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1966 Supreme(Bom) 100

Bombay High Court
PATEL
Kanji Karsandas Thakkar - Appellant
Versus
Lala Ambu Patil - Respondent
Decided On : 12/19/1966

Advocates:
V. V. Divekar, for Applicant; G. N. Vaidya, for Opponent.

A dispute as to possession of the property purchased at an execution sale does not relate to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree.

Headnote:

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE - ORDER 21, RULE 95 - APPEAL - COMPETENCY - AUCTION-PURCHASER - WHETHER A PARTY TO THE SUIT - EXPLANATION TO SECTION 47 - SCOPE - POSSESSION OF PROPERTY PURCHASED AT EXECUTION SALE - WHETHER RELATES TO EXECUTION, DISCHARGE OR SATISFACTION OF DECREE.

Fact of the Case:

The plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of monetary dues from the defendant. After a decree was made, a Darkhast was filed for sale of the property. The property was sold in execution proceedings and purchased by the plaintiff. The defendant took an appeal to the District Court and it was dismissed. The plaintiff filed an application for possession, which was granted by the trial Court. The defendant filed an application for recalling of the order on the ground that the application was barred by limitation. The trial Court held that Article 134 did not apply, but Article 137 applied and confirmed its earlier order. The defendant took an appeal to the District Court, but the appeal was dismissed. The defendant filed a second appeal to the High Court.

Finding of the Court:

The High Court held that the second appeal was incompetent. The Court held that the dispute as to possession of the property purchased at the execution sale could not be regarded as a matter connected with the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. The Court also held that the amendment to Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code, which added the explanation that a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree is deemed to be a party to the suit, was not intended to affect the principle that a dispute as to possession of the property purchased at the execution sale does not relate to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree.

Issues: Whether a second appeal is competent in a dispute as to possession of the property purchased at an execution sale.

Ratio Decidendi: A dispute as to possession of the property purchased at an execution sale does not relate to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, an auction-purchaser is not a party to the suit for the purpose of Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code, and a second appeal is not competent in such a dispute.

Final Decision: The second appeal was dismissed.

ORDER :- This is an appeal against an order made under Order 21, Rule 95 of the Civil Procedure Code. The short facts are that a suit was filed by the plaintiff for recovery of his monetary dues from the defendant, being Suit No. 340 of 1952. After a decree was made in that suit, a Darkhast was filed, being Darkhast No. 440 of 1957 for sale of the property. This Darkhast was filed on November 17, 1960. The property was sold in execution proceedings and it was purchased by the plaintiff and the sale was finally confirmed on February 24, 1961. The defendant-appellant took an appeal to the District Court and it was dismissed on January 29, 1962. The present application for possession was filed on January 29, 1965, the trial Court directed possession to be delivered. Then the defendant made an application for recalling of the order on the ground that the present application was barred by limitation. The contention was that the new Limitation Act of 1963 had come into force on January 1, 1964, and the period provided for recovery of possession by a purchaser at an execution sale is one year from the date title sale became absolute. The trial Court held that Article 134 did not apply, but Article 137 applied and confirmed its earlier order. The defendant took an appeal to the District Court but the District Court relying upon the decision in Hargovind Fulchand v. Bhudar Raoji, 26 Bom LR 601 : (AIR 1924 Bom 429) (FB), held that the appeal was not competent under Section 47. The learned Judge, therefore dismissed the appeal. Originally, this appeal was filed as an appeal from order, but at the time of the admission, Mr. Divekar got it converted into a second appeal.

2. Mr. Divekar contends that the matter falls squarely within Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code and, therefore, a second appeal is competent. Originally, there was a conflict whether or not an auction-purchaser could be regarded as a party to the suit in relation to some disputes which arise between the parties. Some Court held that as he purchases the property in the sale in execution, he may as well be regarded as a party to the suit since he takes the property of the judgement-debtor and if the question arising in the dispute between him and any of the parties related to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, then it must be decided under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. On the other hand, quite a few other Courts took the view that an auction-purchaser could not be regarded as a representative of the judgement-debtor and as such a party to the suit. By the amendment to Section 47 of the Code, the explanation was added, by which it was provided, amongst other things, that a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree is deemed to be a party to the suit. Mr. Divekar contends that the question in issue now between the parties., that is recovery of possession by the auction-purchaser, relates to at least execution of the decree and, therefore, as the auction-purchaser is party under the explanation to Section 47, the order of the trial Court must be regarded as an order under Section 47 and, therefore, appealable as such.

3. In my view, the contention is not sound. There were several kinds of disputes raised on the entry of an auction-purchaser which could be regarded as relating to the satisfaction, discharge or execution of the decree, and yet could not be tried under Section 47, C.P. Code, because some Courts held that an auction-purchaser could not be regarded as a party to the suit, and it is only, in my view, in order to resolve this conflict that the amendment of the section was brought about. In order, however, that this explanation should apply, the disputes between the parties must be such as relate to execution, satisfaction or discharge of the decree. The present dispute as to possession of the property which the auction-purchaser has purchased can in no sense be regarded as a matter connected with the execution, discharge or satisfa









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