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2008 Supreme(Bom) 1174

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
A.S.OKA, J.
Vishal Damodar Patil — Petitioner
Versus
Vishakha Vishal Patil The State of Maharashtra — Respondents
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.1552 OF 2008
Decided on : AUGUST 20,2008

Advocates appeared:
Mr.Uday Warunjikar for the petitioner
Ms P.P.Shinde A.P.P. for State
Ms Manisha Bagale for Respondent No.1.

The main legal point established in the judgment is that interim relief can be granted under section 23 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act in aid of the final relief sought in the main application under section 12(1), without the requirement of a separate application for interim relief.

Headnote:

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act - Interim Relief - Section 12, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 28 - The court discussed the relevant provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, particularly sections 12, 17 to 22, and 23, along with the corresponding rules. It highlighted the power of the Magistrate to grant interim and ex parte orders under section 23, the requirement of filing an affidavit in prescribed form, and the absence of a separate application for interim relief. The court emphasized that the interim relief can be granted in aid of the final relief sought in the main application under section 12(1) of the Act.

Fact of the Case:

The first respondent filed an application under section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, seeking interim maintenance and permission to reside in a shared house. The petitioner-husband appealed the decision, arguing that no prayer for interim relief was made by the first respondent and that the impugned order was illegal.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the learned Magistrate had the jurisdiction to grant interim relief under section 23 of the Act, even without a separate application for interim relief. It noted that the petitioner was aware of the reliefs claimed by the first respondent and had an opportunity to oppose the prayer for grant of interim relief.

Issues: The issues revolved around the grant of interim relief under section 23 of the Act, the requirement of a separate application for interim relief, and the legality of the impugned order.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the interim relief can be granted in aid of the final relief sought in the main application under section 12(1) of the Act, and there is no requirement of filing a separate application for interim relief under section 23.

Final Decision: The petition was rejected, and the main application under section 12(1) of the Act was directed to be decided by the learned Magistrate without being influenced by the grant of interim relief.

ORAL JUDGMENT:

1. The submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the parties were heard on the last date. With a view to appreciate the submissions, it will be necessary to refer to the facts of the case in brief. . The first respondent filed an application under section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act). The learned Magistrate passed an order on 4th January 2008 on the said application directing the petitioner-husband to pay interim maintenance at the rate of Rs.1,000/- p.m. The learned Magistrate also directed that the first respondent wife was permitted to reside in a shared house situated at village Shedung, Post Ajiwali, Taluka Panvel, District Raigad. An Appeal was preferred by the Petitioner by invoking section 29 of the said Act. The Appeal was dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge by order dated 15th July 2008.

2. The submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that there was no prayer made by the first Respondent for grant of any interim relief. He submitted that in absence of any prayer in the main application under section 12 of the said Act or in absence of any separate application filed by the first Respondent for grant of interim relief, the learned Magistrate could not have granted interim relief in favour of the first Respondent. He submitted that in absence of any interim application being made by the first Respondent, there was no occasion for the learned Magistrate to consider the prayer for grant of interim relief. He submitted that as no opportunity was granted to the petitioner to oppose the prayer for grant of interim relief, the impugned order deserves to be set aside only on this ground. He submitted that the direction issued by the learned Trial Judge by order dated 4th January 2008 by which the first Respondent was permitted to reside in the shared house is in the nature of the final order which could not have been passed without giving an opportunity to the petitioner of adducing evidence. He submitted that the impugned order is therefore illegal and is required to be quashed and set aside. The learned counsel for the first Respondent supported the impugned Judgments and Orders and submitted that the learned Magistrate had jurisdiction to grant interim relief though there was no separate application containing a prayer for interim relief filed by the first Respondent.

3. I have carefully considered the submissions. It will be necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the said Act. Sub section 1 of section 12 of the said Act provides that an aggrieved person or any other person on behalf of the aggrieved person or a protection Officer may present an application to the Magistrate for seeking one or more reliefs under the said Act. The reliefs which can be sought under the said Act are incorporated in sections 17 to 22 of the said Act. Section 17 is regarding a right of a woman to reside in the shared household. Section 18 gives power to the learned Magistrate to pass a prohibitory order against the Respondent in the application under section 12(1) of the said act. The said prohibitory order is essentially for preventing the respondent from committing an act of domestic violence or from preventing commission of any act as specified in the protection order. Section 19 empowers the Magistrate to pass a residence order. Under the said section the learned Magistrate can restrain the Respondent in the application under section 12 from dispossessing or in any other manner disturbing the possession of the aggrieved person from the shared household. Under the said section the learned Magistrate can issue direction against the Respondent to remove himself from the household. Under the said section the learned Magistrate can direct the Respondent to secure the same level of alternate accommodation for aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household. Section 20 confers power on the lea















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