Bombay High Court
SHARAD MANOHAR
Madhavdas Dwarkadas - Appellant
Versus
Jugal Kishore Saraf - Respondent
Decided On : 04/29/1982
PRESIDENCY SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT - SECTION 41 - JURISDICTION - REVOCATION OF LICENSE - CAUSE OF ACTION - MERGER OF CAUSE OF ACTION - ESTOPPEL - JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES - FACTUAL ISSUES - REMAND - [SECTION 41 OF THE PRESIDENCY SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT] - [JURISDICTION OF THE COURT TO GRANT EJECTMENT APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 41 OF THE ACT] - [REVOCATION OF LICENSE BY FILING EJECTMENT APPLICATION OR EXECUTION APPLICATION] - [CAUSE OF ACTION FOR SECOND EJECTMENT APPLICATION] - [MERGER OF CAUSE OF ACTION IN CONSENT ORDER] - [ESTOPPEL AGAINST RAISING JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES] - [FACTUAL ISSUES RELATING TO COMPENSATION AND FURNITURE] - [REMAND FOR RE-APPRECIATION OF EVIDENCE AND DISPOSAL OF THE APPLICATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW]
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner, the owner of a flat in a building at Walkeshwar, filed an ejectment application under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act against the defendant, who was in possession of the flat on leave and license basis. The Trial Court rejected the application on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to grant such application in view of an order in certain previous proceedings between the parties. The petitioner challenged this decision in the present writ petition.
Finding of the Court:
The High Court held that the consent order passed in the first ejectment application did not bar the second ejectment application. The Court found that the consent order did not bring about any new rights for the defendant and that the license, if it existed, continued as before. The Court also held that the revocation of the license dated 12-4-1965 was itself revoked and the previous license was deemed to be continued as if it was never revoked. The Court further held that the plaintiff was within his rights when he revoked the license for the second time and that the second ejectment application was maintainable.
Issues: 1. Whether the consent order in the first ejectment application barred the second ejectment application? 2. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to revoke the license for the second time? 3. Whether the second ejectment application was maintainable?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The consent order did not bring about any new rights for the defendant and that the license, if it existed, continued as before. 2. The revocation of the license dated 12-4-1965 was itself revoked and the previous license was deemed to be continued as if it was never revoked. 3. The plaintiff was within his rights when he revoked the license for the second time. 4. The second ejectment application was maintainable.
Final Decision: The High Court allowed the petition, quashed and set aside the judgment of the Trial Court, and directed the Trial Court to dispose of the application in accordance with the provisions of law in the light of the observations made by the Court. The Court also directed the Trial Court to hear the application expeditiously and to dispose of the same in any event before 31st Aug., 1982.
2. The facts relevant for the purpose of this judgment are the following :-
The flat in question belongs to the present petitioner and admittedly he gave the same on leave and licence to the defendant in the year 1959. The amount of compensation fixed was Rs. 531/-. It has been contended before me that the said amount of Rs. 531/- was not only for the promises but also for furniture because it was furnished flat which was given on leave and licence basis to the defendant. This fact is stoutly denied before me by Mr. Pandey, the learned Advocate for the defendant. I am keeping this question open for the decision of the Trial Court after the re-appreciation of the entire evidence.
3. The leave and licence arrangement continued till the year 1965. The last leave and licence agreement in that behalf was executed on 21-6-1964 and it was to expire on 31-3-1965. On 12-4-1965 the plaintiff gave a notice to the defendant informing him about the expiry of the agreement of licence and calling upon him to vacate the premises. Due to the failure on the part of the defendant to comply with the requisition, an ejectment application was filed by the plaintiff against the defendant under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (hereafter, the Act). For the sake of convenience, the said ejectment application shall be hereinafter referred as 1st ejectment application. In the said 1st ejectment application the parties arrived at some kind of compromise and a consent order in that behalf was passed on 17-6-1968. As per the consent order the defendant was directed to give vacant possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff unless he paid the entire arrears of compensation due till 31st May, 1968 in stated instalments. The last instalment of Rs. 800/- was to be paid on 27-3-1969. The consent order clearly shows that if any default was made in such payment the consent order was to become executable and the plaintiff would have been entitled to possession of the suit premises by executing the consent order. It appears that according to the plaintiff the defendant had committed some default and hence in the year 1969 be filed an application for execution of the above mentioned consent order. The Trial Court, it appears, directed the execution to proceed, holding that the default was proved. As against the said order, Special Civil Application No. 1053 of 1969 was filed by the defendant in this Court and the same was allowed by the learned single Judge (Vaidya J.) of this Court on 27-3-1973. The Court held that there was no default committed by the defendant and hence no question of execution arose.
4. We present ejectment application (which will be referred to hereinafter as the second ejectment application) was filed by the plaintiff on 24-7-1973. In the said application the relevant facts out of the above mentioned facts have been mentioned. But in para 6 of the application some unhappy averments were made by stating that the agreement of leave and licence dated 21-6-1964 expired by efflux of time, that the licence was never renewed thereafter, that in any event the licence stood revoked by the filing of the first ejectment application, that there existed no subsisting agreement between the parties thereafter and that the respondent was wrongfully in possession of the premises. The reason why I describe this averment to be somewhat unhappy averment will be mentioned by me presently. The prayer that was made in the said application was that
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