2007 Supreme(Bom) 479
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
V.M. KANADE, J.
Chandrakant Govind Kotkar- Petitioner
Versus
M/s. Bombay Intelligence Security (India) Ltd. & Anr.- Respondent
Writ Petition No.922 of 2005
Decided on 3rd April, 2007
Advocates appeared
Mr. S. N. DESHPANDE, for the Petitioner.
Mr. K. S. BAPAT, with Mr. R. D. SUVARNA, for Respondent No. 1.
Headnote:Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 - Schedule IV, Items 9 and 10 - Award - Implementation of - Duty of Industrial Court - Industrial Court cannot go behind award - Industrial Court has only to see whether award was passed by Labour Court - Can take step to implement award. - A perusal of the said order passed by the Industrial Court clearly reveals that this issue has not been considered by the Industrial Court and straight away the Industrial Court has tried to go behind the award and arrived at a finding that the said settlement was not bogus as alleged by the petitioner. The Industrial Court ought to have applied its mind to the provisions of Section 17, sub-clause (2) and the other relevant provisions which are mentioned hereinabove, after having examined them in the light of facts and circumstances of the case. The impugned order therefore is liable to be set aside.
2. After the award was published, it is alleged by the Respondent No.1 that there was a settlement between the parties on 17/02/1997 whereby the Petitioner gave up his right of reinstatement with full back-wages and that an amount Rs.15,000/- was paid by cheque alongwith cash amount of Rs.10,000/- in the presence of representative of the Petitioner Shri. Lobo and the representative of the Company and Shri. Pathak, the advocate on behalf of the Company. This fact, however is the main dispute which is subsequently agitated by both the parties up to this Court.
3. After the award was published on 12/02/1997, the Petitioner sent a letter to the Respondent No.1 on 04/03/1997 for implementation of the award. On 11/03/1997, Respondent No.1 gave a reply to the said letter and stated that there was no question of implementation of the award as there was a settlement between the parties in the presence of the representative of the Petitioner and the Company. Thereafter, on 21/03/1997, the Petitioner's advocate gave a reply to the letter of Respondent No.1, denying that there was any settlement between the parties.
4. Petitioner, thereafter, filed a complaint (ULP) No.338 of 1997 on 15/04/1997 under item Nos.9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions & Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 before the Industrial Court for implementation of the award.
5. Respondent No.1 filed its Written Statement and refused to implement the award and submitted that question of implementation of the award did not arise on account of the settlement between the parties dated 17/02/1997. Parties led evidence by way of affidavits and the Industrial Court dismissed the complaint, holding that in view of the settlement dated 17/02/1997 there was no question of issuing direction to Respondent No.1 to implement the said award.
6. Being aggrieved by the said-order, the Petitioner preferred this Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
7. Shri. Deshpande, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner, submitted that the Industrial Court had committed an error of law which is apparent on the face of record and also had failed to exercise jurisdiction which is vested in it by law. He invited my attention to the relevant provisions and submitted that it was not open for the Industrial Court to go behind the award and the only course of action which was open to the Industrial Court was to see whether award has been passed by the Labour Court and further to take steps to implement the said award. He submitted that the Industrial Court had not taken into consideration provisions of section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1971 alongwith other relevant provisions and, therefore, had misdirected itself in trying to find out whether there was a settlement between the parties. He submitted that, even otherwise, assuming that the Industrial Court had the jurisdiction to consider the alleged settlement between the parties, it ought to have seen that the settlement was not in the prescribed form and not in the presence of the responsible third party such as the reconciliation officer and, therefore, the said settlement was void-ab-initio. He submitted that it was also not in accordance with Form No.60 which was a prescribed form for executing settlement between the parties. He invited my attention to the provisions of section