(Vijay Daga, J)

Rule returnable forthwith.

1. Heard finally by consent of parties.

2. Perused petition and counter affidavits.

3. The petitioner, through this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has brought to our notice prima facie, wilful and deliberate disobedience on the part of the Assistant Commissioner of Customs (Import) to the law laid down by this Court in the case of Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd vs.Union of India 1992 (59) ELT 505 (Bom), Ocean Centres vs Union of India 2005 (180) OLT 313 (Bom); and in the case of Noble Society vs Union of India 2005 (187) ELT 438 (Bom) wherein this Court has laid down and followed from time to time that during the period of limitation available for filing an appeal, no coercive action should be taken to enforce the order. The Assistant Commissioner of Customs (Import) in breach of the law laid down by this Court, which was specifically brought to its notice, encashed bank guarantee worth Rs.14,33,000/- (before expiry of the appeal period) which was furnished by the petitioner by way of security pending adjudication of dispute.

4. When the aforesaid prima facie and willful disobedience was brought to our notice, by an interim order dated 26th April, 2007 respondents were directed to deposit Rs.14,33,000/- with this Court with a further order issuing show cause notice to the Assistant Commissioner of Customs (Imports) as to why action under the provisions of the Contempt of Court Act should not be initiated for prima facie willful disobedience of the law laid down by this Court in the judgment referred to hereinabove and that the conduct of the Assistant Commissioner of Customs (Import) in not following the decisions of was calculated to undermine the dignity and majesty of the court and impair the constitutional authority of High Court.

5. The legal position regarding the binding nature of judgments delivered by High Court was clearly explained as far back as 1962 by the Supreme Court. In East India Commercial Co. Ltd v Collector of Customs, Calcutta, AIR 1962 SC 1893, Subba Rao, J (as he then was) speaking for himself and Mudholkar, J has explained, though A.K.Sarkar, J (the Third Member of the Bench) did not fully agree with this aspect of the legal position, the law laid down (para 29 of thereof) reads as under:

. " This raises the question whether an administrative tribunal can ignore the law declared by the highest Court in the State and intiate proceedings in direct violation of the law so declared under Art. 215, every High Court shall be a Court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Under Art. 226, it has plenary power to issue orders or writs for the enforcement of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose to any person or authority including inappropriate cases any Govt. within its territorial jurisdiction. Under Art. 227 it has jurisdiction over all Courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. It would be anomalous to suggest that a tribunal over which the High court has superintendence can ignore the law declared by that Court and start proceedings in direct violation of it. If a tribunal can do so, all the subordinate courts can equally do so, for there is no specific provision, just like in the case of Supreme Court, making the law declared by the High Court binding on subordinate courts. It is implicit in the power of supervision conferred on a superior tribunal that all the tribunals subject to its supervision should conform to the law laid down by it. Such obedience would also be conducive to their smooth working ;otherwise there would be confusion in the administration of law and respect for law would irretrieably suffer. We, therefore, hold that the law declared by the highest court in the State is binding on authorities, or tribunals under its superintendence, and that they cannot ignore it either in initiati