The main legal point established in the judgment is that the termination of a probationer judge's service does not require an enquiry and may be based on an assessment of the probationer's work and conduct during the probation period, as provided under the Bombay Judicial Services Recruitment Rules, 1956.

D.B. Bhosale, J.

This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against an order of termination dated 9th May, 1995 by which the petitioner, who was appointed as Civil Judge, Junior Division and Judicial Magistrate, First Class (for short "CJJD & JMFC") on probation, has been terminated from the date he received a copy of the order.

2. Necessary facts giving rise to this petition are that the petitioner was selected as CJJD & JMFC vide notification dated 19th November, 1990 issued by the Government of Maharashtra, General Administration Department, Mantralaya (Law & Judiciary Department), Mumbai. The first posting of the petitioner was at Wardha where he joined on 10.1.1991 as a trainee for six months under the District and Sessions Court, Wardha. After completion of the training he was posted at Karanja (Ghadge) on 30.11.1991. He continued to work there till 31.5.1994. Thereafter he was transferred to the District Court at Thane as the 3rd Jt. CJJD and JMFC. The petitioner joined there on 6.6.1994 and continued to work till 25.2.1995 and from there he was transferred to Chandrapur vide High Court notification dated 24.1.1995 and as 4th Jt. CJJD and JMFC, Chandrapur. While at Chandrapur the impugned order dated 9.5.1995 came to be issued.

3. There is no dispute that his initial appointment vide notification dated 19.11.1990 was on probation for a period of two years. He completed the probation period of two years on 11.1.1993. His probation, in view of the observations made by the committee nominated by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice - respondent no.2 was extended by one year vide High Court Resolution No.A.3930(II)/90 dated 26th October, 1993. The extended period of probation got over on 11.1.1994 and thereafter it appears that the probation period stood extended in view of the deeming provision under clause (iv) of sub-rule (4) of Rule (4) of the Bombay Judicial Services Recruitment Rules, 1956 (for short "the said Rules") till his termination vide order dated 9.5.1995. A copy of true translation supplied by the petitioner of the impugned notification dated 9.5.1995 read thus:

"No.CJM 3295/324 (14) III General Administration (Law and Judiciary) Department vide Government Notification No.CJM 1090/400 (55) D III dated 19th November, 1990, Shri Mohan Dagadu Nimbalkar was appointed as Civil Judge Junior Division and Judicial Magistrate First Class in the State of Maharashtra on probation for a period of two years with effect from the date he assumes charge of his post. His probation period has been extended from 12th January, 1993 for a year but he could not complete the above probation period satisfactory. Hence his services as Civil Judge Junior Division and Judicial Magistrate First Class stand terminated from the date he receives copy of this order and his probation period be deemed to have been extended till he receives the copy of this order.

By order and in the name of the Governor of Maharashtra."

4. The petitioner in the writ petition has stated that the order of termination though on plain reading seems to be a termination simplicitor, in fact it was by way of punishment and is stigmatic. He made reference to an incident where some grievance was made by a lawyer at Thane against the petitioner allegedly demanding a bribe for giving judgment in favour of his client. It is further contended that in pursuance thereof an enquiry was initiated and that the petitioner was not given any opportunity of being heard and as a result thereof he came to be terminated in violation of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. In short, he submitted that his termination is stigmatic and it attracts Article 311(2) of the Constitution.

5. We have heard the petitioner in person. He invited our attention to the averments in the writ petition and its annexures so also to the reply affidavit filed by the respondents and its annexures to contend that his termination order was not termination simp