The Limitation Act is a Code complete in itself and no Court is entitled to invoke any principle for holding a claim as not barred by Law of Limitation if such a principle is not to be found expressly or by necessary implication in the provisions of the Limitation Act.

MRIDUL, J. :- These two companion appeals arise out of the judgment and decree dated 30th November 1966, rendered in Special Civil Suit No.48 of 1964, filed in the Court of the Civil Judge, Sr. Dn., at Nasik. By the said judgment and decree, the claim of the plaintiff was partially allowed against the defendant.

2. The plaintiff was an employee of the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, (hereinafter referred to as "the said corporation"), and was working as a cashier-cum-reservation clerk. The date of birth of the plaintiff being 24th October 1905, under the rules of the corporation, the plaintiff was liable to retire on 24th October 1963. The plaintiff, however, was dismissed by the Corporation on 15th July 1953. Aggrieved by the dismissal, the plaintiff filed a Regular Civil Suit No.257 of 1957 on 14th March 1957, inter alia claiming a declaration that the order of dismissal was wrong and for consequential reliefs. The said suit was dismissed by the learned trial Judge on 26th August 1959. In appeal preferred therefrom, the appellate Court by its judgment and decree dated 12th December 1961, decreed the plaintiff's suit. It gave a declaration in favour of the plaintiff that he continued to be in service till the date of the filing of the said suit i.e. till 14th March 1957. The appellate Court also granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff for arrears of salary and certain other incidental charges and costs of the suit. The matter did not rest there. The unsuccessful Corporation sought to have the appellate decree reviewed in appeal by this Court by preferring a Second Appeal being Appeal No.440 of 1962. This Court, however, by its judgment and decree dated 9th January 1964, dismissed the said Second Appeal, subject to a variation in the decree of the appellate Court as to the amount of arrears of pay. The said variation, however, is not material for the purposes of the present appeal.

3. The plaintiff filed the present suit being Special Suit No.48 of 1964, inter alia for recovering a sum of Rs. 24,324-02 ps., being the amount payable to him as arrears of pay, provident fund, gratuity, bonus and other benefits as an employee of the Corporation. In the alternative, the plaintiff prayed for accounts in respect of the said claims. Several issues were raised before the learned Judge. Having regard to the limited controversy that is raised before us, it is unnecessary to notice all the issues or the findings relating thereto. Suffice it to observe, that the learned Judge passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 5,963-13 ps. being the emoluments for the period of 3 years prior to the date of the suit. The learned Judge did not grant to the plaintiff arrears prior to the three years from the date of the suit. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the Corporation filed the abovementioned First Appeal No.381 of 1967. The plaintiff also preferred an appeal being the abovementioned First Appeal No.617 or 1969, challenging the refusal of the learned Judge to grant him his claim over and above the one which was decreed in his favour.

4. Shri C.J. Sawant, the learned counsel for the Corporation, assails the decree on the ground that the suit was barred under the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act and the Rules framed thereunder. This challenge is based upon fact that the plaintiff had preferred an application under the said Act and the said application was pending in the Court of the Joint Civil Judge, Sr. Dn., Nasik. The learned Judge has in paragraph 24 of his judgment dealt with the said contention exhaustively. After noticing the relevant provisions of law, the learned Judge answered the issues against the Corporation. We have carefully analysed the discussion of the learned Judge and we do not find any infirmity in the reasoning of the learned Judge. We are also of the opinion that having regard to the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act and the facts and circumstances of the instant