Bombay High Court
R. M. S. Khandeparkar, D. G. Karnik
SARVADAMAN MANSUKHLAL DOSHI -Appeallant
Versus
DEEPAK MANSUKHLAL DOSHI -RESPONDENTS
Suit 1809 Of 2006
Decided On: 07/13/2007
Jurisdiction - Impugned Order - Section 30 of the C. P. C. - Order 16 of the Code - Section 138 of the Income-Tax Act, 1961 - [Section 30 of the C. P. C., Order 16 of the Code, Section 138 of the Income-Tax Act, 1961]
Fact of the Case:
The appeal challenges an order directing the Income-tax Department to deposit certain documents in the Court and provide necessary information. The appellants argue that the order was beyond the Single judge's jurisdiction and affected their valuable rights. The respondents contend that the order was interlocutory and not a judgment.
Finding of the Court:
The Court found that the impugned order did not finally determine any vital and valuable right or obligation of the parties. It held that the order was not a judgment within the meaning of the expression under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.
Issues: The main issue was the maintainability of the appeal based on whether the impugned order constituted a judgment.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court applied the principles established by the Apex Court in Shah Babulal Khimji's case and Midnapore Peoples' Co-op. Bank's case to determine the nature of the impugned order and its classification as a judgment.
Final Decision: The Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the impugned order was not a judgment within the meaning of the expression under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.
( 1 ) HEARD. ADMIT. The learned Advocates appearing on behalf of the respondents waive service. By consent, heard forthwith.
( 2 ) BY the present appeal, the order dated 4-5-2007 passed in Judges Order No. 146 of 2007 in Suit No. 1809 of 2006 is under challenge. By the impugned order, the Income-tax Department has been directed to deposit certain documents either in originals or the certified copies thereof in the Court and also to give the necessary information as directed under the impugned order.
( 3 ) THE challenge to the impugned order is on the ground that the learned Single judge had no jurisdiction to order production of the documents without ascertaining the relevancy of the documents for adjudication of the matter in dispute. It is further contention on behalf of the appellants that the impugned order is on par with the one in the nature of direction to the witness to produce the documents by issuing summons under the provisions of Order 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure hereinafter called as "the code", and the occasion for issuance of such summons can arise only when the issues are framed and settled and not at any stage earlier thereto and the same having been totally ignored, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. It is their contention that section 30 of the C. P. C. clearly provides that the exercise of power to order discovery and the production of documents is subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed and that therefore the same is subject to the provisions of Order 16 of the Code which has been totally ignored by the learned single Judge while passing the impugned order. It is their further contention that the impugned order forecloses the right of the appellants to object to the relevancy and/or admissibility of such documents and information in evidence as the production of the documents and the disclosure of information is ordered even without following the procedure prescribed for the same under the law and in that context the impugned order affects the valuable rights of the appellants.
( 4 ) ON the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents has raised a preliminary objection about the non-maintainability of the appeal in as much as that the impugned order is not a judgment within the meaning of the said expression under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It is their further contention that the the conditions and limitations which are prescribed for exercise of power under section 30 of the code are those enumerated under Order 11 of the Code and the same do not restrict the power of the Court to order the production of documents and/or disclosure of information even prior to the filing of the written statement by the defendant and there is no restriction that such an order can be passed only after framing of the issues. It is their further contention that the impugned order clearly discloses that the Court has clearly considered the relevancy of the documents and the production thereof at the stage at which the same are ordered to be produced. In any case, since the impugned order has been passed for further progress of the suit, it does not amount to a judgment and is purely an interlocutory order.
( 5 ) BOTH the Counsel in support of their rival contentions have relied upon the decision of the apex Court in the matter of (Shah babulal Khimji Vs. Jayaben D. Kania and another), reported in 1983 (1) Bom. C. R. (S. C.)37 : 1981 DGLS 358 : (1981)4 S. C. C. 8. The learned Counsel appearing for the appellants has further drawn our attention to section 138 of the Income-Tax Act, 1961 to contend that nothing forbids the respondents from approaching the income-tax authorities for necessary information and since there is a specific provision and procedure laid down for obtaining the information from the income-tax authorities, the intervention of the Civil Court to obtain such information and the documents impliedly stands restricted to in t
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