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2007 Supreme(Bom) 1643
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
R.M.S.KHANDEPARKAR & SMT.V.K.TAHILRAMANI, JJ
M/s. Ghatge Patil Transport Limited, - Petitioners
Versus
The State of Maharashtra - Respondents
WRIT PETITION NO.1426 OF 2007
Decided on: 29TH NOVEMBER, 2007
Shri V.A.Gangal and Ashok Gade, Advocates for the Petitioners.
Smt.A.S.Pai, APP for the Respondents.
Headnote:Constitution of India, 1950 - Articles 19(1)(g) and 300-A-Forest Act, 1927, Section 52(1-A)-Confiscation and forfeiture of property-Filing of charge-sheet and proof of offence-Power of authority even before of-Validity of-Said power of authority in consonance with preamble of Act-Power of confiscation and forfeiture is in nature of adjudication proceedings-Totally different from criminal proceedings-One being not subjected to or controlled by another not takes away right to property under Article 300-A-Not violates Article 19(1)(g) of Constitution.-The provisions of Section 52 and Section 52(1-A) of the said Act obviously relate to the power of seizure confiscation and forfeiture of the forest produce along with the vehicle used for transporting the same without proper authority or licence. It cannot be disputed that the same are in keeping with the object and purpose behind the enactment of the said Act which is clearly revealed from the preamble of the said Act which states that the said Act has been enacted to consolidate the law relating to forest, transit of forest product and duty leviable on timber and other forest produce.
Perusal of the provisions of law comprised under Sections 52 and 52(1-A) of the said Act nowhere discloses any restriction which can be said to be unreasonable or beyond the scope of the object of the statute for the purpose for which the statute has been brought in force. The provisions of law enacted for regulated enjoyment of the right in relation to a particular occupation or business cannot be said to be unreasonable unless the power given to the authority to ensure due compliance of the regulations can be disclosed as per se arbitrary or so unlimited that it can be abused and can be exercised to defeat the very purpose of the said Act. That is not the case of the petitioners in relation to the provisions of law comprised under Sections 52 and 52(1-A) of the said Act. Apart from contending that the provisions imposed unreasonable restrictions the petitioners have not been able to elaborate the same to justify challenge regarding constitutional validity on the first ground of challenge.
As regards the contention that the said provisions of law empower confiscation and forfeiture even before the charge-sheet is filed and offence is proved, it is to be noted that the confiscation and forfeiture has nothing to do with the criminal proceedings for the offences committed under the said Act. The power of confiscation and forfeiture assured under the said provisions of law is in the adjudication proceedings which are totally different from the criminal proceedings and one is not subject to or controlled by another.
Forest Act, 1927 - Sections 2(4)(a) and 2(6) - Forest produce - Definition of - Any piece of wood included within definition of forest produce - Definition also includes all articles and goods produced or found in forest alongwith trees, plants or bushes. - Plain reading of definition clauses in Section 2 would reveal that the same are inclusive. The illustrations referred to in the definition are not exhaustive. It is apparent from Section 2(4)(a) read with Section 2(6) of the said Act that timber in any form whether cut into pieces or fashioned would be a forest produce without any restriction about the same being required to be found in or brought from a forest. In other words the definition being very wide any piece of wood could be a forest produce within the meaning of the said expression under the said Act.
Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 - Section 58-H - Forest Act, 1927, Sections 52(1-A) and 2(4) - Forest produce - Whether includes goods made out of it. - The definition of the term "forest produce" is not only confined to the trees, plants or bushes, but it even takes in its grip all the articles and goods which are produced or found in the forest. Indeed, the purport of the definition clause in relation to the term "forest produce", is abundantly clear that the same is quite wider and it includes natural produce as well as the product prepared, out of such pro duce by a human mechanism. Certainly, human mechanism will also include involvement or utilisation of modern plant and/or machine. In that sense, chips, though may not be classified as a natural produce, it also cannot be held that such article prepared and known as ’finished goods’ would loose its original identity on account of such processing on the natural produce. The finished product would necessarily identify with its source which has been used as raw material.
1. Heard. Rule. By consent, the rule made returnable forthwith. Smt.Pai, the learned APP waives service for the Respondents.
2. By the present petition, the petitioners are challenging the constitutional validity of Sections 52 and 52(1-A) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, as applicable to the State of Maharashtra, hereinafter called as "the said Act", being violative of Article 19(1)(g) and Section 300A of the Constitutional of India as also seeking to quash and set aside the Order dated 19th December, 2005 passed by the Range Forest Officer, Wild Life, Kolhapur in Case No.Crime/1591/2005-06 Kolhapur, the Order dated 31st October, 2006 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Shirala, in Criminal Complaint No.183 of 2006 below Exhibit-72, and the Order dated 8th May, 2007 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Islampur, in Criminal Revision Petition No.46 of 2006 and pray further for direction to the respondents for release of their vehicle bearing No.MH-09-Q/7246, hereinafter called as "the said Vehicle".
3. The petitioner company is engaged in the business of transportation of goods and is having its office at Kolhapur, and has several branch offices at various places. The said vehicle belongs to the petitioner and has all India permit for transport. On 29th August, 2005, the said vehicle was found transporting forest produce and therefore was seized by the officers of the respondents under the provisions of the said Act, as well as the provisions of the Wild Life ( Protection ) Act, 1972, hereinafter called as "the Wild Life Act". The forest produce involved in the matter are chips of shrubs known as "Mappia Foetida" which is popularly known as "Narkya Shrub" as well as "Amruta" and the same are used for preparation of medicines.
4. It is the case of the petitioners that pursuant to the seizure of the said vehicle, the same is getting rusted and rottened resulting in deterioration of its value and utility, and therefore, the petitioners requested for release of the said vehicle on execution of a bond so that the said vehicle can be put to the beneficial use by the petitioners to whom it belongs to and can be produced before the concerned authority as and when required for the purpose of investigation or inquiry. The petitioners, therefore, moved an application before the competent authority under Section 60 of the said Act, which came to be rejected by the impugned order dated 19th December, 2005. The said order was sought to be challenged by way of Criminal Writ Petition before this Court being Criminal Writ Petition No.274 of 2006 which came to be disposed of as withdrawn on 28th July, 2006 with liberty to approach the Court of learned Magistrate to seek relief in terms of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The petitioners, thereafter, filed an application under Section 451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Shirala, which came to be rejected by the impugned order dated 31st October, 2006. The matter was carried in Revision Application before the learned Sessions Judge, Islampur, which was heard by the Additional Sessions Judge, Islampur, and was dismissed by the impugned order dated 8th May, 2007. Hence, the present appeal.
5. Initially when the petition was filed, the petitioners have merely sought to challenge the impugned orders. However, by way of amendment to the petition in terms of the order dated 6th August, 2007, the petitioners have sought to challenge the constitutional validity of the Sections 52 and 52(1-A) of the said Act on the ground that the same are violative of Article 19(1)(g) as well as Article 300A of the Constitution of India.
6. We have heard at length the learned advocate for the petitioners and the learned APP for the respondents. While assailing the provisions of law comprised under Sections 52 and 52(1-A) of the said Act, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioners submitted that t
