SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

2010 Supreme(Bom) 721

High Court of Judicature at Bombay
MR. JUSTICE A.M. KHANWILKAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R.M. SAVANT
Nouveaw Exports Private Limited
Versus
Appellate Authority For Industrial Industrial & Financial Reconstruction Co. & Others
WRIT PETITION NO. 2079 OF 2010
Decided on: 19-05-2010

Advocates Appeared:For the Petitioner:Janak Dwarkadas, senior counsel, S. Jagtiani, Shiraj Dhruv and Aditya Hegde i/b M/s. Dhru & Co., Advocates. For the Respondents:R3 & R4, Ms. Jyoti Singh with Ms. Mrudula Khedekar i/b M/s. Dhir & Dhir Associates, R5, S.P. Thorat, R6 & R7, Aspi Chinoy with Z.A. Jariwala, Vikram Mehta i/b M/s. Thakore Jariwala & Associates, Advocates.

Headnote:Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 - Section 13(4) - Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, Section 15(1) - Declaration as to sick company - Claimed by secured creditor - Reference pending before BIFR for revival of company-respondent-3 - During pendency of proceedings, respondent-5, Bank invoked remedy under Act, 2002 - Movable and immovable properties of respondent-3, company sold in public auction - Sale confirmed by DRT - Possession of property handed over to respondent-7 - Petitioner claiming business agreement with respondent-3, company, sought direction from BIFR to allow to remove their stock, equipments and machinery - Rejected by BIFR - Appeal against rejected by AIFR - Challenged - Held - No question of finding fault with action taken by respondent-5-Bank of invoking remedy under Section 13 of Act, 2002 - Said action protected by third proviso to Section 15(1) of Act, 1985 - Writ petition dismissed. - In Court opinion, what is significant to consider is to examine the efficacy of the third proviso to Section 15(1) of the Act of 1985. On bare perusal of the said provision, it is seen that it is in the nature of carving out exception to the general category of cases referred to in Section 22 of the Act of 1985. The fact that company has already been declared as sick company or that the Board has propounded a scheme and which is being implemented, does not take the matter any further and will have no impact on the exception provided in the third proviso to Section 15(1) of the Act. The reference even at the stage of implementation of the scheme, for all purposes, will have to be treated as pending before the Board and more particularly in the context of the third proviso to Section 15(1) of the Act of 1985. Ordinarily, if the scheme is framed under the provisions of Act of 1985, that would bind all the creditors in terms of Section 18(8) of that Act. But, once the secured creditors representing not less than three fourth in value of the amount outstanding against the financial assistance disbursed take measures to recover their secured debt, under Section 13(4) of the Securitisation Act, the reference would abate. With abatement of the reference, the scheme will have no legal effect whatsoever and thus, cannot continue to bind the specified class of secured creditors, who have invoked the provisions of the Securitisation Act. In absence of provision, such as the third proviso to Section 15(1) of the Act of 1985, it would have been possible to contend that upon framing of the scheme under Section 18 of the Act of 1985, the secured creditor would be bound by the same and cannot resort to any other action without the consent of the Board. But the third proviso under Section 15(1) of the Act of 1985 relieves the specified strength of secured creditors from that shackle and permits them to pursue their remedy under the provisions of Securitisation Act, which have been introduced as a special enactment to further the cause of financial sector and the financial institutions to which the same is applicable. Suffice it to observe that the above position is reinforced from the provisions and in particular the third proviso to Section 15(1) read with Section 22 of the Act of 1985 itself. Thus, Section 37 of the Securitisation Act cannot be pressed into service to whittle down the sweep of the third proviso to Section 15(1) of the Act of 1985.

Judgment :-

A.M. Khanwilkar, J.


1. Heard counsel for the parties.


2. This Petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, takes exception to the order passed by the Appellate Authority for Industrial & Financial Reconstruction, New Delhi, dated 13th January, 2010, whereby the prayer for interim relief during the pendency of Appeal preferred by the Petitioner has been rejected. The Petitioner, by the said Appeal, had questioned the correctness of the order passed by the Board For Industrial And Financial Construction (BIFR) dated 7th January, 2009.


3. Briefly stated, the question that arises for our consideration is in the context of the fact that the Respondent No.5-bank claims to be the sole secured creditor of the Respondent No.3-borrower. The Reference was pending before the BIFR for revival of the Respondent No.3-company. During the pendency of the said proceedings, the Respondent No.5-bank invoked remedy under the provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short “Securitisation Act”) and proceeded with the sale of properties of Respondent No.3. Consequent thereto, the movable and immovable properties in Respondent No.3-company were sold in public auction as back as in July, 2008. That sale has been confirmed by the DRT and possession of the said property has also been made over to the Respondent No.7. These facts are not disputed. However, the Petitioner, claiming to have business conducting agreement executed by the Respondent No.3-company in its favour and also in the capacity of one of the unsecured creditor, moved the BIFR for a direction against the Respondent No.5-bank not to proceed with the further steps under the Securitisation Act; and stay the implementation of the proposed actions to be taken by the bank. Further, it was prayed that the Respondent No.5-bank and the Respondent No.3-company should allow the representatives of the Petitioner to enter the Vashi Plant and remove their stock, equipments and machinery etc. Further relief is claimed in the said application against Respondent No.3-company to disclose to BIFR and the Petitioner, the details and the status of the securitisation application that was filed by the Respondent No.3-company in the DRT, whereby the action initiated by the Respondent No.5-bank was subject matter of challenge. This application preferred by the Petitioner was rejected by the BIFR on 7th January, 2009. Even though this order is relevant, has not been annexed to the Petition. But, copy of the said order has been handed over to us across the bar. The BIFR has taken the view that since the sale has already been completed and action under Section 13(4) of the Act of 2002 has been taken to its logical end and also upheld by the DRT, the Board has lost its jurisdiction over the company’s case. It is this decision of the BIFR which has been challenged in Appeal before the AIFR. During the pendency of the said Appeal, interim relief was prayed to direct the Respondents to maintain status quo with regard to the company’s property till the disposal of the Appeal. This prayer has been considered by the Appellate Authority in the impugned judgment. The Appellate Authority has declined to grant any interim protection to the Petitioner for the reasons recorded in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the impugned decision. The substance of the reason is that the sale in favour of the Respondent No.7 has been concluded long back and because the action under section 13(4) has been taken to its logical end, it was not open to interdict that process and moreso because the BIFR proceedings have abated.


4. The argument canvassed before us is essentially founded on the mandate of Section 22 of The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. It was argued that the proceeding resorted to by the Respondent No.5-bank were covered by the sweep of Section 22 of the Act of 1985 and, therefore, the same could not have pro

























































































Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon telegram-icon
whatsapp-icon Back to top