Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith.

Heard by consent of parties.

2. The respondent No.2- complainant is common in all these cases. In Writ Petition Nos.1342/2010 to 1348/2010, the complaint has been filed by the complainant for the offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (“N.I.Act” for short) against M/s.Elite International Pvt.Ltd. of which the present petitioner is Director, and as such arrayed as accused in the complaint.

3. In Writ Petition No.2033/2010 with Writ Petition Nos.2035 to 2041/2010 the complaint has been filed by the complainant against M/s.Vedic Cotton Limited. It is the allegation of the complainant that the petitioner herein is a Director of accused No.1. However, it is disputed by the petitioner contending that the petitioner had resigned on 11th September 2008. However, in view of the view that I am taking in the present matter, I do not find it necessary to go into that controversy.

4. The basic contention of the petitioners is that the petitioners are sought to be implicated in the complaint by invoking provision of vicarious liability under section 141 of the N.I.Act. It is contended that the averments necessary for fastening the petitioners with criminal liability under section 141 as mandated by the Apex Court in various pronouncements have not been made in the complaint and, as such, the complaint is liable to be quashed.

5. Shri Kotwal, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that merely alleging that the Director was in-charge of the affairs of the company at the relevant time is not sufficient enough to fasten a vicarious liability upon a Director of the company unless a specific role of such a Director is placed on record of the complaint. Learned counsel relies on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of S.M.S.Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, 2005 (8) SCC 89 : 2005 AIR 3512 (SC); N.K.Wahi v. Shekhar Singh, (2007) 9 SCC 481; Ramrajsingh v. State of M.P., 2009 (6) SCC 729; and National Small Industries Corpn.Ltd. v. Harmeet Singh Paintal, (2010) 3 SCC 330.

6. Shri Yashpal Thakur, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.2, on the contrary, submits that the averments necessary to implicate the Director have been made in the complaint. He submits that the learned single Judge of this Court (Kanade, J.) in the case of Mrs.Pooja Ravinder Devidasani v. State of Maharashtra (Criminal Writ Petition No.614/2010 along with other writ petitions decided on 6th October 2010), who was also the Director of M/s.Elite International Pvt.Ltd., has held that the averments made in the complaint were sufficient enough to fasten the liability upon the Director and to proceed further with the case against the said Director under section 138 of the N.I.Act. He submits that the averments made in the present case are identical with the averments in the said cases. He submits that the learned single Judge of this Court while considering all the judgments of the Apex Court, on the issue, has taken the said view and, therefore, on this short ground the present petitions are also liable to be dismissed. Learned counsel also relies on the judgment of the same learned single Judge in the case of Rajiv Banga v. L & T Finance Company Ltd. (Criminal Writ Petition No.1238/2010 decided on 3rd December 2010) and the recent judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Rallys India Ltd. v. Poduru Vidya Bhusan (Criminal Appeal No.924/2011 decided on 13th April 2011). He submits that the Apex Court in the said case has found that the averments like the one, made in the present complaint, were sufficient enough to proceed against the director or the partner of the company, in view of the provisions of section 141 of the N.I.Act. He, therefore, submits that the said judgment, which is the last word of the Apex Court, would bind this Court and, in view of the said judgment, this Court should dismiss the present petitions.

7. Section 141 of the N.I.Act reads thus:

“141