ORAL JUDGMENT :- Heard the advocate for the petitioner. The Respondent though served, nobody is present on his behalf.

2. The petitioner Meenakshi is claiming to be the tenant of the disputed land. She applied to the tenancy Court Le. Tahsildar Guhagar on 15-6-1988, under section 7 -B of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (hereinafter referred to as the Tenancy Act), to decide whether she is a tenant. As per the order of the Tahsildar, he recorded the statement of the landlord and the tenant and the petitioner gave her oral evidence that she was the tenant. The Tahsildar also relied upon the so-called admission of the landlord and allowed that application that she should be declared as tenant from 1-4-1957. Against this order, present Respondent filed an appeal before the SDO Chiplun, under section 74 of the Tenancy Act. That Appeal was allowed. Against the judgment 'in appeal, tenant preferred Revision before the Tribunal. The Revision came to be dismissed, and therefore, this petition on behalf of the tenant. The counsel for the petitioner raised one point to assail orders of the SDO and MRT, Bombay. According to him, the order of the Tahsildar was dated 30th June, 1988 and the appeal before the SDO came to be filed on 27-9-1990 i.e. after about two years, to be specific 21 months and this was a time barred appeal and the period prescribed for filing the appeal under section 71 of the Tenancy Act, was 60 days from the date of the order of Mamlatdar or Tahsildar. He contended that when admittedly appeal was time barred, the SDO has no powers to hear the appeal, in the absence of any application for condonation of delay. Mr. Dalvi, drew my attention to the decision of Supreme Court reported in (2001) 9 SCC 717, Ragho Singh vs. Mohan Singh and ors. wherein in paragraph 6, Supreme Court held that since it is not disputed that the appeal before the Additional Collector was beyond time by 10 days and an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act was not filed for condonation of delay, there was no jurisdiction in the Additional Collector to allow that appeal. The appeal was liable to be dismissed on the ground of limitation.

3. It appears from the order of MRT that this point does not appear to have been raised before the MRT. In the Revision filed before MRT though the petitioner has taken the point of limitation, it is not considered by the MRT. However, since it is a question going to the root of the matter. It requires consideration.

4. Apparently, the submission of the advocate for petitioner that the SDO should not have entertained the appeal, unless it was accompanied by an application for condonation of delay, appears to be getting the support from the above case-law. However, that is not the end of the matter. The petitioner before this Court is claiming to be a tenant of the disputed land from the tillers day i.e. 1-4-1957. She has filed application before the Tahsildar in the year 1988 i.e. after 31 years and surprisingly enough her entire case is based on oral evidence. Not a single copy of extract of revenue record i.e. 7-12 extract which shows in the cultivation column the name of the tenant, was produced by the petitioner. The period of 31 years is not a small period, but it is a very long years period. When not a single entry is to be found in favour of the petitioner, showing her name in the column of the person in possession of the disputed land and cultivating it as a tenant, the Tahsildar should have outright rejected her application. It is very easy to lead oral evidence of the matter, but the basic document of tenancy is the revenue record. The absence of the name of the petitioner in the revenue record i.e. 7-12 extract for 31 years, alone should have been the sufficient ground to reject her application.

5. The counsel for the petitioner, however, repeatedly harping upon the fact that in the statement of the landlord recorded by the Tahsildar shows that he has admitted that the petitioner w

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