SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

2008 Supreme(Bom) 421

2008(4) ALL MR 335
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)
B. P. DHARMADHIKARI, J.
Jaglal s/o. Premlal Jayaswal & Anr. - Appellants
Versus
Waman s/o. Shyamraoji Dhobale & Anr. - Respondents
Second Appeal No.286 of 1992
Decided on : 17th March, 2008

Advocates appeared
Shri. A. M. GORDEY, Advocate for the Appellant
Shri. J. J. CHANDURKAR, Advocate for the Respondents

Headnote:Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 - Section 143(5)-Jurisdiction of Tahsildar-Invocation of-Civil suit filed on 28.12.1981-Jurisdiction of Tahsildar sought to be invoked on 24.3.1982 pending civil suit-Invocation of jurisdiction of Tahsildar itself legally not permissible.-In view of substantial question of law framed, it is apparent that the only question to be decided is whether in the pending suit, the order of Tahsildar under Section 143(1) could have been assailed. As already stated above from the facts, it is clear that the appellant defendant approached the Tahsildar when the Civil Suit was already filed on the very same subject-matter. The provisions of Section 143 sub-section (5) clearly show that the Legislature has taken precaution to see that no inconsistent orders come into force and once a decision of Tahsildar is challenged in the Civil Suit, further challenged to such order before the revenue authorities is expressly prohibited. It is not the case of any of the parties that in case of grievance of present nature. Civil suit cannot be filed directly. It is, therefore, apparent that the party who has grievance has an option either to approach the Tahsildar under Section 143(1) and then to file a civil suit. In these circumstances, after the civil suit is filed, if it is held that the approach to Tahsildar is very same matter under Section 143(1) is legal and permissible, the possibility of inconsistent orders being passed again emerges. In fact, in view of the precaution taken vide Section 143, sub-section (5) and primacy given to civil remedy, it is clear that after an option is exercised, the other party cannot switch over to other forum so as to seek any inconsistent order or to make an attempt for any different order at least till Tahsildar passes an order. In the circumstances, it is clear that as the civil suit was already filed on 28.12.1981, invocation of jurisdiction of the Tahsildar by present appellants on 24.3.1982 was itself legally not permissible.

JUDGMENT :-

The original defendants have challenged the concurrent judgments and decrees whereby the suit of the respondents plaintiffs to restrain the appellants from entering the field Survey No.35/2 or 35/1-A, from going over the Dhura to reach their field Survey No.35/1 of village Temburkheda, came to be decreed with a declaration that the defendants have no such rights.

2. The appeal has been admitted for final hearing on 14-3-1992 by raising a question as to whether the Civil Court, in a already instituted suit, can go into the correctness of the decision of Tahasildar under Section 143(3) of Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, which was based on the needs of the cultivators, and whether a fresh suit under Section 143(4) of the said Code was necessary, after the decision of the Tahasildar ?

3. The respondents - plaintiffs filed Regular Civil Suit No.1 of 1982 on 28-12-1981 for declaration and injunction as mentioned above. The said suit, upon its transfer to the Court of Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division Warud, was re-numbered as R.C.S.No.33 of 1989. The plaintiffs are admittedly the owners of field Survey No.35/2 and 35/1-A situated digonically opposite to each other. The field Survey No.35/1 belongs to the original respondents/present appellants. The plaintiffs approached with a grievance that the respondents were not entitled to use their fields or Dhura shown by them as Shiv of village Bembadi on eastern side of field survey No.35/ 2, and then on its northern side to reach his field Survey No.35/1. They contended that there was a regular cart way (Pandhan) from Temburkheda village to Bembadi village, which began from Survey No.38 of Temburkheda, and passed on western side of field Survey No.35/l and 35/1-A. Between these two fields and said cart way, there is survey No.32. Cart way proceeds by western boundary of survey No.32, and it was the case of the plaintiffs that the defendants used this way to reach the boundary between the survey No.31 & 32, and from there, they took a turn towards east (right hand turn) and reached north west corner of their field survey No.35/1. The Trial Court after adjudication, decreed the suit of the plaintiffs, and held that the defendants had no such right, and it also held that the plaintiffs proved that the defendants had usual way by Pandhan between Temburkheda and Bembadi. The defendants then filed the Regular Civil Suit No.112 of 1998, and 2nd Additional District Judge, on 22-6-1992, dismissed the appeal.

4. Advocate Shri. A.M. Gordey appearing for the appellant/original defendants has contended that from very scheme of Section 143 of Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, it is apparent that the suit to question order of Tahasildar passed in pursuance thereof must be instituted after the said order. He contends that hearing of the suit was already instituted, and the Tahasildar has passed the order under Section 143 of Maharashtra Land Revenue Code in favour of the present appellants on 23-9-1985. He states that no suit has been filed after 23-9-1985, and there is no amendment made in the Civil Suit already filed questioning the said order. According to him, the Order of Tahasildar dated 23-9-1985, therefore, attained the finality. He points out that the said order was challenged before the appellate Forum and the revisional Forum prescribed under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, and thereafter, in Writ Petition before the Division Bench of this Court by the present respondents, and the order of Tahasildar was maintained by all authorities and this Court. Accordingly, in view of this development, Civil suit itself became redundant, and ought to have been dismissed. He further contends that even on facts, the findings reached by the Trial Court or the Lower Appellate Court cannot be sustained because according to him existence of Shiv Dhura between village Temburkheda and village Bembadi is an admitted position.

He therefore, contends that the perversity of findings is the substantial question













Click Here to Read the rest of this document

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top