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1978 Supreme(Bom) 75
Bombay High Court
PRATAP
Shafiqus Ahmed - Appellant
Versus
Jayant Metals Corporation Bombay - Respondent
Decided On : 04/14/1978
V.C. Meghani, for Applicant; D.R. Dhanuka, for Opponents.
Distress proceedings can be levied only at the instance of a landlord against his tenant and only for recovery of "rent" strictly so called.
Headnote:
PRESIDENCY SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT, 1882 - Distress proceedings - Distress warrant - Validity - Conditions precedent - Relationship of landlord and tenant - Rent - Meaning and scope - Distress proceedings can be levied only at the instance of a landlord against his tenant and only for recovery of "rent" strictly so called and not at the instance of a licensor against his licencee, much less at the instance of the plaintiffs herein claiming to recover storage charges or fees from the defendant for storage facilities made available to the latter under an oral arrangement between the parties.
Fact of the Case:
Plaintiffs, claiming to be lessees of a portion of an open plot of land, gave a part of the land to the defendant for storage facilities on payment of storage charges. The plaintiffs revoked the licence and called upon the defendant to pay the arrears of storage charges. The defendant did not comply, so the plaintiffs moved the Court of Small Causes at Bombay for a distress warrant against the defendant's moveable properties for recovery of the arrears. Distress was levied against the defendant's goods. The defendant paid the amount of the distress warrant under protest and the goods were released. The defendant applied to the Court to set aside the distress, discharge the warrant and order refund of the monies paid. The trial Court dismissed the application. The defendant challenged the order.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that distress proceedings can be levied only at the instance of a landlord against his tenant and only for recovery of "rent" strictly so called and not at the instance of a licensor against his licencee, much less at the instance of the plaintiffs herein claiming to recover storage charges or fees from the defendant for storage facilities made available to the latter under an oral arrangement between the parties. The Court further held that the word "rent" in Chapter VIII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 should receive only its plain, ordinary, normal, primary and natural meaning. The Court also held that the distress proceedings were illegal as the relationship between the parties was not that of landlord and tenant and the arrears becoming due were not arrears of rent strictly so understood.
Issues: 1. Whether distress proceedings can be levied at the instance of a licensor against his licencee for recovery of storage charges or fees? 2. Whether the word "rent" in Chapter VIII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 should be given a wide or narrow meaning? 3. Whether the distress proceedings in the present case were illegal?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. Distress proceedings can be levied only at the instance of a landlord against his tenant and only for recovery of "rent" strictly so called. This is because the right to distress for arrears of rent is a statutory right exercisable in accordance with the terms of the statute in question. Chapter VIII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 embodies the prevalent law on the subject and constitutes a self-contained statutory code and treatise relating to the right to distress for arrears of rent. 2. The word "rent" in Chapter VIII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 should receive only its plain, ordinary, normal, primary and natural meaning. This is because the intention of the legislature in enacting the statute was to provide a summary remedy for the recovery of rent by a landlord from his tenant. The word "rent" in the statute, therefore, should be construed in a narrow sense, meaning rent payable by a tenant to his landlord for property demised by the landlord to the tenant. 3. The distress proceedings in the present case were illegal because the relationship between the parties was not that of landlord and tenant and the arrears becoming due were not arrears of rent strictly so understood. The plaintiffs were claiming to recover storage charges or fees from the defendant for storage facilities made available to the latter under an oral arrangement between the parties. This arrangement did not create a landlord-tenant relationship between the parties and the storage charges or fees were not rent strictly so called.
Final Decision: The petition was allowed. The order dated September 23, 1977, passed by the trial Court in Distress Warrant No. 236 of 1977 was set aside. The defendant's application challenging the distress proceedings was allowed and the distress proceedings including the distress warrant in question were quashed. The amount with costs deposited under protest by the defendant in compliance with the distress warrant and lying in the trial Court was ordered to be forthwith refunded to him unconditionally.
2. As per the case or the plaintiffs, a portion of an open plot of land of which the plaintiffs claim to be lessees from the Trustees of the Port of Bombay, was, under an oral arrangement, given by the plaintiffs to the defendant for storage facilities on payment of storage charges/compensation at the rate of Rs. 122/- per month. The said licence, also called an arrangement, was revoked by the plaintiffs by notice dated Feb. 12, 1977. By subsequent notice dated June 23, 1977, the plaintiffs called upon the defendant to pay the arrears of storage charges. This notice not being complied with, the plaintiffs moved the Court of Small Causes at Bombay on July 12, 1917, for distress warrant against the moveable properties of the defendant for recovery of Rs. 1,344/-, being the arrears of compensation for the period 1-11-1975 to 31-10-1976 and obtained a warrant addressed to the Bailiff and Appraiser of the Court directing him to distrain the moveable property of the defendant lying on the premises in question for the sum of Rs. 1,344/- and costs of the distress, according to the provisions of Chap. VIII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Distress was accordingly levied on July 18, 1977, against the goods of the defendant lying on the premises in question. On July 15, 1977, the defendant paid, but under protest, the amount of the distress warrant so that the goods may be released. Payment was accepted accordingly by the Court and the attachment was raised. Subsequently, by his application (also described as notice) dated July 29, 1977, and on grounds more particularly mentioned therein in that behalf, the defendant prayed to the Court to set aside the distress, discharge the warrant and order refund of the monies paid. The plaintiffs opposed the said application. The trial Court hearing the matter was pleased, by its order dated Sept. 23, 1977, to dismiss the said application. This petition challenges the legality and validity of the said order.
3. It was contended by Mr. Meghani, the learned Advocate for the defendant, that distress proceedings in Chap. VII of the Act can be levied only at the instance of a landlord against his tenant and only for recovery of "rent" strictly so called and not at the instance of a licensor against his licencee, much less at the instance of the plaintiffs herein claiming to recover storage charges or fees from the defendant for storage facilities made available to the latter under an oral arrangement between the parties. According to him the provisions of Chap. VIII were clear and unambiguous leaving no room for any doubt about its application only to a restricted and specified class of cases. Mr. Dhanuka, the learned Advocate for the plaintiffs, has, on the other hand, contended that Chap. VIII contemplates wide and comprehensive relationships and not necessarily one restricted to that between landlord and tenant strictly so understood. Consequently, the amount recoverable by way of distress can, he contends, be not only rent in its narrower sense but payment in its wider meaning so as to include also storage charges and licence fee, both of which would be compensation within the meaning of the word "rent" in Chap. VIII of the Act. There seems to be no direct authority on this question involved nor is there any set guideline or strait-jacket formula enabling an instant solution. However, on a consideration of the scheme of Chap. VIII and its origin, object and purpose, conclusion clearly emerging t
