The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement of a reasonable relationship between the quantum of fee and the service or benefit provided, and the lack of quid pro quo in the hike of supervision charges from Rs. 20/- to Rs. 50/-.

B. P. DHARMADHIKARI, J.

( 1 ) BY this writ petition filed under Article 226 of constitution of India, the petitioner ? Association is challenging the increase in transit fee from Rs. 20/- to Rs. 50/- by Respondent no. 1 ? Municipal Corporation, on the ground that it is illegal, void and without jurisdiction.

( 2 ) DURING arguments, Shri Lohiya, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner also contended that in fact there could not be levy of any transit fee on goods/ transport vehicles which used National Highway only for passing from one point to another point and therefore today he has moved an application seeking permission to amend prayer clause by which he is seeking quashing and setting aside of relevant provisions of Standing orders framed by Respondent No. 1 under the provisions of section 466 (1) (A) (f) of Bombay Provincial Municipal corporation Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). As the necessary facts are already on record in writ petition with necessary assertions, we have allowed the amendment. Shri ghare, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 stated that as contents of petition are being changed, Respondent No. 1 should be permitted to file appropriate reply. However, we do not find it necessary. Amendment is accordingly allowed. Necessary amendment be carried out during the course of the day.

( 3 ) THE petitioner is a registered Society under the societies Registration Act, 1860, and its locus to maintain such petition has not been disputed by Respondent No. 1 or by respondent No. 2 ? State of Maharashtra. The petitioners have stated that they have passed a resolution to challenge increase in transit fee by Respondent No. 1. They have pointed out that akola Municipal Corporation has come into existence from 1. 10. 2001 and before that it was ?a? class Municipal Council. The recovery of Octroi has started after conversion of Municipal council into Municipal Corporation and octroi has been imposed by the Corporation with effect from 1. 12. 2002. It is stated that imposition of octroi has been challenged in separate petition. e. Writ Petition No. 4100 of 2002 which is already admitted for final hearing. The petitioners have contended that the octroi can be levied only if goods are imported for consumption, use or sale within municipal limits in view of provisions of Section 147 of the act. They state that if the vehicle containing goods pass from one point to other point through Corporation limits, statute permits corporation to recover supervision charges/ transit fee. It is contended that initially when octroi was being levied by municipal Council, the rate of transit fee was Rs. 2/- per vehicle and on 1. 12. 2002, when octroi was imposed by Municipal corporation, it was Rs. 20/- per vehicle. It is contended that only because vehicle passes through municipal limits, such an amount of Rs. 20/- cannot be levied. It is further stated that on 28. 3. 2003, General Body of Akola Municipal Corporation passed resolution and increased transit fee from Rs. 20/- to Rs. 50/- and said resolution along with increase has been assailed before us. It is stated that as it is fee, there has to be a proportionate relation between rate of fee and the service rendered or facility extended. As there is no quid pro quo, the petitioners prayed that said hike should be set aside. It is further contended that in view of provisions of Section 147 read with Section 466 (1) (A) (f) of the act, the supervision or transit fee is leviable only if goods are imported within city limits and thereafter are sought to be exported out of it. It is stated that thus resting of goods in municipal limit is sine qua non when goods merely pass through municipal limits without taking any halt or when the bulk is not broken, there cannot be any recovery of transit fee.

( 4 ) IN this background, we have heard Shri Lohiya, learned counsel for the petitioner - association, Shri Ghare, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 and Shri Deopujari, learned

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