This appeal is directed against an Order passed on 11-42000 by the learned Comarca Judge of Salcete and Quepem whereby he rejected application dated 7-12-1999 filed by the appellant for depositing owelty money or in the alternative to participate in the auction.

2. This case has a chequered history. In the inventory proceedings initiated in the year 1975, in a licitation held on 14-7-1988, appellant offered the highest bid individually for Item No.2, and along with three others for Item No.3. On 10-3-1989, Appellant sought extension of time to pay owelty amount. On 14-31989 at 11.00 a.m. trial Court granted time. At 12.50 noon the Court rescinded the order and declared auction null and void. This Order was challenged before this Court. This Court quashed the order and remanded the matter for re-hearing. On 30-4-1992 Trial Court rescinded its order dated 14-3-1989 and this Court upheld this order on 12-2-1996 in Appeal From Order No. 44/92. On 9-4-1999 the Trial Court pennitted Pradeep Yeshwant, respondent No.8, to take part in a fresh auction. On 11-10-1999, in Civil Revision Application No. 127/99 the High Court confirmed this order. Thereafter appellant filed application dated 7-121999, which was rejected by the impugned Order.

3. According to the appellant, Articles 1412 and 1417 of the Portuguese Code do not provide for disqualification of a defaulting bidder. Further, when other defaulting bidders have been permitted to deposit owelty money before start of new auction, (presumably by order in Civil Revision Application No. 127/99 by this Court) denying the same right to petitioner would amount to discrimination. Highest bid for property Item No.3, of Rs. 13,01,010/- was offered by 4 parties who were to contribute proportionately. Failure by one would make auction ineffective as a whole. Lastly, according to appellant, licitation is after all an auction and therefore provisions of Articles 1417 read with Article 904 of Procedure Code would apply.

4. I have heard both the learned Counsel for the appellant and respondents. Arguments advanced give rise to the following points for determination:

(1) Is a defaulting bidder at a licitation disqualified from bidding at a subsequent licitation?

(2) Is a defaulting bidder entitled to deposit the price at the start of the auction?

5. At the outset, the learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that appeal is not tenable as these very questions had been previously raised and dealt with by this Court in judgment dated 12-2-1996 in Appeal From Order No. 44/1992. Therefore they cannot be re-agitated now. His learned adversaries submitted that question which came up for determination in Appeal From Order No. 44/1992 was not the same. They submitted that observations in the judgment would have to be read in the context of the controversy raised. I have carefully considered these submissions.

6. It may be recalled that Appeal from Order No. 44/92 was filed by this very appellant to challenge Order passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Margao on 30-4-1992 revoking his earlier Order dated 14-3-1989, whereby appellant had been granted five days time to deposit owelty money. Facts which led to passing these Orders are enumerated in paragraphs 7 to 12 of the judgment of this Court in Appeal from Order No. 44/92. Submissions of parties relating to extension of time are then dealt with up to para 21. This Court held that the trial Court rightly rescinded Order extending time for paying owelty money. In para 22, the Court observed as under:

"Undisputedly the scheme of the inventory proceedings is that the person-successful bidder fails to deposit the money within 5 days, auction held earlier in his favour is cancelled and his right extinguishes. Consequently, debars him from participation in licitation. Property comes back to others debarring his participation in auction. Such person is entitled to get his share only but not bid for others share." 7. In para 24 the Court observ