conversion and nikah are challenged by the respondent. It was contended that there being no conversion the plaintiff did not acquire any right to dissolve the marriage by talaq as per the Muslim personal law applicable in India. She also contends that the alleged talaq did not have the effect of dissolving the civil marriage performed in England, but talaq, if proved, was intended to dissolve only the alleged muslim marriage (nikah). The claim of "Fasid" marriage was also contested. However, in view of the contention based on the provisions of the Foreign Marriage Act, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act') which came into force in 1969 before the plaintiff pronounced talaq, advanced by Mrs. Nanavati for the respondent and which I am accepting, it is not necessary to decide the other questions of law and fact.
5. The contention of Mrs. Nanavati is that any marriage which is a fore
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