Rule.

2. Heard finally with consent of parties.

3. This is an application under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code seeking to quash order dated 12.03.07 passed by the Sessions Judge whereby he confirmed the order of the Magistrate.

4. The facts are as follows: The present application under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code is filed by the accused in Criminal Complainant instituted under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. It is alleged that the accused/applicant had borrowed a sum of Rs.20,000/- from the complainant on 01.03.95 and the accused-applicant issued a cheque in favour of the complainant. The loan was to be repaid within a period of one year but was not, and an extension of one more year was granted. Further extension of yet another one year was sought and it was also granted by the complainant and ultimately time was extended upto the year 1999. The cheque was tendered in the bank thereafter and it was dishonoured. Hence the complaint came to be filed under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act.

5. Accused filed an application for his discharge and dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the debt sought to be recovered is barred by law of limitation. Although the complaint was filed in the year 1999 and accused had appeared in the case in 1999 he chose to file this application for discharge in the year 2005 i.e. after 6 years. The main ground upon which discharge was sought was that the period of limitation for recovery of loan had already expired when the complaint case was filed and cheque could not have revived the barred debt. Loan was advanced on 01.03.1995 and the cheque is dated 01.03.1999.

6. Mr. Kalar learned counsel for the accused/applicant contended that the limitation for recovery of loan amount under civil law is only 3 years and the cheque is dated 01.03.1999. He submits that the complainant seeks to recover the barred debt. He also submits that there is no acknowledgment at all of the debt within limitation and hence the debt is completely barred on the date of issue of cheque. The argument has no force for two reasons. Firstly complainant along with the complaint has filed a deposit receipt said to be issued by the accused. It shows that it was first renewed in 1996 and then in 1997. It is renewed under the signature of the accused. The said acknowledgment mentions that the date of repayment was extended upto 1998. Finally there is an endorsement that the contract is renewed upto 01.03.1998. As said earlier it is under the signature of the accused. It is obvious that the accused acknowledged the debt by making endorsement on the same document that the contract is renewed. Thus if this acknowledgment is taken into consideration the debt could be recovered even under the civil law within 3 years from 01.03.1997. The time of three years from 01.03.1997 would expire on 01.03.2000. The cheque was tendered in bank on 10.03.1999. Even complaint under Section 138 is filed in April 1999. Obviously even on date of institution of complaint the debt was legally recoverable. The ratio in Mr. Narendra V. Kanekar Vs. The Bardez Taluka Coop. Housing Mortgage Society Ltd. & Ano. 2006(3) of All MR 673 cited by Shri Kalar could squarely be applied to this case. Next reason is that, the cheque was issued and renewed from time to time could itself, be treated as an acknowledgment. The cheque bears the amount, the name of the payee and the signature of the drawer of the cheque as well as the date of issue. Therefore, a cheque itself is a document which could fall within the scope of Section 18 of the Limitation Act. Acknowledgment is given before the expiry of period of limitation since time was extended under the signature. In the instant case therefore we need not go into the question whether the claim could be said to be barred by limitation if a suit was to be filed. In fact in Narendra Kanekar's case cited supra the Court has observes as follows: Mere giving a cheque, without an