2006 Supreme(Bom) 1503
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
D.G.DESHPANDE, J.
Ramesh Bhimrao Patil : Petitioner
versus
Mohan Daji Mali & ors. : Respondents.
WRIT PETITION NO. 2831 OF 1992.
Decided on: September 20, 2006.
Advocate Appeared
Mr.Nitin P. Deshpande for the petitioner.
None for the respondents though served.
The absence of limitation prescribed for filing an application under Section 140 and the overriding effect of Section 144 on the provisions of Chapter X were crucial in the court's decision.
Headnote:
Motor Vehicle Act - Application for Condonation of Delay - Section 140, Section 166, Section 144 - The court discussed the provisions of Section 140, Section 166, and Section 144 of the Motor Vehicle Act. It highlighted the absence of limitation prescribed for filing an application under Section 140 and the overriding effect of Section 144 on the provisions of Chapter X. The court emphasized that the provisions of limitation prescribed in Chapter XII were wrongly applied to the application under Section 140, leading to a wrong conclusion by the tribunal. The judgment also referenced the deletion of subsection (3) of Section 166, granting the petitioner the right to apply under Chapter XII.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner, an injured person, filed an application before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act 1988, seeking compensation for an accident. The MACT rejected the application for condonation of delay, leading to the filing of the present petition.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the MACT erred in applying the provisions of limitation from Chapter XII to the application under Section 140. It held that the absence of limitation prescribed for filing an application under Section 140 and the overriding effect of Section 144 on the provisions of Chapter X were crucial in reaching this decision.
Issues: The issues revolved around the application of provisions of limitation, the interpretation of Section 140, and the impact of the deletion of subsection (3) of Section 166 on the petitioner's rights.
Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the incorrect application of provisions of limitation from Chapter XII to the application under Section 140, the absence of limitation prescribed for filing an application under Section 140, and the overriding effect of Section 144 on the provisions of Chapter X.
Final Decision: The impugned order of the MACT was set aside, and the MACT was directed to decide the application within a specified period. The petitioner was granted the right to apply under Chapter XII following the deletion of subsection (3) of Section 166.
1. Heard learned advocate for the petitioner. Though the respondents were served, nobody is present for them. The applicant, who was an injured person, had filed an application before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Pune vide M.A.C.P. No.4 of 1991. It was an application under section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act 1988. He also applied therein for condonation of delay. The accident had occurred on 24/11/1989 and his application for condonation of delay under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, [herein after referred to as the M.V.Act], came to be filed on 20.10.1991.
2. The M.A.C.T. Pune, treating this application as Exhibit 12, rejected the application on the ground that there was no provision for condoning the delay or after coming to the conclusion that the tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the application for condonation of delay filed after one year of the accident. It is against this order of the M.A.C.T. dated 28.4.1992 the present petition has been filed.
3. Mr. Deshpande, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, firstly, contended that when an application under Section 140 is made under Chapter X of the M.V.Act, no limitation is prescribed. It is a summary enquiry where the applicant has not to prove any negligence. The amount of compensation is fixed by Legislature which is Rs.50,000/- in case of death and Rs.25,000/- in case of permanent disability. The learned advocate Mr. Deshpande pointed out that similarly such section under Old Act was 92A which was introduced by way of Amendment of 1982 in the M.V.Act, 1939 and very object of introducing Section 92A was to give benefit to the victims of the accident. The Legislature meant to help all destitutes who are affected by the motor accident and not only to those who are pedestrians or their legal representatives and, the object of this section is to speed up payment of compensation on no fault principle. Therefore, Section 92A was treated as a piece of beneficial legislation, providing for an immediate aid to claimants on account of death in an accident and, it should not be allowed to circumvented on technical pleas of joinder, non-joinder or misjoinder of parties.
4. The learned advocate for the petitioner also pointed out that Chapter XII regarding compensation after inquiry is totally different chapter wherein under Section 166 an application was required to be made to the tribunal for claiming compensation. Subsection (3) of Section 166 prescribed limitation. But subsection (3) was deleted in 1994 meaning thereby at present there is no limitation prescribed for making an 4 application under Chapter XII. The advocate for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Hintendra Vishnu Thakur and others v/s. State of Maharashtra and others reported in (1994) 4 SCC 602, and on the basis of para 26 contended that if the provisions relating to limitation are amended, then they are to be treated as procedural amendment and to be made applicable retrospectively. The Supreme Court in para 26 held thus :- "The Designated Court has held that the amendment would operate retrospectively and would apply to the pending cases in which investigation was not complete on the date on which the Amendment Act came into force and the challan had not till then been filed in the court. From the law settled by this Court in various cases the illustrative though not exhaustive principles which emerge with regard to the ambit and scope of an Amending Act and its retrospective operation may be culled out as follows:
(i) A statute which affects substantive rights is presumed to be prospective in operation unless made retrospective, either expressly or by necessary intendment, whereas a statute which merely affects procedure, unless such a construction is textually impossible, is presumed to be retrospective in its application, should not be given an extended meaning and should be strictly confined to its clearly defined lim