1. Both the Second Appeals are being disposed of by this common Judgement in as much as they arise out of common Judgement rendered by the First Appellate Court in two inter connected Appeals (R.C.A. No.107 of 1981 and R.C.A. No.223 of 1981).

2. Unfortunately no substantial question of law was formulated at the time of admission of the Appeals nor any substantial question of law is indicated in the Appeal Memo of either Appeal. The Apex Court in "B.C. Shivashankara v/s. B.R. Nagaraj (2007 AIR SCW 1588) observed: "Sub-section (5) of Section 100 is applicable only when any substantial question of law has already been formulated and it empowers the High Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law. The expression ’on any other substantial question of law’ clearly shows that there must be some substantial question of law already formulated and then only another substantial question of law which was not formulated earlier can be taken up by the High Court for reasons to be recorded, if it is of the view that the case involves such question."

3. In view of limited scope available under sub-section (5) of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, now it is difficult to frame any substantial question of law, particularly when no such question was formulated by the appellants in the Appeal Memo and that this Court also did not formulate the same while admitting the Appeal. The Second Appeals cannot be entertained, therefore, in the absence of any real substantial question of law involved therein.

4. Though I am not inclined to entertain these Second Appeals for the reasons mentioned above, yet even on consideration of the merits, I find it difficult to interfere with the findings of the First Appellate Court.

5. Original plaintiff Anjanabai claimed right of preemption available under Section 22 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Admittedly, she is entitled to half share in the suit land. She is daughter of original defendant No.1 Trivenibai. The relationship would be clear from the following genealogical table: Yedba (died in 1973) ____________¦________________________ ¦ ¦ Anjanabai Trivenibai (Daughter-Plaintiff) (Widow-Defendant No.1)

6. Yedba was owner of three parcels of the lands situated at village Koudgaon. They are: Survey No.118-1(B), Survey No.118-2(B) and Survey No.123-(B). The defendant No.1 sold the suit lands to defendant Nos. 2 and 3 under two (2) registered sale deeds. The plaintiff’s case before the trial court was that she was minor at the time of said sale transactions which are not binding on her. She claimed half share as the legal heir of the deceased Yedba and further claimed remaining half share alienated by her mother, in the exercise of her right of preemption available under Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. She was ready and willing to pay half of the consideration amount in lieu of the said share. The trial court partly decreed the suit holding that the plaintiff was entitled to claim half share by way of partition but dismissed the claim for remaining half share sought in pursuance to right of preemption. Feeling aggrieved, both the parties preferred the Appeals. The First Appellate Court dismissed the defendants Appeal whereas allowed the Appeal preferred by the plaintiff.

7. The only question involved is whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim right of preemption under Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Though no substantial question of law is formulated and framed, yet I deem it proper to proceed on the assumption that the question 6 whether the right of preemption conferred by Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act could be enforced by the plaintiff after the alienations were made and what is the purport of expression "any one of such heir proposed to a transfer his or her interest" as used in sub-section (1) of Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

8. The fact that the plaintiff and defendant No.1 are the only l