The acquisition of land for the purpose of providing house sites to landless laborers is a 'public purpose' as contemplated by Section 4 (1) or Section 17 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

DHARMADHIKARI, J.:- In Special Civil Application No. 1766 of 1975 as also in the other petitions which were heard along with this Special Civil Application, so far as the common questions of law are concerned, the State Government is acquiring lands belonging to the petitioners as the same are needed or are likely to be needed for the public purpose, namely, providing house sites to landless labourers. It further appears from the notifications issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, referred to hereinafter as the Act, that as the Additional Commissioner, Nagpur was of the opinion that the acquisition of the lands is urgently necessary, he directed under sub-section (4) of Section 17 that the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act shall not apply in respect of the said lands. A schedule is attached to each of the notifications issued under Section 4 of the Act giving details about the landed property. Thereafter in some cases notifications under Section 6 of the Act are issued, whereas in Special Civil Application No. 1389 of 1975 a notice under Section 4 (1) of the Act is issued to the land-holder and it is at that stage he has approached this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India praying for a writ of certiorari for quashing the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act. In some other Special Civil Applications notifications under Section 6 of the Act are issued directing the Land Acquisition Officer to take recourse to the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Act so as to enable him to take possession of the lands needed for public purpose, on expiration of 15 days from the publication of the notice mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Act. Therefore, in some of the petitions, which are pending for hearing, in pursuance of such a direction after issuing a notice under Section 9 (1) of the Act, the Land Acquisition Officer was taking necessary steps for taking possession and at this stage the petitioners have approached this Court for a writ of certiorari or mandamus under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.

2. As the main questions involved in all these petitions were common, the counsel appearing in all these writ Petitions were heard on two main questions, namely, (1) As to whether the acquisition of the lands for the purpose of providing house sites to the landless labourers is "a public purpose" as contemplated by Section 4 (1) or Section 17 (1) of the Act ? and (2) as to whether the Additional Commissioner was right in exercising his power under sub-section (4) of Section 17 in dispensing with the enquiry contemplated by Section 5-A of the Act.

3. Shri V.M. Kulkarni, the learned counsel for the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 1389 of 1975 contended before us that giving sites to landless labourers is not a "public purpose", as in substance the land is being acquired by the Government for providing house sites to named individuals. He further contended that the benefit arising out of the present acquisition proceedings is being given to the named individuals, namely, the landless labourers as per the list attached to the proposal. The general public as such is neither being benefited, nor providing the house sites to the landless labourers is in the interest of general public or a community as a whole. He further contended that the Additional Commissioner has further committed an error in exercising his power under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act, when in fact there was no real urgency for acquiring the land for providing the house sites to the landless labourers.

4. Shri Udhoji, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 1486 of 1975, adopted the argument advanced by Shri V.M. Kulkarni and contended that the present purpose for which the land is being acquired is not covered by the expression "public purpose" as defined by Section 3 (f) of the Act. He further contended t