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2008 Supreme(Bom) 135

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.

ING VYSY A BANK LTD. - Petitioner.
VS.
MODERN INDIA LTD. and another -Respondents.
Arbitration Petition (Lodg.) No.748 of 2007
Decided On 30-1-2007

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared
For petitioner:P.K. Samdani, Senior Advocate with lndranil Deshmukh instructed by Amarchand and Mangaldas and S. A. Shroff and Co.
For respondent Nos. 1 and 2:Ms. Rajni Iyer, Senior Advocate with Ms. Sudeshna Guha Roy instructed by Paras Kuhad and Associates

Headnote:Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, 1887 - Section 41-Bar Under-Jurisdiction of Court-Non-obstante clause in Section 41(1) of Act has overriding effect over all other provisions of Act-Suits falling within definition of Section 41(1), lie within exclusive jurisdiction of Small Causes Court, irrespective of fact that value of subject-matter exceeds limits on its pecuniary jurisdiction-Suit relating to recovery of possession attracts Section 41(1) of Act notwithstanding fact that some of reliefs structured around a claim for specific performance.-The first thing to be noted about Section 41 is that it is prefaced with a non-obstante provision as a result of which the provisions of sub-section (1) are given overriding force and effect notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in the Act nonetheless, however, subject to sub-section (2). The jurisdiction to entertain and try all suits and proceedings between a licensor and a licensee and/or a landlord or tenant is conferred upon the Court of Small Causes where the suit relates to the recovery of possession of immovable property or to the recovery of licence fees or charges or rent therefore irrespective of the value of the subject-matter of such suit or proceeding. The words "irrespective of the value of the subject-matter of such suits or proceedings" are intended to indicate that even though the value of the subject-matter would exceed the pecuniary limits on the jurisdiction of the Court, it is the Court of Small Causes which is conferred with the jurisdiction to entertain and try suits of the descriptions specified in sub-section (1). However, sub-section (2) carves out an exception in respect of those suits for the recovery of possession or of licence fees, rent or charges to which the Rent Act, the other Acts enunciated or any other law for the time being in force apply. The non-obstante clause in sub-section (1) of Section 41 has overriding effect over all the other provisions of the Act. The would include the provisions contained in Section 18 defining the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court. Suits falling in the description contained in sub-section (1) of Section 41 would lie within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court notwithstanding the fact that the value of the subject-matter exceeds the limits on its pecuniary jurisdiction. The non-obstante provision in sub-section (1) of Section 41 will also prevail over Section 19 because when the suit is of the description contained in the former provision that will prevail over the latter. The primary determination which the Court must make in every such case is whether the suit in substance and in essence is a suit relating to the recovery of possession or the recovery of licence fee, rent or other charges between a landlord and tenant or a licensor and licensee. The Court will decide the issue by looking at the learned and disregarding the chaff. The existence of a jural relationship of licensor and licensee or as the case may be of landlord and tenant the nature of the cause of action the character of the reliefs sought and whether the claim of the plaintiff arises from and out of the obligations of the parties as licensor and licensee or landlord and tenant are important consideration. The garb or cloak which is wrapped around the pleadings by an statute draftsman must be kept aside to deduce the pith and substance of the pleadings. If the suit relates to the recovery of possession if is a suit to which Section 41(1) applies notwithstanding the fact that some of the relief or a portion of the cause of action is structured around a claim for specific performance. The Court must ask itself : Does the theme and the foundation relate to the recovery of possession? And in answering question the pleadings must be considered as a whole without severing its constituents, or reading parts in isolation.

JUDGMENT :-

The principal issue which falls for the determination of the Court is whether the provisions of section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 would bar the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal to entertain a claim for specific performance of an agreement of renewal contained in an agreement of licence executed between a licensor and licensee. The relief which has been sought in these proceedings under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is an order of injunction restraining the licensor from terminating the agreement of licence and acting upon a communication calling upon the licensee to hand over vacant possession and in particular, restraining the licensor from initiating proceedings for the recovery of possession of the licensed premises. An injunction has also been sought restraining the licensor from disturbing the use and occupation of the premises by the licensee; from entering into any third party rights in respect of the licensed premises. Other consequential reliefs restraining the licensor from interfering with the use of common facilities have been sought.

2. The respondents are licensors and the petitioner is a licensee in respect of commercial premises consisting of Unit No.7 in the A Wing on the first floor of a building known as Modern Centre situated at Mahalakshml, Mumbai. The petitioner has been ill occupation of the premises from 1st January, 2002. A leave and licence agreement is stated to have been initially entered into on 19th October, 2001 for a term of three years commencing from 1st January, 2002 which was to expire on 31st December, 2004. According to the petitioner a right, was conferred upon it of a refusal to renew the agreement for a further two terms of three years each commencing from 31st December, 2004. On 11th January, 2005 an agreement of licence was entered into between the parties under which a licence was granted by the respondents to the petitioner to utilize the facilities of a business center at the premises for a period of three years commencing from 1st January, 2005 and ending on 31st December, 2007. The licence fee under the agreement was fixed at Rs.5,75,0001- per month and a deposit of Rs.60 lacs was furnished free of interest for the due performance of the obligations under the agreement. Towards the provision of certain services and facilities, the petitioner was to pay in addition an amount of Rs.14,510/- each month. Clause 5 of the agreement deals with renewal and made the following provisions:

"5(a) Client shall have the right of refusal to renew this Agreement for fUl1her periods of three years from 1st January, 2008 to 31st December, 2010.

(b) In the event of the Client opting for renewal, the charges under subclause (a) of Clause No.8 shall be increased by 15% i.e. to Rs.6,61,2501(Rupees six lacs sixtyone thousand two hundred fifty only) per month.

(c) In the event of the Client desiring to renew the agreement after completion of three years (36 English calender months) beyond 31st December, 2007 the Client shall give to the Conductor advance notice of 6 months in writing before the expiry of the agreement.

(d) All other terms and conditions herein shall remain the same during the extended period of agreement for renewal period."

3. Clause 6 of the agreement provided that the agreement was terminable for a breach on the part of the other party. During the period of renewal the petitioner was entitled to terminate the agreement with a notice of six months while on the other hand the respondents did not have any right to terminate the agreement other than for a breach of the conditions of the agreement. Under clause 7(a)(i) the agreement was to be terminable by efflux of time. Sub-clause (c) of clause 7 provides that upon the termination of the agreement the petitioner would hand over vacant and peaceful possession to the respondents failing which the respondents were entitled to remove the belongings of the petitioner upon the expir














































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